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The purpose of this Editorial is to reflect on the potentials and challenges of qualitative research in financial accounting and introduce the four papers included in this Special Issue.

The authors draw on and discuss extant literature and the papers included in the Special Issue to develop our assessment of the current state of the field of qualitative financial accounting research and possible future paths ahead.

The authors observe that qualitative research on financial accounting is still an emerging field with substantial further research potential.

The authors outline future potentials for qualitative accounting research.

This Editorial contributes to studies on the state of academic research in (financial) accounting.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a shareholder association prepares for and later act at the annual general meeting. It focusses on how the association evaluates corporate proposals to pay dividends and how they vote on equity distributions at the annual general meeting.

This paper relies on observation of the shareholder association before the annual general meeting as well as at the meeting. The analysis is informed by institutional analysis as a way to make sense of how the association experience tension in the setting of the stock market and how it activates responses to these tensions.

The shareholder association failed to target companies that comply with an institutionalized view of good ownership despite those companies distributing more equity than the association deems to be in line with sound governance. This the authors understand to result from institutional tensions between a traditional stewardship model of governance and the more recent financial investor logic that emphasizes equity distributions as mean to create shareholder wealth. As good ownership is often equated with long-term committed owners, which makes the association fail to target non-traditional companies that are similar to companies with traditional ownership in terms of dividend ratios.

The paper demonstrates how institutional logics influence micro-level action in offering guidance to individual members. There are two relevant aspects to this. First, it offers guidance in terms of how to identify whether a corporate proposal is in line with the associations’ policy. Second, institutional logics influence micro-level action because deviations from it require explanations.

There are so far little qualitative research on how participants in governance mechanism use accounting to take decisions. In this way, the paper adds insight to both investor communities as well as behind the doors of the AGM.

The aim of this paper is to investigate how top management is constructed as a good steward of its company at the annual general meeting (AGM) and how accounting is used in the course of this process.

To meet these aims the authors attended 36 AGMs of Swedish listed companies. The interactions that occurred at the AGMs were analysed, using the theory of translation.

One‐third of all questions dealt with financial accounting issues, while the majority of the questions concerned non‐financial aspects of stewardship, i.e. company's efforts regarding environmental, equality and ethical issues.

There is some concern that the complexity of accounting information may make shareholders feel remote from the company. However, AGMs provide a setting where the financial accounts can be complemented with verbal explanations and visual aids. This contextualizes the financial accounts and makes them understandable to an audience that includes many private investors. This contributed to the fact that accounting was discussed, questioned and referred to. Hence, accounting enables the stewardship function of the AGM.

Although AGMs have been the subject of criticism, they are still an important part of the corporate governance system. Since AGMs are live events, shareholders are able to pursue a topic with further questions, an option that is not available to other modes of corporate communication.

Whereas the AGM has been in the foreground in government inquiries and codes of conduct, it has been largely neglected in accounting research.

This paper aims to analyze the process of producing a reported profit number to understand how different actors overcome the tensions arising from the often conflicting value frames that apply in different situations during this process and how the actors can benefit from the ensuing friction.

The tensions found in the profit production process are theorized in terms of dissonance (Stark, 2009), emphasizing how multiple voices, drawing on different value frames, contribute to the search for a profit number. The authors study this by means of a case study of a large listed company in the construction industry, where, because of how judgment pervades the profit production process, the search for profit is particularly exposed.

The authors find three important value frames – caution, control and compliance – which managers, accountants and auditors draw on in the profit production process, depending on the situation they find themselves in. With this finding, the authors contribute to the previous research on financial reporting and management work and the production of profits by demonstrating how the relationships between the involved actors – primarily the auditor–client relationship – can be characterized by principled and constructive rivalry in which competing value frames can coexist alongside each other and how the dissonance created in these situations can produce generative and productive friction.

Previous research has mostly focused on profit measurement, taking the existence of a “true” profit number for granted. The auditor–client negotiation literature typically suggests that actors endeavor to solve situations in a zero-sum game where different value frames are present. This paper, drawing on an incipient theoretical approach to accounting research which emphasizes multivocality and perspective, contributes to the nascent research on financial accounting and management work in general and the profit production process in particular. With empirical illustrations of the dissonance found in this process, this paper suggests that tensions resulting from dissonance (Stark, 2009) may be a resource in situations like the profit production process.

The purpose of this paper is to understand how external auditors communicate with audit committees (ACs).

A total of 53 interviews were conducted with participants in the ACs of 22 French companies listed in the CAC 40 index, including external and internal auditors, CFOs, AC chairpersons, and members.

In multiple accountability relationships, external auditors sit in the middle. They therefore use impression management (IM). While AC members expect them to be transparent, they are also expected to preserve managers’ “face” by sustaining impressions of consistency. The construction of impressions of consistency and transparency takes place mainly backstage, through time-consuming teamwork shared by auditors and CFOs. External auditors have power to make things transparent, but the use of such power is tricky, because it can damage relationships with CFOs. External auditors have a difficult “discrepant role” (Goffman, 1959) to play.

This study provides insights into what occurs behind the scenes with ACs, which can help regulators think deeper about relationships between external auditors and ACs.

This research makes contribution to governance, IM, and AC literature. It analyzes the AC process from external auditors’ – rather than AC members’ – points of view. Highlighting the AC process backstage, it shows that IM can be carried out collectively toward an internal rather than external audience and demonstrates that external auditors practice rather than limiting IM.