Elite Politics and Economic Crisis: Hyperinflation in Argentina, 1989–1990

Abstract

Hyperinflation is a rare form of macroeconomic crisis that often results from extreme political events, such as revolution or regime change. The 1989–1990 Argentine hyperinflation is puzzling because it occurred in the absence of such an event. Moreover, conventional fiscal mechanisms linking political processes to hyperinflation do not sufficiently explain the Argentine case. Previous theories emphasizing distributional conflict and institutional weakness contain key elements of an explanation of the Argentine hyperinflation but do not capture the range of mechanisms that produced extreme financial instability. This chapter offers an elite theory approach that subsumes elements of these approaches within a broader theory of elite fragmentation, competition, and conflict. Elite fragmentation inhibits collective action in both economic and state elites, resulting in deficits in policymaking capacity. Fragmentation among state policy elites leads to policy volatility and incoherence, while fragmentation among politically mobilized economic elites results in elite stalemates constraining the options of policy elites. These policymaking patterns lead to prolonged delays in the adjustment of unsustainable organizational structures, resulting in explosive forms of crises.

Citation

Van Gunten, T.S. (2024), "Elite Politics and Economic Crisis: Hyperinflation in Argentina, 1989–1990", Emigh, R.J. and Riley, D. (Ed.) Elites, Nonelites, and Power (Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 41), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 141-173. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0198-871920240000041006