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Organizational incentives and structures play a crucial role in realizing explorative and exploitative innovations in firms. Existing studies have neglected the role of trade-off mechanisms between the two on innovation ambidexterity. This study aims to investigate these trade-off mechanisms and their position on innovation ambidexterity.

Given the limited theoretical understanding, the authors conducted a case study with a sample of two Chinese firms with abundant interview and secondary data.

The results show that firms can develop innovation ambidexterity at two levels, namely, the time and space levels, using incentive synergy as well as organizational structures. Furthermore, the authors explain the role of the trade-off between incentive synergy and organizational structure in promoting a balance between explorative and exploitative innovation.

The authors propose trade-off mechanisms between incentive synergy and organizational structure and explore how trade-off mechanisms can play a role in promoting a balance of explorative and exploitative innovation at both time and space levels.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the contribution of organizational intelligence quotient (OIQ) and organizational emotional quotient (OEQ) for intelligent organizations.

This paper develops a framework of OIQ and OEQ, based on the structure of intellectual capital (intellectual capital). Then, a specific questionnaire is designed and sent to ten national research institutes in China. Data from nine of them are analyzed as case study samples.

Data show that intelligent organizations are related with high OIQ as well as high OEQ. In the case of average-intelligent organizations, even if around high-IQ employees, “collective stupidity” caused by the failure of synergy of structural capital is the major gap to be a smart organization, just like a football team grouped by brilliant players always loses due to the dearth of coordination. OEQ, or the synergy between structural capital and human capital, is the critical point to avoid collective stupidity for organizations with intelligent employees.

Research results are based on case study in a particular country. Measurement tools for OIQ and OEQ are in bound of the IC concept.

The paper helps organizations to find out the critical problems causing collective stupidity in a changing environment.

Analogic to human beings’ intelligence, this paper develops a frame of OIQ and OEQ, and compares their contribution to intelligent organization building in a changing environment.

Promoting technological innovation is important to address the complexity of major engineering challenges. Technological innovations include short-term innovations at the project level and long-term innovations that can enhance competitive advantages. The purpose of this study is to develop an incentive mechanism for the public sector that considers short-term and long-term efforts from the private sector, aiming to promote technological innovation in major engineering projects.

This study constructs an incentive model considering the differences in short-term and long-term innovation efforts from the private sector. This model emphasizes the spillover effect of long-term efforts on current projects and the cost synergy effect between short-term and long-term efforts. It also explores the factors influencing the optimal incentive strategies for the public sector and innovation strategies for the private sector.

The results indicate that increasing the output coefficient of short-term and long-term efforts and reducing the cost coefficient not only enhance the innovation efforts of the private sector but also prompt the public sector to increase the incentive coefficient. The spillover effect of long-term innovation efforts and the synergy effect of the two efforts are positively related to the incentive coefficient for the public sector.

This research addresses the existing gap in understanding how the public sector should devise incentive mechanisms for technological innovation when contractors acting as the private sector are responsible for construction within a public-private partnership (PPP) model. In constructing the incentive mechanism model, this study incorporates the private sector's short-term efforts at the project level and their long-term efforts for sustained corporate development, thus adding considerable practical significance.

The purpose of this article is to understand synergies in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions.

Provides excerpts from the forthcoming book Synergies: The Art and Science of Making 2+2=5 by Bill Pursche.

The six most common mistakes that acquiring executives make are: defining synergies too narrowly or broadly; missing the window of opportunity; incorrect or insufficient use of incentives; not having the right people involved in synergy capture; mismatch between culture and systems; and using the wrong process.

This paper is a new approach to capturing the value of synergies in M&A, aimed at executives throughout the M&A process.

In this paper we analyze the influence of transaction costs on the stock market reaction to global alliance formation. In particular, we analyze to what extent the stock market reacts negatively to the presence of attributes that increase motivation or coordination costs. We adopt a relational framework, analyzing the direct impact of these attributes not only on transaction costs but also on the potential synergies of the alliance and the incentives to invest in the relationship. Our results show that the stock market reacts negatively to transaction costs only in connection with free riding hazards.

This paper aims to systematically examine the key notion of integration of non-market and market strategies in the increasingly popular study of corporate non-market strategies.

This paper is based on a brief literature review of the non-market strategy (NMS) research that shows the existing literature does not offer a clear and systematic account of the key notion of integration. It suggests any systematic account of integration should address at least three interrelated questions, i.e. why, what and how to integrate non-market and market strategies?

For the why question, the authors use a formal model to demonstrate that the essence of the most important type of integration synergy lies in the positive spillover or externality from non-market to market strategies. For the what question, the authors identify the contents of integration at three levels, i.e. the level of non-market environment analysis, the level of NMS choice, and the level of non-market dynamic interactions. For the how question, the authors argue that the combination of non-market and market strategies should be seamless in terms of horizontal, vertical and intentional coordination. Overall, the authors argue, only when the right contents are combined and seamlessly coordinated will there be high synergies from integration of non-market and market strategies.

Managers are advised to give non-market strategies full attention. Managers charged with non-market tasks should explore how to seamlessly coordinate non-market and market strategies in order to gain maximal synergies.

This paper is the first to examine the key notion of integration in a systematic manner. It is the first to propose a three-question solution to systematic understanding of the notion and the first to propose the seamless coordination concept and its associated three aspects of seamless coordination.

The purpose of the paper was to investigate the role of fiscal incentives in driving foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the Ghanaian economy based on data from 1975 to 2017 with the Eclectic paradigm as the theoretical basis. FDI inflows was the dependent variable whiles trade openness, corporate tax rate, exchange rate and market size were the independent variables with corporate tax rate as the main explanatory variable of interest.

The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test technique was employed to investigate Cointegration in the model. The results showed the presence of cointegration among the variables.

The results revealed that corporate tax rates have a significant negative impact on FDI inflows into the Ghanaian economy in the long run and significant positive impact on FDI inflows in the short run. In the context of Ghana, the positive short-run relationship observed is attributed to the lag effect of tax policy on FDI inflows.

One obvious limitation of the research is that, it does not identify the specific foreign businesses that are more deserving of a low corporate rate and to what extent can that boost FDI inflows in Ghana. Another limitation is that the data analyzed in the paper is exclusively for Ghana and the findings may not be generalized for other countries.

Based on the research findings, it is recommended that the Ghana Revenue Service (GRA) restructures the corporate tax regime in the country to deal with the policy lapses. It is also recommended that low corporate rates should be maintained especially in respect of foreign companies that are into the production of goods and services for which indigenous companies in Ghana have a comparative disadvantage in order to drive FDI into the Ghanaian economy.

This paper is unique for providing up to date and dynamic insights into the tax incentive and FDI nexus in the Ghanaian context.

According to TCE, different forms of economic organization – markets, hierarchies, hybrid forms of various kinds, etc. – are characterized by different “syndromes of attributes,” or coherent sets of features (Williamson, 1991). Because each form of organization implements a distinctive set of governance features, each is efficient for a different type of transaction, implying trade-offs among the forms. The two key categories of features are the allocation of decision-making authority among and within firms and the intensity of the incentives facing firms and members of them. By concentrating decision-making authority, hierarchies have the benefit of facilitating “cooperative adaptation”; that is, coordinated change among two or more parties. Adaptation to new economic circumstances is, after all, the main function of an economic system (Hayek, 1945). Hierarchies are said to facilitate cooperative adaptation better than markets because unlike for markets, courts will not intervene in internal disputes and fiat is available as a last resort. This leaves more scope for the management hierarchy to use its authority to promote cooperative adaptation to unanticipated circumstances (Williamson, 1975, 1991). On the other hand, hierarchies feature weaker incentive intensity, that is, weaker links between individual or unit performance and individual or unit reward. This is because market-like levels of incentive intensity would inhibit cooperative adaptation by stimulating “autonomous adaptation” instead. Autonomous adaptation refers to adaptation by individual firms or organizational members that occurs without regard to its effects on other parties. Williamson (1985) also argues that market-like incentives lack credibility within hierarchies due to the ultimate availability of fiat. Thus, for TCE, the most fundamental trade-off between various forms of internal organization is between cooperative adaptation and incentive intensity.

Building on economic and psychological ownership theories, this study investigates whether group incentives can reduce shirking because these practices enable employees to feel psychological ownership that motivates them to prevent their own and coworkers shirking in a collective work setting. We analyzed a sample of 38,475 employees in eight companies that participated in the survey administered by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in 2005. Our findings reveal that (1) short-term-oriented group incentives (STOGIs) and long-term-oriented group incentives (LTOGIs) are positively related to self-shirking regulation and coworker-shirking intervention; (2) STOGIs have stronger relationships with these anti-shirking outcomes than LTOGIs; and (3) the interaction between LTOGIs and formal training is positively related to these anti-shirking outcomes. Although some scholars are concerned about the free rider problem in the collective working and rewarding structure, our work demonstrates how and why employee shirking may be mitigated in such settings.

This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies.

This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the articles in context.

Firms can struggle to be both established and innovative, needing different approaches to resource use and risk taking when attempting to keep market share and disrupt new markets.

The briefing saves busy executives, strategists and researchers hours of reading time by selecting only the very best, most pertinent information and presenting it in a condensed and easy-to-digest format.