Executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and enterprise innovation

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation, and to further explore in depth the impact of executive shareholding on corporate innovation under different industries.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper uses the panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample to empirically study the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation based on multiple linear regression models and panel fixed effects.

Findings

The research shows that: on the whole, the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation presents an inverted “U” shape; institutional investors will negatively regulate the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation; the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation will show obvious industry differences in different industries.

Research limitations/implications

The empirical results not only enrich the research on the effects of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice, but also provide targeted experience for promoting enterprise innovation. Due to the limitations of innovation indicators and industry sample selection, it is necessary to be cautious when extending the results to other fields.

Practical implications

Enterprises should fully consider the impact of executive shareholding on innovation and formulate a scientific executive incentive system according to the differences of their industries. The government should be aware of the important role of institutional investors in enterprises, improve the channels and ways for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, and improve the basic system of capital markets.

Originality/value

On the one hand, this paper empirically tests the regulatory role of institutional investors' shareholding and the relationship between executive shareholding and enterprise innovation, which enriches the research on the effect of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice. On the other hand, the research by industry is more targeted to provide experience for promoting enterprise innovation.

Citation

Wang, T. and Cheng, D. (2023), "Executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and enterprise innovation", European Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 26 No. 6, pp. 1744-1762. https://doi.org/10.1108/EJIM-11-2021-0553