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This chapter proposes a framework explaining the evolution of property rights in land, assuming two unequal groups of actors: elites possessing means of violence and nonelite land cultivators. It then shows that all intermediary groups – those acting between the chief violence holders (i.e., rulers) and cultivators – are in effect (greater or lesser rulers and cultivators). Using this framework, this chapter explains most of the developments in the evolution of land rights in 19th century colonial Bengal. The proposed theoretical framework explains how different, hierarchically arrayed claims over land and the resulting allocation of rights was a function of asymmetries in power and information between three groups: rulers, direct cultivators, and intermediaries without their own coercive means. It explains inter alia why private property in land was not likely to emerge in this configuration, and that the (non-private) property rights of the other two groups wouldn't attain stability as long as rulers perceived an information asymmetry. In such a situation, land rights would attain neither “private,” nor “public” character.

In this chapter, we review the historical development of elite theory, and then we propose a way forward beyond it. Elite theory emerged as a critique of democracy in the late 19th century. Although it used historical materials illustratively, it tended to be ahistorical theoretically because its primary aim was to demonstrate the perdurance of elites even in conditions of mass suffrage. Lachmann was the first scholar to develop elite theory as a truly historical and explanatory framework by combining it with elements of Marxism. Even Lachmann's theory, however, remained inadequate because it did not rest on a fully articulated theory of power. In this introduction, we suggest a “relational power theory” as a remedy to this situation, and we use it to formulate a general heuristic for the study of elites, nonelites, and their interrelationships. To illustrate its utility, we show how it can illuminate the chapters in this volume (though they were not necessarily written for these purposes).

Today, companies are struggling to develop their human resources analytics (HRA) capability, although interest in the subject is rapidly increasing. Furthermore, the academic literature on the subject is immature with limited practical guidance or comprehensive models that could support organisations in the development of their HRA capability. To address this issue, the aim of this paper is to provide a maturity model – i.e. HRAMM – and an interdependency matrix through which an organisation can (1) operationalise its HRA capability and assess its organisational maturity; (2) generate harmonious development roadmaps to improve its HRA capability; and (3) enable benchmarking and continuous improvement.

The research described in this paper is based on the popular methodology proposed by Becker et al. (2009) and the procedure for maturity evaluation developed by Gastaldi et al. (2018). This method combines academic rigour and field experience in analytics, in a process spanning eight main phases that involves literature reviews and knowledge creation techniques.

We define HRA maturity through four areas and 14 dimensions, providing a comprehensive model to operationalise HRA capability. Additionally, we argue that HRA maturity develops through an evolutionary path described in four discrete stages of maturity that go beyond traditional analytics sophistication. Lastly, the interdependency matrix reveals specific enablers for the development of HRA.

This paper provides practitioners with useful tools to monitor, evaluate and plan their HRA development path. Additionally, our research helps practitioners to prioritise their work and investment, generating an effective roadmap for developing and improving their HRA capability.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to provide a model for evaluating the maturity of HRA capability plus an interdependency matrix to evaluate systematically the prerequisites and synergies among its constituting dimensions.

Hyperinflation is a rare form of macroeconomic crisis that often results from extreme political events, such as revolution or regime change. The 1989–1990 Argentine hyperinflation is puzzling because it occurred in the absence of such an event. Moreover, conventional fiscal mechanisms linking political processes to hyperinflation do not sufficiently explain the Argentine case. Previous theories emphasizing distributional conflict and institutional weakness contain key elements of an explanation of the Argentine hyperinflation but do not capture the range of mechanisms that produced extreme financial instability. This chapter offers an elite theory approach that subsumes elements of these approaches within a broader theory of elite fragmentation, competition, and conflict. Elite fragmentation inhibits collective action in both economic and state elites, resulting in deficits in policymaking capacity. Fragmentation among state policy elites leads to policy volatility and incoherence, while fragmentation among politically mobilized economic elites results in elite stalemates constraining the options of policy elites. These policymaking patterns lead to prolonged delays in the adjustment of unsustainable organizational structures, resulting in explosive forms of crises.

Following the tradition of scholarship showing that elites institutionalize their tastes via cultural philanthropy, this chapter investigates patronage of Asian art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Drawing on content analysis of museum press releases and other documents, I conceptually elaborate and empirically illustrate different patterns of Asian art patronage among Asian and white patrons as well as among Asian patrons from different ethnic groups. Engaging theory asserting that elites legitimate art tied to their ethnoracial heritage through supporting it at cultural organizations, I elaborate how Asian elites are especially committed to supporting Asian art at the museum. In addition, I illustrate how, compared with each other, Asian elites particularly champion art from their respective ethnic groups – for example, Chinese elites support Chinese art at higher levels than Asian elites who are not Chinese, and Indian elites support Indian art at higher levels than Asian elites who are not Indian. This chapter advances theory about elites and cultural legitimation, elites and organizational contributions, and progressiveness within the elite.

Islamic economic ideology has exerted a profound influence on the evolution of the open market, particularly in the domains of individual property rights, unobstructed commerce, and restrained governmental interference. The Islamic doctrine pertaining to individual property rights underscores the entitlement of individuals to possess and exercise dominion over their possessions, and this fundamental doctrine has played a pivotal role in shaping the unrestrained market. Islamic economic philosophy also champions free trade, affording individuals the freedom to exchange commodities and services devoid of governmental constraints. This doctrine has contributed to the creation of a more efficient and prosperous economic milieu. Ultimately, Islamic economic thought propagates the concept of delimited governmental involvement in economic affairs. This principle affords enterprises the latitude to undertake risks, while empowering entrepreneurs to establish novel companies, both of which are integral to economic expansion. The undeniable contributions of Islamic economic thought to the maturation of the open market are incontestable. These principles have been instrumental in the establishment of a more efficient, flourishing, and vibrant economic landscape. As our world becomes progressively intertwined, it remains imperative to retain the insights gleaned from Islamic economic thought and persist in the pursuit of an equitable and free market system.

A “state-driven” approach suggests that colonists use census categories to rule. However, a “society-driven” approach suggests that this state-driven perspective confers too much power upon states. A third approach views census-taking and official categorization as a product of state–society interaction that depends upon: (a) the population's lay categories, (b) information intellectuals' ability to take up and transform these lay categories, and (c) the balance of power between social and state actors. We evaluate the above positions by analyzing official records, key texts, travelogues, and statistical memoirs from three key periods in India: Indus Valley civilization through classical Gupta rule (ca. 3300 BCE–700 CE), the “medieval” period (ca. 700–1700 CE), and East India Company (EIC) rule (1757–1857 CE), using historical narrative. We show that information gathering early in the first period was society driven; however, over time, a strong interactive pattern emerged. Scribes (information intellectuals) increased their social status and power (thus, shifting the balance of power) by drawing on caste categories (lay categories) and incorporating them into official information gathering. This intensification of interactive information gathering allowed the Mughals, the EIC, and finally British direct rule officials to collect large quantities of information. Our evidence thus suggests that the intensification of state–society interactions over time laid the groundwork for the success of the direct rule British censuses. It also suggests that any transformative effect of these censuses lay in this interactive pattern, not in the strength of the British colonial state.