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Even the smartest organizations believe that “good enough is never good enough.” Highly intelligent people may be able to do important things individually; still, it is their accumulated brainpower that allows them to do great things. Collective intelligence means when a group of people do things that seem intelligent. On the other hand, when intelligent people are gathered or hired in an organization, they tend toward collective stupidity and slow-wittedness. Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to develop a model of the factors affecting and affected by collective stupidity.

This study was conducted using a mixed-method approach and in two phases: qualitative and quantitative. First, in the qualitative phase and in order to achieve new findings, semi-structured interviews with experts from 12 knowledge-based companies were used to design a conceptual model and formulate the hypotheses. At the end of the qualitative phase, the conceptual model and relationships between variables were drawn. Then, in the quantitative phase, by running structural equation modeling, the antecedents and consequences of collective stupidity derived from the qualitative phase findings were analyzed and the research hypotheses were tested in 110 industrial knowledge-based companies.

The results of the qualitative phase revealed that individual, group and organizational factors were the antecedents of collective stupidity, with individual factors having three dimensions, collective ones including two dimensions and organizational ones focusing on the characteristics of managers/companies. It was also found that collective stupidity had individual consequences in three dimensions and organizational consequences in five dimensions; and one-sidedness, non-strategic thinking, organizational injustice and weakness in the management of key personnel were extracted as mediators. The results of the quantitative phase confirmed the research model and showed that individual factors and organizational consequences had the lowest (0.037) and highest (1.084) effect sizes on collective stupidity, respectively.

The study of the phenomenon in a particular context and the difficulty of generalizing the findings to other situations, the small size of the study population due to the disproportionate number of experts to the total staff in the qualitative phase, and the limited participation of experts due to the negative nature of the issue in the quantitative phase. Taking advantage of the diversity of experts' mental abilities through equipping the organization with tools for recognizing collective stupidity, improving collective decision-making, enhancing the efficiency of think tanks and organizational prosperity in the age of knowledge economy, preventing damage to the body of knowledge of the company and reducing social loafing can be the main operational implications of this study.

Using a mixed-method approach for analyzing the antecedents and consequences of collective stupidity in this study and examining such a phenomenon in a knowledge-based organizational context and its implementation in a developing country can be among the innovations of the present research. By following a few studies conducted in this field in addition to the organizational pathology of the phenomenon using a fundamental method, this study obtained deep results on how to make the maximum use of experts’ capacities. This was to the extent that in all of the three sections, i.e. the antecedents and consequences of collective stupidity, a new factor emerged.

In 1967, Robert N. Bellah famously argued that there existed an “American Civil Religion,” which was distinct from churchly religion and captured the “transcendental” dimension of the American project. In this chapter, I revisit the civil religion concept and reconstruct it along more Weberian lines. Specifically, I argue that the civil religion tradition is one of three competing traditions for thinking about the proper relationship between religion and politics in America; the other two are religious nationalism and liberal secularism. Whereas liberal secularism envisions a complete separation of the religious and political value spheres, and religious nationalism longs for their (re)unification, civil religion aims for a mediating position of partial separation and productive tension. Following Bellah, I argue that the two central strands of the civil religion tradition have been covenant theology and civic republicanism. The body of the chapter sketches out the development of the tradition across a series of national foundings and refoundings, focusing on the writings of leading civil theologians from John Winthrop and John Adams through Abraham Lincoln and John Dewey to Martin King and Barack Obama. The conclusion advances a normative argument for American civil religion – and against liberal secularism and religious nationalism. I contend that liberalism is highly inclusive but insufficiently solidaristic; that religious nationalism is highly solidaristic but insufficiently inclusive; and that only civil religion strikes a proper balance between individual autonomy and the common good.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the contribution of organizational intelligence quotient (OIQ) and organizational emotional quotient (OEQ) for intelligent organizations.

This paper develops a framework of OIQ and OEQ, based on the structure of intellectual capital (intellectual capital). Then, a specific questionnaire is designed and sent to ten national research institutes in China. Data from nine of them are analyzed as case study samples.

Data show that intelligent organizations are related with high OIQ as well as high OEQ. In the case of average-intelligent organizations, even if around high-IQ employees, “collective stupidity” caused by the failure of synergy of structural capital is the major gap to be a smart organization, just like a football team grouped by brilliant players always loses due to the dearth of coordination. OEQ, or the synergy between structural capital and human capital, is the critical point to avoid collective stupidity for organizations with intelligent employees.

Research results are based on case study in a particular country. Measurement tools for OIQ and OEQ are in bound of the IC concept.

The paper helps organizations to find out the critical problems causing collective stupidity in a changing environment.

Analogic to human beings’ intelligence, this paper develops a frame of OIQ and OEQ, and compares their contribution to intelligent organization building in a changing environment.

This chapter introduces the concept of an intelligent organization in the context of the twenty-first-century knowledge economy. An intelligent organization is one in which individuals behave intelligently, work is grounded in intelligent methods and choices, and rich stocks of intelligence in the form of knowledge capital to support intelligence work and choices. Intelligence is defined as both a thing and attribute and behavior and way of working. The chapter also highlights examples of intelligent behaviors and or organizational pathologies. The chapter also highlights the importance of becoming aware of intelligent and unintelligent choices.

This study explores the effects of different structures of accountability on the development of groupthink. Specifically, the differences between individual and collective accountability are examined and contrasted to a condition with no accountability. The groupthink phenomenon can be differentiated into collective avoidance, arising from a pessimistic perception of a decisional issue, and collective overoptimism. It is argued that structures of accountability can either promote or reduce groupthink, depending upon the way group members perceive the decisional issue. We tested the hypothesis that accountability can prevent the collective‐avoidance type of groupthink, and that individual accountability will be more effective in doing so than collective accountability, by preventing the possibility to “hide in the crowd.” The results confirm that under conditions conducive to collective avoidance, individual accountability is more effective in reducing groupthink‐like tendencies than collective accountability. However, group members expecting to be collectively responsible still display less symptoms of groupthink than control groups. In particular, accountability makes groups display more difficulty to reach consensus, stimulates group members to try to influence the decision making, results in a more equal dispersion of influence within the group, and in less risky decisions. Some methodological concerns regarding research on groupthink and accountability, and the implications of the findings for future research in this area are discussed.

An Innocent Merriment – A Medieval Song about the Plague also sheds light on the COVID-19 epidemic period as an epidemic song. Companies are not in solidarity; they are trying to replace artificial intelligence with labour. Short work, more rest, more time for children, strong immune system, happy families are easier with artificial intelligence. Using artificial intelligence against labour condemns us to collective stupidity. The slogan of capitalism has been discussed in the prime centres of globalisation. For the financial centre, globalisation is the unimpeded circulation of money across borders, the transfer of its earnings whenever it wants, and not encountering national barriers. Now it is said that there should be customs for goods and a mobility barrier for people. People will not accept this without injuring their conscience. The Wat Tyler rebellion, which erupted after the Black Death following the Great Famine, was the birth pain of the bourgeoisie. The war against the mystical, irrational world of the Middle Ages strengthened the bourgeoisie. The irrational ideas of the bourgeoisie, which today emulate the aristocracy with admiration, open the way for despots; the bourgeoisie is almost preparing its own end. The bourgeoisie led the great transformations by preaching respect for labour in the footsteps of thinkers such as Wat Tyler, A. Smith, J. Locke. However, the leadership cannot be sustained with the feudal capitalist mood: ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’ is still alive, except for the leader! The understanding of ‘the better always can be in a shorter time’ in the economy made humanity unhappy and filled its time. Based on the household economy, the environmentally friendly core economy can be a solution by opening the door to street workers and disadvantaged groups, as the flood of solidarity in every corner of our planet adds strength and morale to our resilience.

Contemporary organizations with multinational business activities must strive to achieve strategic responsiveness to thrive and survive as they operate across a highly dynamic and complex global business environment. Here we emphasize the importance of combining the slow analytical strategy processes at headquarters with the fast autonomous responses taken by frontline agents in the subsidiaries in view of the changing conditions. New business developments are observed first in the fast activities around the multinational periphery where updated experiences from ongoing responses create useful insights that can be used strategically if management at headquarters is cognizant about its existence and able to collect this information. We introduce the notion of democratizing the strategic engagement of managers and employees at all levels and locations of the multinational corporation (MNC) as an essential leadership paradigm. The implied interaction between slow central analytical reasoning at headquarters and updated insights from fast decentralized initiatives in local subsidiaries constitutes an effective dynamic responsive mechanism. This dynamic interaction implies that critical strategic decisions made in the MNC must be informed by the diverse updated insights of managers and employees operating on the corporate frontlines tapping into the crowd wisdom readily available in and around the organization.

This article aims to trace the historical development of the behavioral strategy (BS) field, which implements psychology in strategic management. Mainly, it provides a contextual understanding of how this stream of research has historically evolved and what relevant future trajectories are. This work is part of the “over half a century of Management Decision” celebrative and informal Journal section.

We consider BS literature produced in management decision (MD), the oldest and longest-running scholarly publication in management, as a proxy for the evolution of management thought. Through a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) process, we collected – via the MD website and Scopus – a sample of 97 BS articles published in MD from its foundation (1967) until today (2024). Regarding the analysis, we adopted a Reflexive Thematic Analysis approach to synthesize the main BS topics, then read from a historical perspective regarding three “eras” over which the literature developed. Selected international literature outside the Journal’s boundaries was considered to complement this historical analysis.

Historically, within the BS field, the interest passed from the rules to rationally govern strategic decision-making processes, to studying what causes cognitive errors, to understanding how to avoid biases and to being prepared for dramatic changes. The article also identifies six future research trajectories, namely “positive heuristics,” “context-embedded mental processes,” “non-conventional thinking,” “cognitive evolutionary triggers,” “debiasing strategies” and “behavioral theories for new strategic challenges” that future research could investigate.

The limitation of the study lies in its exclusive focus on MD for investigating the historical evolution of BS, thereby overlooking critical contributions from other journals. Therefore, MD’s editorial preferences have influenced results. A comprehensive SLR on the BS field is still needed, requiring broader journal coverage to mitigate selection biases and enhance field appraisal.

This contribution is the first to offer a historical evolutionary view of the BS field, complementing the few other reviews on this stream of research. This fills a gap in the study of the evolution of management thought.