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In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder can actively participate in corporate governance and protect the interests of investors, its impact has not been fully understood. This research investigates how shareholding ratio and ownership type of the second largest shareholder moderate the relationship between controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio and cash dividends.

The authors conducted econometrics analysis based on a panel data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017.

The authors find that the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio has a significant negative impact on cash dividends. However, this influence is conditional on the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder. The negative impact is weakened when the second largest shareholder holds a large proportion of shares or when the shareholding gap between the second largest and the controlling shareholder is small.

This research extends the existing literature by highlighting the nuanced moderating effect of the second largest shareholder on the relationship between the controlling shareholder and cash dividends, thus making a unique contribution to the understanding of corporate governances in the emerging financial market in China.

The purpose of this paper is to start with the background of the construction of the M-score model, find the variables that can represent the fraud characteristics of Chinese companies, and use the data of Chinese A-share listed companies to modify the M-score model.

In this paper, the fraud behavior of Chinese enterprises that M-score cannot detect is summarized as the basis of adding variables. Then, based on the data of Chinese listed companies, a modified M-score model including nine variables is constructed by the logistic regression method based on Wald.

Based on the original 8 variables of M-score, this paper adds 10 new variables that can represent the fraud characteristics of Chinese listed companies, and finally, constructs a modified M-score model with 9 variables. Results indicated that indexes such as gross profit margin, fixed assets depreciation rate, equity concentration and audit opinion can characterize the financial fraud of Chinese listed companies.

The modified M-score model based on the characteristics of Chinese enterprises’ fraud is more suitable for Chinese market, which can help investors avoid fraud risks, protect their own rights and interests and reduce losses.

Starting from the background of the model, this paper looks for variables that can characterize the characteristics of fraud in Chinese listed companies. Then, subdivides the research samples into specific fiscal years in which fraud occurs, so that the modified M-score model can be more suitable for the Chinese market.

The aim of this paper is to investigate (1) whether the different dimensions of internationalization experience have different effects on internationalization speed? (2) And how the degree of digitalization plays a moderating role in these relationships?

The authors test the hypotheses on a sample of 431 Chinese listed companies export data from 2007 to 2016, using multiple regression analysis.

The international expansion experience to developed economies will accelerate the internationalization speed of MNCs, while international expansion experience to emerging economies has an inverted U-shaped relationship with internationalization speed. The digitalization degree weakens the relationship between international experience and internationalization speed, whether it is international expansion experience to developed or emerging economies.

By decomposing the dimensions of international experience and considering the degree of digitalization as a new moderating variable, the paper helps to clarify the debate on the relationship between international experience and speed of internationalization, thus contributing to the internationalization speed literature and the digital technology perspective. Revealing the process of international experience affecting internationalization speed has implications for MNCs to achieve high-quality and rapid internationalization.

The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation, and to further explore in depth the impact of executive shareholding on corporate innovation under different industries.

This paper uses the panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample to empirically study the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation based on multiple linear regression models and panel fixed effects.

The research shows that: on the whole, the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation presents an inverted “U” shape; institutional investors will negatively regulate the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation; the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation will show obvious industry differences in different industries.

The empirical results not only enrich the research on the effects of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice, but also provide targeted experience for promoting enterprise innovation. Due to the limitations of innovation indicators and industry sample selection, it is necessary to be cautious when extending the results to other fields.

Enterprises should fully consider the impact of executive shareholding on innovation and formulate a scientific executive incentive system according to the differences of their industries. The government should be aware of the important role of institutional investors in enterprises, improve the channels and ways for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, and improve the basic system of capital markets.

On the one hand, this paper empirically tests the regulatory role of institutional investors' shareholding and the relationship between executive shareholding and enterprise innovation, which enriches the research on the effect of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice. On the other hand, the research by industry is more targeted to provide experience for promoting enterprise innovation.

Despite increased research attention to management innovation, the literature offers conflicting explanations of how it affects firm performance. The rational perspective emphasises the role of management innovation for organisational routine updating. The fashion perspective views management innovation as a symbolic activity to foster legitimacy. The purpose of this study is to integrate the two perspectives and explore both the mediating effects of organisational efficiency and business legitimacy and the moderating effect of CEO shareholding.

Based on empirical data from 238 Chinese firms, this study conducts stepwise regression to test the hypotheses.

This study finds that management innovation positively affects both organisational efficiency and business legitimacy and then firm performance. However, the promotion effect of organisational efficiency is stronger than that of business legitimacy on firm performance. The results further indicate that CEO shareholding strengthens the effect of management innovation on organisational efficiency but weakens it for business legitimacy.

This study presents a complete explanation of the effect of management innovation on firm performance by exploring the mediating effect of both organisational efficiency and business legitimacy. Further, it compares the effects of organisational efficiency and business legitimacy on firm performance. Finally, it resolves the conflict between the rational and fashion perspectives by involving the moderating effect of CEO shareholding.

This study investigates the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) cash compensation in relation to corporate governance and performance in China's listed firms. This article also aims at analyzing gender earning differentials among CEOs.

The empirical analysis is based on the panel data set which contains information on the CEOs of 1,701 firm-year observations over the period 2006-2010. A Oaxaca decomposition is also implemented to measure the gap between male and female CEO compensation.

The paper observes that CEO compensation relies more on firm accounting performance than on stock market performance. This relationship is especially evident when accounting performance is measured as the return-on-assets. Dominant shareholders such as the state and block holders have a distinct impact on the use of incentive pay. The presence of a compensation committee in a Chinese listed firm is correlated with an excessive pay package for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), even though there is evidence that pay-for-performance is more likely in the presence of a compensation committee. Furthermore, this context extends the international body of evidence on CEO compensation by offering a novel accounting of the gender gap in pay among China's listed firms. Examination of the dataset reveals that women represent approximately 6.8 percent of CEOs. In keeping with international norms, female CEOs are more senior and better educated than their male counterparts, yet they receive less favorable compensation. The Oaxaca decomposition shows a larger unexplained part of the pay-gap and suggests that the gender statistically explains a great deal of the gap in pay between male and female CEOs across China's listed firms.

This article contributes to the international corporate governance literature and implications for the design of good corporate governance for China's listed firms. Moreover, this article also highlights the current gender gap among CEOs in compensation.

To examine how shareholding affects optimal profits, R&D innovation, NEV market scale and social welfare in two supply chain models with partial and cross ownership patterns.

The gradual retreat of government subsidies has directly weakened the financial support available to the stakeholders of new energy vehicles (NEVs). In this context, upstream and downstream enterprises of NEV are constantly seeking new business models of cooperation to achieve possible win-wins. NEV supply chain shareholding is an emerging new practice for such explorations. However, its performance in the NEV supply chain is seldom investigated. In this paper, we employ a Stackelberg game model to investigate how partial and cross-ownership affect the optimal decisions in a NEV supply chain.

Results showed that: (1) Compared with the unilateral shareholding model, the battery supplier will benefit from cross-ownership in the supply chain, while the NEV manufacturer will not necessarily benefit from it. At the same time, cross-ownership will bring the greatest incentive for battery R&D (2) Supply chain downstream competition will not necessarily lead to the improvement of the total consumption of NEVs or the level of battery design. Pareto improvement can be brought only when one of the manufacturers holds less than a certain equity threshold. In addition, downstream competition will also not necessarily bring more benefits to the battery supplier.

At present, NEV supply chain management has attracted widespread attention from scholars from all walks of life. Previous studies have been carried out that covers topics such as pricing strategies and optimal profits and the role of NEV in the sustainable development of the automotive industry supply chain, or disparate impacts of government subsidies and carbon emission regulation on supply chain members. However, as far as the authors know, compared with the new emerging NEV corporate practice, the shareholding phenomenon between upstream and downstream in the supply chain of NEV has not been studied in the existing studies.

This study aims to examine the effects of local tournament incentives on environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure and the quality of such disclosures among Chinese A-share listed companies. Furthermore, it seeks to investigate the moderating roles of CEO duality, institutional investors’ shareholding and product market competition in this relationship.

This study uses a quantitative approach, and data from A-share listed companies in China spanning from 2012 to 2021. To test the proposed hypotheses, the authors conduct hierarchical regression analysis along with a series of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our findings.

The findings of this study indicate that local tournament incentives have a positive impact on companies’ propensity to disclose ESG information, yet they negatively influence the quality of these disclosures. Additionally, the presence of CEO duality and product market competition attenuate this relationship, whereas the shareholding of institutional investors serves to strengthen it.

This study’s findings can aid policymakers and regulators in China and other emerging economies in policies that promote high-quality ESG information disclosure, taking into account local tournament incentives. Furthermore, the study underscores the importance of maintaining robust corporate governance structures within firms to ensure that CEOs’ self-serving motivations do not undermine ESG disclosure.

This study adds to the ongoing discourse on the significance of ESG disclosure in emerging economies by analyzing the influence of executive promotion incentives on ESG disclosure from an external labor market standpoint. By exploring the potential self-serving motivations of CEOs in promoting ESG values and practices within organizations, this paper addresses a gap in the existing literature.

This paper considers carbon abatement in a competitive supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and two retailers under vertical shareholding. The authors emphasize the equilibrium decision problem of stakeholders under vertical shareholding and different power structures.

A game-theoretic approach was used to probe the influence of power structure and retailer competition on manufacturers' carbon abatement under vertical shareholding. The carbon abatement decisions, environmental imp4cacts (EIs) and social welfare (SW) of different scenarios under vertical shareholding are obtained.

The findings show that manufacturers are preferable to carbon abatement and capture optimal profits when shareholding is above a threshold under the retailer power equilibrium, but they may exert a worse negative impact on the environment. The dominant position of the held retailer is not always favorable to capturing the optimal SW and mitigating EIs. In addition, under the combined effect of competition level and shareholding, retailer power equilibrium scenarios are more favorable to improving SW and reducing EIs.

This paper inspects the combined influence of retailer competition and power structure on manufacturers' carbon abatement. Distinguishing from previous literature, the authors also consider the impact of vertical shareholding and consumer preferences. In addition, the authors analyze the SW and EIs in different scenarios.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate governance (CG) best practices, and the extent to which board characteristics and shareholding structures can explain discernible differences in the level of voluntary CG disclosure in a number of emerging Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) economies.

The paper uses a number of multivariate regression methods, namely, ordinary least squares, weighted, non-linear, lagged-effects, two-stage least squares and fixed-effects regression techniques to analyse data collected for a sample of listed corporations in emerging MENA economies from 2009 to 2014.

First, in general, MENA listed firms have a relatively lower level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices compared to listed firms in developed countries. Second, the evidence suggests that corporate board characteristics, including board diversity, have a positive association with the level of voluntary CG disclosure. In contrast, the findings indicate that unitary board leadership structure, director shareholdings and government shareholdings negatively impact on the level of voluntary CG disclosure. The study does not, however, find any evidence to suggest that family shareholdings have any significant relationship with the level of voluntary CG disclosure. The findings are generally robust to alternative measures and potential endogeneity problems.

This is one of the first empirical efforts at investigating the association between CG mechanisms and voluntary disclosure in emerging MENA economies that observably relies on a multi-theoretical framework within a longitudinal cross-country research setting.