Case studies

Lewis Byrd, a partner in the private equity firm Opportunity Capital Partners, is managing a number of interconnected issues. First, in his role as investment professional responsible for the firm's investment in a doghouse manufacturing company called Dogloo, he has to manage a relationship with an entrepreneur who has behaved in a way that has made coinvestors nervous about his skills as a CEO. The CEO, Aurelio Barretto, is a Cuban immigrant who has established a close confiding relationship with Byrd, who is an African American. Barretto has increasingly relied on Byrd to run interference for him with investors, while also providing the strategic advice that typically supports an investor-entrepreneur relationship. Another issue is that there is a potentially costly lawsuit looming involving copyright infringement by a larger, well-funded competitor in the pet products market. Byrd has to manage potentially volatile relationships while determining what's best for his firm from an investment standpoint and how best to advise Barretto to proceed. The case provides insights into the challenges in private equity investing that occur after the striking of the financial deal. The case also provides information for students about the technical and legal structure of private equity financing.

In January 2012, Ellen Kullman, CEO and chairman of DuPont, must decide whether to retain or sell the company's Performance Coatings (DPC) division. This is an introductory case on valuing a leveraged buyout. The case focuses on a publicly listed corporation's decision to divest a large division and asks students to compare the division's value if it remains under DuPont's control or is sold to an outside party. The transaction size of approximately $4 billion is too large for potential strategic buyers in the industry, making private equity (PE) firms the most likely bidders. The case provides a base-case adjusted present value (APV) model of DPC as a stand-alone company and gives students specific assignments to adjust it to reflect the division's potential value under PE ownership (e.g., EBITDA growth, multiple arbitrage, and increased leverage).

The case is designed to illustrate and discuss the differences between a public company's valuation based on unlevered free cash flows and a PE sponsor's valuation based on residual (levered) cash flows.

This case has been successfully taught in a second-year elective course covering entrepreneurial finance and private equity and in an advanced undergraduate course on corporate finance. It is appropriate for use in classes on private equity, advanced corporate finance, or deal valuation.

In November 2003, John Fruehwirth, a principal at Allied Capital, was considering a $20 million mezzanine investment in growth capital for Elephant Bar, a California restaurant chain. Elephant Bar had had some initial success in California but now Allied's investment committee had to wrestle with the question of whether the restaurant concept was strong enough to travel and become a national brand or whether it was mainly a “California Concept.” And if the concept was strong enough to travel, would Allied Capital be able to meet its underwriting standards? Because Elephant Bar is a company with aggressive growth plans, it is significantly riskier than traditional mezzanine investments. The case can be used in courses on venture investing to illustrate another funding source available to young companies. Traditional mezzanine financing is often used to provide a portion of the funding for late-stage investments, such as leveraged buyouts. The case can also be used in courses on private equity to illustrate the perspective, risk mitigation strategies, and return expectations of mezzanine investors.

This case has a teaching note and a spreadsheet, which are available to registered faculty members.

This negotiation case is meant to be used in conjunction with “Hybritech, Incorporated (A)” (UVA-F-0792); half the class works from one case and half from the other. Lilly is considering acquiring Hybritech, but the genetic-engineering company's future cash flows are difficult to predict and value. Both companies want to effect the merger, but the cases, which provide essentially the same information in all other respects, provide widely divergent projected cash flows. The “Hybritech, Incorporated (B)” case (UVA-F-0793) is the follow-up case dealing with the payment structure of the acquisition.

In the mid-1980s, Emerson Electric looked at possible two-year debt issues in three countries: the United States, Switzerland, and New Zealand. The $65 million to be raised is earmarked for general corporate expenses. Emerson has subsidiaries in 27 countries, including the three candidate countries. In this case, students act as Emerson's CFO and must evaluate the U.S., Swiss, and New Zealand economies to determine in which currency to secure the needed debt issues.

This case examines the April 2007 decision of British music company EMI to suspend its annual dividend as the company struggled to respond to the effect of digital audio distribution on its core business. The EMI case is intended to serve as an engaging introduction to corporate financial policy and themes in managing the right side of the balance sheet. The case contrasts EMI's storied success with artists such as the Beatles, the Beach Boys, Pink Floyd, and Norah Jones with its recent inability to succeed in financial markets. In light of takeover threats and restructuring costs, EMI's CFO Martin Stewart must recommend EMI's dividend policy.

This case presents an opportunity for students to use flexible budgeting to perform a variance analysis on the operating results of EntertainmentNow.com. First, the company's original budget is flexed to account for changes in sales volume. Then, actual results are compared to the flexed budget and analyzed for product mix, price, cost of goods sold, efficiency, and other variances. In addition, the case requires a simple calculation to determine the breakeven level of sales given the company's current variable and fixed costs.

This case concerns the troubles that Euro Disney experienced from the start. Euro Disney claimed that the major cause of its poor financial performance was the European recession and the strong French franc. The timing of the park's opening could not have been more inopportune. If the recession had been the only cause of Euro Disney's problems, the financial restructuring would only need to carry the park forward to better economic times. Only when Europeans began spending freely again would investors learn the answers to some uncomfortable questions: Was the whole idea of Euro Disney misconceived? Were there other fundamental cultural problems that could inhibit the park's success? Would Euro Disney fail to recover even though other European companies did? And, if so, why was the Disney theme-park concept successful in Japan and not in France?

In 1989, the Walt Disney Company financed its major European theme park and real estate development using a variety of financing tools and techniques that, when bundled together, amounted to a project financing. The case recounts the details of this financing and invites students to evaluate the financing from various standpoints, including those of the Walt Disney Company, the government of France, European equity investors, and European banks. The resulting opinion about the attractiveness of the project ultimately hinges on beliefs about European market demand for an American-style theme park. The case may be used to exercise students' skills in valuation analysis, to illustrate techniques for financing major real-property projects, and to explore the creation and transfer of wealth in such projects.

A hedge-fund strategist had two decisions to make. First, what was the path of core euro zone long-term interest rates likely to be over the next year? Was the dramatic decline in German long rates over the past few years an aberration that would soon be reversed, or was it part of the “new normal” that would persist for some time? Second, how would periphery long rates evolve relative to core rates? That is—the spread between long rates in the likes of Greece, Spain, and Ireland and those in Germany—how would they evolve over the next year? Was the dramatic divergence in euro zone long rates likely to persist, or would the coming year see a continuation of the modest reconvergence that has occurred since mid–2012? He knew many factors influenced long-term interest rates; he would have to use his entire toolkit to address this issue. The evidence was in no way clear-cut. Some factors pointed toward lower German rates, some toward higher, some toward a widening of euro zone spreads (even a dissolution of the euro zone as we know it?), and some toward reconvergence.