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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of four different incentives in improving hedging effectiveness and propose an alternative regulatory mechanism for China’s futures market.

The research method that this study uses is a laboratory experiment, and this study follows the basic norms of experimental research. In addition, this paper designs and conducts a game experiment between hedgers and futures brokerage firms (FBFs) under different incentive mechanisms.

By analyzing the experimental data, it is found that compared with other incentive mechanisms, hedgers’ willingness to hedge and FBFs’ regulatory intention are both significantly higher for the dynamic linkage updating mechanism, indicating that hedgers have a stronger willingness to follow their hedging plan, and FBFs are more responsible for their regulatory behaviors. Additionally, the dynamic linkage updating mechanism has a long-term impact on effective hedging in the futures market.

The findings suggest that the dynamic linkage updating mechanism is beneficial for effectively restricting both hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ regulatory slack and improving the hedging efficiency of the futures market.

To solve the problem of inefficient hedging in China’s futures market, i.e., hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ passive collusion with hedgers, the regulators of China’s futures market should reform the existing incentives and adopt a dynamic linkage updating mechanism to encourage all the participants to actively improve hedging effectiveness.

This paper analyzes and verifies, for the first time, the role of the dynamic linkage updating mechanism in the investing behaviors of hedgers and the regulatory behaviors of future brokerage firms. The futures market experiment that was designed and used in this study is a pioneering and exploratory experiment that applies game theory and mechanism design theory to the field of behavioral finance.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the governance mechanism of overcoming or solving three problems: cooperation problem, coordination problem and appropriation problem. Also to raise the value chain cost efficiency and to elevate the value chain competitive advantage.

The methodology is the experimental study. The authors design an experience simulating the transaction process across firms to explore the separate and joint governance effects of trust and incentive on the cost of value chain.

According to the experimental results it is found that the high level of trust between firms and the incentive based on the joint interests of value chain can effectively mitigate or avoid the cooperation, coordination and appropriation problems, and thus have significant governance effects on the cost of value chain. Incentive is out of effect when a much lower level of trust across firms exists, which reflects that there is a significant complementary relationship between trust and incentive mechanisms.

The research limitation is that the practical experience and the cognition of experimenters of the researchers will influence the conclusion of the experiment, so the research on the influences of other factors must be deepened.

The paper's value is in setting out a value chain cost management theory frame, demonstrating trust and incentive as two kinds of governance mechanism in the value chain cost management mechanism, adopting experiment method to verify the above theory, and providing the relevant behavior evidence for future research.

Purpose – To develop a framework for studying financial incentive program implementation mechanisms, the means by which physician practices and physicians translate incentive program goals into their specific office setting. Understanding how new financial incentives fit with the structure of physician practices and individual providers’ work may shed some insight on the variable effects of physician incentives documented in numerous reviews and meta-analyses.

Design/Methodology/Approach – Reviewing select articles on pay-for-performance evaluations to identify and characterize the presence of implementation mechanisms for designing, communicating, implementing, and maintaining financial incentive programs as well as recognizing participants’ success and effects on patient care.

Findings – Although uncommonly included in evaluations, evidence from 26 articles reveals financial incentive program sponsors and participants utilized a variety of strategies to facilitate communication about program goals and intentions, to provide feedback about participants’ progress, and to assist practices in providing recommended services. Despite diversity in programs’ geographic locations, clinical targets, scope, and market context, sponsors and participants deployed common strategies. While these methods largely pertained to communication between program sponsors and participants and the provision of information about performance through reports and registries, they also included other activities such as efforts to engage patients and ways to change staff roles.

Limitations – This review covers a limited body of research to develop a conceptual framework for future research; it did not exhaustively search for new articles and cannot definitively link particular implementation mechanisms to outcomes.

Practical Implications – Our results underscore the effects implementation mechanisms may have on how practices incorporate new programs into existing systems of care which implicates both the potential rewards from small changes as well as the resources which may be required to obtain buy-in and support.

Originality/Value – We identify gaps in previous research regarding actual changes occurring in physician practices in response to physician incentive programs. We offer suggestions for future evaluation by proposing a framework for understanding implementation. Our model will assist future scholars in translating site-specific experiences with incentive programs into more broadly relevant guidance for practices by facilitating comparisons across seemingly disparate programs.

Knowledge sharing is an important way to improve the knowledge system of industrial construction, and the supervision mechanism is an important way to improve the efficiency of knowledge sharing. However, some research works and practices indicate that the effects of applying the supervision mechanism are not obvious. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to propose an incentive method of knowledge sharing based on the supervision mechanism for promoting knowledge sharing among member enterprises in the industrial construction supply chain.

A basic incentive model and an optimization model of knowledge sharing in the industrial construction supply chain based on the supervision mechanism were developed via the principal–agent theory. Weighted coefficients of explicit and implicit knowledge sharing were introduced into the basic model, while the supervision reward was added into the basic model of the optimization model. The effect of these two models was compared and analyzed via numerical simulation.

The optimal incentive coefficient and effort level of knowledge sharing can be obtained by solving the two aforementioned models. The results of the comparison between the two models indicate that the introduction of a supervisory reward improved the effort level and expected earnings produced by knowledge sharing, but reduced the confirmed equal earnings of member enterprises in the industrial construction supply chain.

Mutual transformation between tacit and explicit knowledge was not considered, and supervisory costs were also not considered, in the estimation of the output of knowledge sharing.

The new models proposed by this study provide theoretical guidance for the design of knowledge sharing incentive measures in the industrial construction supply chain based on the supervision mechanism. The findings suggest that member enterprises should pay attention to the costs of knowledge sharing, in order to obtain more benefits.

This study introduced the weight coefficients of explicit and implicit knowledge sharing into a previous incentive model, proposed an incentive optimization model of knowledge sharing in the industrial construction supply chain based on a supervisory mechanism, and revealed the change rules of related variables that affect the model with the change in weight coefficients. The findings verify the effectiveness of introducing supervisory reward measures and extend the range of theoretical application.

According to governance theory, choosing an effective supply chain (SC) governance mechanism can balance the interests and conflicts between enterprises and help them achieve their performance goals. However, incentive and relational governance have not been fully studied in improving enterprise cooperative performance (ECP). This study aims to examine the relationship between incentive and relational governance in general, the direct effects of combined governance strategy (CGS; the combination dimension of the above two governance mechanisms) on ECP and the mediating effects of SC ambidexterity on CGS and ECP in particular.

To test the hypotheses, this study implements hierarchical linear regression and bootstrap with a survey data set of Chinese manufacturing enterprises.

Results demonstrate that incentive and relational governance can generate complementary effects through enabling and compensating mechanisms, and their combination, that is, CGS, can promote ECP more than a single governance approach; CGS is conducive to solving the SC ambidexterity dilemma and can simultaneously enhance SC alignment and adaptability, thus further improving ECP; and SC ambidexterity plays an intermediary role between CGS and ECP.

The present study examines the complex interaction between incentive governance, relational governance, SC ambidexterity, and ECP. Implications for theory and practice are that formulating appropriate CGS can develop SC ambidexterity and improve ECP.

This paper aims to propose a system dynamics model of blockchain online community knowledge sharing, with the following goals: to reveal the internal mechanism of blockchain technology on community knowledge sharing; to show the impact of blockchain technology on knowledge sharing; and to promote knowledge sharing and the self-development of blockchain online communities.

Based on the core characteristic factors of blockchain technology, including incentive mechanism, trust mechanism, information protection mechanism, etc., a knowledge sharing analysis framework is established. Through the use of the Vensim PLE (Personal Learning Version) software, according to the steps of “putting forward a dynamic hypothesis”, “establishing a system dynamic equations”, and then “model testing” and “simulation”, the article analyzes in depth the process and extent of the impact of the above features on online community knowledge sharing.

The results show that the blockchain incentive mechanism, trust mechanism and information protection mechanism all contribute to promoting an increase in the number of community knowledge sharing users, as well as in the total amount of knowledge shared. The results also show that the token reward in the incentive mechanism has in fact a higher degree of influence than the trust and information protection mechanisms.

At present, no research on the internal mechanism of knowledge sharing in blockchain online communities has been carried out. This article plays a complementary role in research in this field, and offers significant guidance for promoting online community knowledge management and online community development.

Megaprojects contribute greatly to China’s socio-economic development. However, the diverse stakeholders of megaprojects tend to be prone to conflict and plunge the project into lower performance than expected. This study aims to investigate (1) the optimal supervision mechanism under direct supervision of the owner and (2) the optimal indirect supervision mechanism of the owner, with involvement of integrated construction consultancy (ICC) in supervision and considerations into the impact of collusion between the ICC and the general contractor on supervision efficiency.

This study applies the principal–agent theory and game theory to design effective incentive and punishment mechanisms for direct and indirect supervision by the owner. Through the theoretical framework of game theory, it analyses the strategic interactions between the owner, the ICC and the general contractor, and evaluates the effectiveness of various supervision mechanisms based on Nash equilibrium theory.

The results showed adopting the direct supervision mechanism when the probability of the general contractor’s opportunistic behavior being detected was higher or the occurrence had a greater impact on the owner. However, the increase in supervision cost would reduce the motivation of owner’s direct supervision and prompt the owner to choose the indirect supervision mechanism. Additionally, the indirect supervision mechanism was more likely to inhibit the collusion between the ICC and the general contractor. Thus, increasing penalties for ICC would result in improved supervision of ICC, thereby improving the benefits to the owner.

This study examines the dynamic interaction between the owner, the general contractor and the ICC. The study establishes a game tree and game matrix based on principal–agent theory, and analyses direct and indirect supervision models to determine the Nash equilibrium and optimal supervision strategy that is in the best interest of the owner. The study advocates for improved management and supervision mechanisms and argues that tailored supervision mechanisms can significantly improve the performance of megaprojects, which is well validated in megaprojects in China.

The motivation to participate in crowdsourcing (CS) platforms is an emerging challenge. Although researchers and practitioners have focused on crowd motivation in the past, the results obtained through such practices have not been satisfactory. Researchers have left unexplored research areas related to CS pillars, such as the evolution of the crowd’s primary motivations, seekers applying effective policies and incentives, platform design challenges and addressing task complexity using the synchronicity of the crowd. Researchers are now more inclined to address these issues by focusing on sustaining the crowd’s motivation; however, sustaining the crowd’s motivation has many challenges.

To fill this gap, this study conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) to investigate and map the challenges and factors affecting sustained motivation during CS with the overcoming implications. Studies that satisfied the inclusion criteria were published between 2010 and 2021.

Important sustainable factors are extracted using the grounded theory that has sustained participation and the factors' cohesion leads to the identification of challenges that the pillars of CS face. Crowds being the most vital part of CS contests face the challenge of engagement. The results reported the factors that affect the crowd’s primary and post-intentions, perceived value of incentives and social and communal interaction. Seekers face the challenge of knowledge and understanding; the results identify the reason behind the crowd’s demotivation and the impact of theories and factors on the crowd's psychological needs which helped in sustaining participation. Similarly, the platforms face the challenge of being successful and demanding, the results identify the latest technologies, designs and features that seekers proclaim and need the platforms designer's attention. The identified task challenges are completion and achievement; the authors have identified the impact of trait of task and solving mechanisms that have sustained participation.

The study identifies, explores and summarizes the challenges on CS pillars researchers are facing now to sustain contributions by keeping participants motivated during online campaigns. Similarly, the study highlights the implication to overcome the challenges by identifying and prioritizing the areas concerning sustainability through the adoption of innovative methods or policies that can guarantee sustained participation.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the incentive effects of existing compensation mechanisms in case of the bankruptcy of a financial institution.

The paper uses insights of law and economics to predict the effects of compensation mechanisms on the incentives of depositors, financial institutions, financial regulators and government.

The paper shows that the current compensation system in The Netherlands will not provide sufficient incentives for all stakeholders to prevent the failure of a financial institution. Adjustments to this system are necessary to improve these incentives.

The paper examines for the first time the impact of different compensation mechanisms on the incentives of multiple stakeholders. It also shows how these mechanisms influence each other regarding their incentive generating capability. These findings offer important insights for policy makers.

Non-vehicle operating carrier platform is a typical crowdsourcing logistics platform that has achieved rapid development in China in recent years, and the sustainable development of non-vehicle operating carrier platform is underpinned by a large and stable professional user group. The purpose of this paper is to understand what platform incentives are available and to explore the influence mechanism of these incentives on actual carriers’ continuous intention to participate in non-vehicle operating carrier platform.

Based on organizational institution theory and behavioral motivation theory, the paper established the influence mechanism model of platform incentives on actual carriers’ continuous participation intention of non-vehicle operating carrier platform. A total of 300 questionnaires were distributed by Road Transportation Management Bureau of Zhejiang Province and a third-party questionnaire survey platform, and 176 valid questionnaires were collected. The partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) method based on PLS estimation was used to analyze the data.

The results revealed that the platform incentives have a significant influence on actual carriers’ continuous participation intention. The influence of the reputation incentive is the most profound, ranking first. The influence of the resource incentive is second to that of reputation incentive, ranking second. The influence of the bonus incentive ranks third. The operating cost perception, social value perception and functional value perception have significantly mediating effect. Furthermore, the mediating effect of social value perception and functional value perception is significantly higher than that of operating cost perception.

This study revealed the influence mechanism of platform incentives on actual carriers’ continuous participation intention of non-vehicle operating carrier platform. The relevant research results provided references for the establishment of platform incentive mechanism.