Search results

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of priming on people’s risk perceptions and safety decisions in a virtual construction simulator.

Civil engineering students were recruited to interact with a virtual reality (VR) safety simulator. They were divided into four groups covering with and without sound and with and without priming factors. Data were collected on the risks that they perceived and the safety levels of their actions.

It was found that obvious stimuli in a virtual environment with sound help people to recognise more hazards near the location of the stimuli. Sound is helpful in training simulations to create high levels of presence. However, priming factors are not suitable to be added to VR simulators for training purposes. Priming of safe choice results in people taking fewer risks in the VR simulator, but this does not carry over into other situations. Compared to priming effects, being “injured” in a training simulator with sound improves trainees’ ability to make safe decisions.

VR simulation is helpful in construction training because of its unique ability to give trainees exposure to dangerous situations without physical risk. However, the overloading the working memory of users is detrimental to the outcomes. Therefore, the optimum level of complexity in VR simulators should be further studied.

The purpose of this study is for examining the evolution of stakeholder influence and the trans-period effect (TPE) of process performance of public–private partnerships (PPPs). TPE refers to the ripple effect of project performance across different phases of a PPP.

Social network analysis is used to analyze each stakeholder’s influence on PPP performance. For examining the TPE, partial least squares structural equation modelling is conducted.

The performance in the five phases (e.g. initiation and planning, procurement, construction, operation and transition) of PPPs exhibits significant TPE. The stakeholder network varies in different phases. The most influential stakeholder is a public authority, followed by a public initiator and a private consortium.

The project type of PPPs is not considered in the stakeholder network analysis. Future work should focus on developing a multidimensional stakeholder network by considering the typology of the project. Moreover, the TPE cannot reflect the relationships between the KPIs in the different phases, and thus, further study is required.

This research provides a useful tool for measuring the life cycle outputs and outcomes of PPPs through enhanced process-oriented performance measurement. The developed PMS enable practitioners to have a better understanding of the process performance of the projects and then ensure informed decision-making about actions to be required and taken to improve future performance.

This study contributes to knowledge of performance management by simultaneously addressing the process and stakeholder management theories within the context of PPPs. The proposed PMS provides an insight into managing stakeholders’ influences to enhance the life cycle performance of PPPs.

Relationship conflict between the owners and contractors is inevitable, which could induce negative consequences. Yet, the existing literature mostly focused on its direct effects on project performance and ignored the process by which relationship conflict gradually deteriorates cooperation as well as corresponding managerial approaches. Given the fact that relationship conflict originates from interdependent tasks, the proposed theoretical model is intended to measure relational behavior as an instant outcome of relationship conflict, and explore the buffering role of contract enforcement approach.

This paper develops the conceptual model based on the literature review. Then the questionnaire survey was conducted. The dyadic data obtained from 168 Chinese construction project professionals were analyzed by the Partial Least squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) technique.

The results show that relational behavior partially mediates the link between relationship conflict and project performance. Besides, three types of contract enforcement approaches are found to differentially change the negative link between relationship conflict and relational behavior. Rigid contract enforcement can worsen the adverse effects of relationship conflict on relational behavior, whereas flexible contract enforcement can alleviate these negative effects. The level of mitigation hinges on whether compromising behaviors or obliging behaviors are chosen.

The study extends the knowledge of conflict theory and contract theory in the construction field. Based on the proposed conceptual model and PLS-SEM results, this study contributes to the understanding of relationship conflict’s consequences between the owners and contractors and enriches conflict management approaches in the construction field.

This study aims to develop a Stackelberg Game Model for seeking the optimal subsidy plans with varying levels of government financial capability (GFC). Furthermore, the scenario-based analysis is conducted and will enable governments to identify a comprehensive subsidy plan as follows: improve project performance and optimise social welfare.

A Stackelberg Game Model is developed to optimise the effectiveness of subsidies on the performance of public-private partnerships (PPPs).

According to the scenarios that are generated from the model, governments that are confronting with limited public budgets could reduce the intensity of performance incentives and increase the participation-oriented subsidy. Whilst a participation-oriented subsidy can stimulate private organisations’ willingness to participate in infrastructure PPPs, a performance-oriented subsidy is capable of facilitating the projects’ performances. Intuitively, the performance-oriented subsidy enables the private entities of PPPs to improve their efforts on the projects to realise higher profits. However, the participation-oriented subsidy is unable to affect the level of their effort spent on the projects. To satisfy both parties’ expectations in a PPP, the performance-oriented subsidy needs to be prioritised for a purpose of enabling higher quality outputs.

The game model developed in this study contributes to the literature by offering new insight into the underlying mechanism of governments and private entities, in terms of their decision-making for subsidy planning and contributions (i.e. resource allocation and spending) during the life-cycle of PPPs. This research enriches the government subsidy model by revealing the effects of the GFC and clarifies the impacts of two different schemes of subsidy on the performance of PPPs.

The government has been conventionally viewed as being omnipotent to provide PPPs with a wide range of subsidies. However, the subsidies are not unlimited, due to GFC. In addressing this void, this study has modelled the impacts of government subsidy plans with a consideration of GFC-related constraints. The combined effects of the participation- and performance-oriented subsidies on the project performance of PPPs have been examined.

In construction projects, engineering variations are very common and create breeding grounds for opportunistic claims. This study investigates the complementary effect between an inspection mechanism and a reputation system in deterring opportunistic claims, considering an employer with limited inspection accuracy and a contractor, which can be either reputation-concerned or opportunistic.

This paper applies a signaling game to investigate the complementary effect between the employer's inspection and a reputation system in deterring the contractor's possible opportunistic claim, considering the information-flow influence of claiming prices.

This study finds that in the exogenous-inspection-accuracy case, the employer does not always inspect the claim. A more stringent reputation system complements a less accurate inspection only when the inspection cost is lower than a threshold, but may decline the employer's surplus or social welfare. In the optimal-inspection-accuracy case, the employer always inspects the claim. However, only a sufficiently stringent reputation system can guarantee the effectiveness of an optimal inspection in curbing opportunistic claims. A more stringent reputation system has a value-stepping effect on the employer's surplus but may unexpectedly impair social welfare, whereas a higher inspection cost efficiency always reduces social welfare.

This article contributes to the project management literature by combing the signaling game theory with the reputation theory and thus embeds the problem of inspection mechanism design into a broader socio-economic framework.

An optimal control model is built considering the private sector's opportunistic effort diversion and reciprocal effort improvement, while a numerical study is conducted to draw some managerial implications.

In infrastructure PPP projects, private sectors may opportunistically divert part of their effort from the current projects to other projects to allocate their limited human resources. Nevertheless, this effort diversion can be inhibited by dynamic incentives since the private sectors reciprocally exert greater effort into the current projects when receiving the dynamic incentives. This article investigates how the government specifies the output standard that the private sector should meet and offers dynamic incentives to mitigate the private sector's opportunistic effort diversion.

The output standard for the private sector to acquire the dynamic incentives should be specified as the output level corresponding to the private sector's optimal long-run stationary equilibrium (OLSE) effort level, which decreases with its reciprocal preference level but increases with its effort-diverting level. The optimal dynamic incentives comprise an initial incentive and a periodic OLSE incentive, which declines with the reciprocal preference level but improves with the effort-diverting level. Besides, the numerical study reveals that the government should distinguish whether the bidders have high effort-diverting levels and, if so, should focus on their reciprocal preference levels and decline the bidders with low reciprocal preference to avoid utility loss.

This article provides a theoretical model combining opportunistic behavior with reciprocal preference through an optimal control lens, thus embedding the problem of incentive design into a broader socioeconomic framework.

In today's digital and post-pandemic era, construction teams can span their boundary to obtain important resources and support in computer-mediated ways. However, the benefits of computer-mediated team boundary spanning (TBS) are mostly assumed. Empirical evidence for these benefits is in lack. Thus, this study attempts to investigate the influence of computer-mediated (instant messaging in this study) TBS on construction project performance and the underlying mechanism.

From the multiteam system (MTS) perspective, this study employs the input-process-outcome (IPO) framework and coordination theory to explore the influence of instant messaging-based team boundary spanning (IMTBS) on construction project coordination processes and project performance. A theoretical model is built and validated with a survey involving 206 construction projects.

Results show that IMTBS positively affects knowledge integration and project coordination, but negatively affects project commitment. The positive link between IMTBS and project performance is attributable to knowledge integration and project coordination. Further, project commitment is also found to negatively mediate the relationship between IMTBS and construction project performance.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to empirically investigate the influence of TBS on construction project performance. As such, this study contributes to the literature on TBS in the construction field. In addition, the findings of this study unveil the double-edged characteristic of IMTBS, which should attract managers' attention. This also indicates that the form of TBS is a significant determinant of its effectiveness, which should attract scholars' attention in the future.

Previous research has little specific guidance on how to improve large infrastructures’ risk analysis. This paper aims to propose a practical risk analysis framework across the project lifecycle with Bayesian Networks (BNs).

The framework includes three phases. In the qualitative phase, primary risks were identified by literature reviews and interviews; questionnaires were used to determine key risks at each project stage and causal relationships between stage-related risks. In the quantitation, brainstorming and questionnaires, and techniques of ranked nodes/paths, risk map and Bayesian truth serum were adopted. Then, a BN-based risk assessment model was developed, and risk analysis was conducted with AgenaRisk software.

Twenty key risks across the lifecycle were determined: some risks were recurring and different risks emerged at various stages with the construction and feasibility most risky. Results showed that previous stages’ risks significantly amplified subsequent stages’ risks. Based on the causality of stage-related risks, a qualitative model was easily constructed. Ranked nodes/paths facilitated the quantification by requiring less statistical knowledge and fewer parameters than traditional BNs. As articulated by a case, this model yielded very simple and easy-to-understand representations of risks and risk propagation pathways.

Rare research has developed a BN risk assessment model from the perspective of project stages. A structured model, a propagation network among individual risks, stage-related risks, and the final adverse consequence, has been designed. This research provides practitioners with a realistic risk assessment approach and further understanding of dynamic and stage-related risks throughout large infrastructures’ lifecycle. The framework can be modified and used in other real-world risk analysis where risks are complex and develop in stages.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether, how and when new venture creation progress (NVCP) affects work-to-family conflict (WFC) by introducing coping behavior strategies as mediators, entrepreneurs’ prior experience and family involvement in business as moderators.

This study performs multivariate regression analysis based on a sample of 260 nascent entrepreneurs from the Chinese Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics.

This study reveals that an entrepreneur’s WFC tends to increase along with the growth of the new venture. Specifically, NVCP impels entrepreneurs to adopt reactive role behavior strategy and meet both entrepreneurial and family demands; meanwhile, NVCP propels entrepreneurs to adopt prioritizing entrepreneurship behavior strategy for the increasing work demands, thus leading to more WFC; the mediation effect of prioritizing entrepreneurship behaviors is stronger than that of reactive role behaviors, which leads to an overall positive main effect. Moreover, the preceding mediating paths are moderated by entrepreneurs’ prior experience and family involvement.

First, the authors have investigated how NVCP influenced WFC. However, the authors did not extend the research to the possible effect of WFC on entrepreneurial performance. Second, in the work-family-conflict literature, unmarried and those without children are often excluded since their private life demands differ significantly from parents’ demands. Although the authors control for marital status in the model, the number of children is still left uncontrolled. Furthermore, the authors only used the first two waves of data, leading to a potential selection bias. In addition, the Chinese context may have influenced the generalizability of the results in a complex manner.

This paper indicates that reactive role behavior strategy will decrease WFC, while prioritizing entrepreneurship behavior strategy will increase WFC. Therefore, the authors suggest entrepreneurs adopt more reactive strategy to reduce WFC. Besides, both prior experience and family involvement strengthen the relationship between NVCP and prioritizing entrepreneurship behavior strategy, thereby leading to more WFC. Therefore, entrepreneurs with prior experience and family involvement should pay more attention to their roles in family. Furthermore, entrepreneurs with family involvement can try to segment the entrepreneurship-family boundary psychologically. For example, entrepreneurs can avoid business talking with families but show concerns for them at rest time.

WFC has been found negatively related to individual health and well-being. And entrepreneurs experienced even more WFC than employees in established organizations. Therefore, it is of great importance to focus on the topic of reducing entrepreneurs’ WFC. This research indicates that entrepreneurs can experience less WFC by choosing reactive role behavior strategy. Prior experience and family involvement can induce them to be more attached to new venture creation. This research provides practical suggestions and reminders for entrepreneurs.

This mediated moderation model elaborates whether, how and when NVCP affects WFC, thereby contributing to the knowledge of entrepreneurship-family interface and enlightening nascent entrepreneurs about balancing their start-up responsibilities with their family life.