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Existing research on stock price manipulation driven by equity incentives has mainly focused on earnings management, without considering other potential manipulation methods. Therefore, we examine whether management engages in tone management during earnings communication conference following equity incentives.

Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to June 2023 as the sample, we explore the impact mechanism of equity incentives on the tone of earnings communication conference.

Equity incentives are found to increase abnormal tone in earnings communication conferences. The characteristics of equity incentives themselves affect tone management. For instance, equity incentives based on stock options, as well as those within the exercise feasibility year, have a more pronounced effect on facilitating tone management. The mechanisms through which equity incentives affect different tones vary: the increase in positive tone is associated with improved financial performance, while the increase in abnormal tone is linked to executives reducing their holdings to obtain cash. Further discussions reveal that the impact of equity incentives on abnormal tone is weaker when there is a higher degree of real or accrual-based earnings management, suggesting a possible substitution relationship between earnings management and abnormal tone. Additionally, when a company experiences low investment efficiency, high executive compensation and a lower proportion of negative news coverage in the external information environment, the impact of equity incentives on abnormal tone becomes more pronounced.

Our study primarily focuses on conducting exploratory research into the mechanism, purpose, timing and alternative selection of tone management in the year following the grant of equity incentives. We have not provided a detailed theoretical explanation regarding the transmission channels or mechanisms through which tone management affects investor sentiment and trading behavior.

We provide valuable insights for identifying the quality of information disclosure in earnings communication conference.

We clarify the mechanism of equity incentives on management’s tone, reveals the timing preferences of tone management during the earnings communication conference.

The major shareholders may try to manipulate the stock price for tunneling after share lockup expiration, but the earlier studies focus on earnings management and do not consider other potential manipulation methods. Therefore, we explore the tone management of earnings communication conferences.

We take the China A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2021 as our sample to examine how, why and when share lockup expiration of major shareholders affects tone management of earnings communication conference.

Firms tend to engage in tone management in earnings communication conferences when the lockup expires by increasing the optimism of the tone and decreasing the similarity between the responses and questions. The purpose of tone management is not for share reduction, but rather for improving market performance and better share pledge. The effect of share lockup expiration is weaker when the firm engages in real or accrual-based earnings management, and when the firm keeps higher accounting conservatism. In addition, in companies at growth and maturity stages, where executive compensation is high, institutional investor ownership is low and the controlling shareholder is a non-state-owned enterprise, the impact of share lockup expiration on the tone management becomes more pronounced.

Our study reveals the ways and purposes of tone management when share lockup expires, shows the timing preferences of tone management and helps identify the quality of information disclosure in earnings communication conferences, enriching the research on tone management and market value management.

This paper explores the association between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and management tone manipulation.

This study uses data from A-share listed non-financial companies from 2009 to 2021 as its sample for empirical tests. In addition, the study relies on text analysis and the construction of models to investigate the relationship between D&O insurance and management tone manipulation.

The authors find that the purchase of D&O insurance will lead to management tone manipulation in the “management discussion and analysis” part of companies’ annual reports, and operating risk and agent cost are the two paths for the effect. Further analysis shows that having a male CEO and employing high-quality auditors can weaken the positive impact of D&O insurance on tone manipulation.

This paper provides a new approach for studying the literature related to D&O insurance and management behavior, and the findings enrich our understanding of the influencing factors and the mechanism of management tone manipulation, thus revealing policy implications for further standardization of the terms and system of D&O insurance in China.

This paper explores how the disclosure quality, measured by the abnormal tone of environmental and social report, may determine the environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance of the firm. This study also investigates the impact of the moderator “board of directors” to explore the extent to which a well-balanced board of directors may affect this association within an impression management strategy.

This work uses a sample of 616 firm-year observations using a sample of French firms indexed on SBF120 index from 2010 to 2017. To test the developed hypotheses, the GLS regression is applied and to control for endogeneity issue and sample selection bias, the authors used, respectively, the two stage least square (2SLS) procedure and the Heckman model.

Findings suggest that a well-balanced board of directors moderates the relationship between the ESG performance and the disclosure quality. The positive effect of abnormal tone management on ESG is weakened by the presence of a good structure of the board, attenuating impression management initiatives.

The research provides evidence of the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting quality, in particular disclosure tone management, on the level of ESG performance in the French context. As the board of directors may have a major impact on weakening impression management strategies in particular tone management practices, in order to improve CSR report quality, the authors recommend French companies to ensure a well-balanced board of directors.

This study helps investors to comprehensively evaluate the information disclosed on CSR reports. It unveils that a strong board composition induces better quality of CSR report and brings better ESG performance. Thus, the study results point to the importance of a well-balanced board of directors and the regulation of the narrative disclosure of CSR information.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how variations in management’s tone within management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) sections of 10-K reports can serve as an indicator of tax avoidance and highlight the complex relationship between such linguistic shifts and the tax avoidance decisions within firms.

The paper uses a textual analysis approach to identify linguistic cues in MD&A sections of 10-K filings related to tax avoidance, going beyond traditional quantitative measures. The study uses differences in negative word occurrences in MD&A to measure management’s tone change and examines various measures of tax avoidance. The sample covers the period from 1993 to 2017 and comprises all firms with 10-K filings available on EDGAR, totaling over 30,000 firm-year observations.

The findings indicate a complementary relationship between tax avoidance and other drivers of firm performance. When firms have more negative management’s tone, they are less willing to engage in tax avoidance and vice versa. The study’s approach with management’s tone change provides a different and statistically significant improvement in model fit for detecting tax avoidance.

This paper provides actionable insights for detecting tax avoidance through the analysis of management’s tone in corporate disclosures, offering a new tool for researchers, investors and tax authorities. It highlights the importance of linguistic cues as indicators of tax avoidance behavior, complementing traditional financial metrics.

The paper contributes to the literature by using management’s tone change as a time-varying factor to explain tax avoidance behavior. It uncovers a larger set of linguistic cues in MD&A that can be used to detect tax avoidance. This research provides a complementary approach to traditional quantitative tax avoidance measures and offers insights into the overall relationship between tax avoidance and firm performance, going beyond one-dimensional measures typically used in prior literature.

This paper aims to examine whether firms meeting or just beating an earnings benchmark engage in tone management in earnings conference calls to complement earnings management in the UK context. It also investigates whether the audience tone in beating or just meeting earnings fails to predict future performance.

This study was performed using a sample of non-financial UK firms listed in the FTSE 350 index over the period 2010–2015.

The findings show that firms that exercise more earnings management to meet or just beat earnings are positively associated with the abnormal tone during earnings conference calls. The outcomes also reveal that the audience’s tone of firms meeting or just beating an earnings benchmark fails to predict future performance. This confirms the effectiveness of the tone management in managing the perception of audience.

This study highlights the need for increased accountability by firms on earnings conference call. It also supports academics and practitioners in understanding the management discretion used in reporting and communication during the earnings conference call. Overall, the results of this study are beneficial for regulators, policymakers and professionals, regarding confirming the need for the earnings conference calls to be regulated.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the association between earnings management and tone management in the UK earnings conference calls. It adds to the existing literature by examining the self-serving behaviour of managerial tone during earnings conference calls within a sitting in which meeting or just beating a benchmark is used. Unlike several studies that explain the behaviour of tone as a signalling strategy, this study reveals that the tendency of impression management behaviour can explain the tone management.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent corporate social responsibility (CSR) is used as a symbolic strategy of greenwashing. Analyses focus on the relationship between CSR and disclosure tone management practice in sustainable reports derived from social impression management incentives.

This study is based on a sample of French listed firms (SBF 120) over a seven-year period (2010–2016), i.e. 539 firm-year observations.

Multivariate analysis indicates a significant relationship between CSR and disclosure tone management. The obtained results show that firms that are less concerned with tone management in sustainable reporting process consider more socially responsible issues. Findings support the socially substantive initiatives and the transparency perspective of CSR.

The negative association between CSR and tone management highlights the firm’s transparency. However, there could be other discretionary practices which may determine impression management strategies. Thus, future research may consider other discretionary behavior associated with CSR to mislead users.

All actors (government, green-association, investors, etc.) interested in CSR and greenwashing issues have to bring initiatives to reinforce the monitoring and reporting procedures.

This study investigates the association between CSR and disclosure tone management for the French context since the specificity of its regulatory framework of CSR disclosure. Thus, corporate narrative reporting users may be required to consider impression management practices (i.e. tone management) and read between the lines.

The authors investigate whether abnormal tone in corporate narrative disclosures is associated with earnings management and earnings quality, in an emerging market context. Based on agency theory and opportunistic/impression management perspective, this study examines whether executives manage disclosure tone to support their opportunistic behavior, when using earnings management.

This study uses a sample of earnings press releases of publicly traded firms in the MENA region during 2014–2019. It employs textual analysis to measure disclosure tone. The authors estimate abnormal disclosure tone after controlling for firm characteristics. Discretionary accruals proxy for earnings management and are estimated using Modified Jones model. Earnings quality is measured using accounting-based and market-based proxies: earnings smoothness, persistence, predictability and value relevance/informativeness.

Results show a positive association between abnormal disclosure tone and earnings management. Additionally, results show that earnings persistence is higher for firms with lower levels of abnormal disclosure tone. Results are sustained for earnings smoothness, but not for predictability and value relevance/informativeness.

Results provide initial evidence of management's use of tone management jointly with earnings management. This adds to prior studies adopting the opportunistic perspective of disclosure tone, through showing that discretionary tone in narrative disclosures can be strategically used by management to influence investors' perceptions.

The results provide valuable insight to board of directors, auditors and market participants on the possible biases emerging from tone of narrative disclosures in corporate reports. For regulators and standard-setters, results shed light on the need for regulations and rules beyond financial statements, to guide disclosure of narrative information in different corporate reports.

This study contributes to the rare evidence that investigates textual disclosure characteristics to uncover management's opportunistic practices and assess earnings quality. Where majority of studies concentrate on developed markets, this study provides novel evidence of emerging markets by examining the association between abnormal disclosure tone and earnings management/earnings quality. Also, it validates the tone management model proposed by Huang et al. (2014) for capturing tone manipulation.

This paper examines the effect of audit committee (AC) reporting, measured by the tone of audit committee disclosures, in improving financial reporting quality as proxied by earnings management.

The authors focus on the textual properties of AC reports, particularly the tone of AC disclosure, and their impact on financial reporting quality proxied using real and accruals-based earnings management. For additional analysis, the authors use a financial reporting index and matched sample. The analysis is based on a sample of UK FTSE 350 firms.

The analysis suggests that AC reports are not boilerplate but varied in language. The authors find AC reporting is negatively associated with both real and accruals-based earnings management. In our additional tests, the authors find a positive association between financial reporting quality index and reporting tone.

Overall, this paper provides baseline evidence for future research and policy making and reveals that ACs reporting what they have done increases transparency and impacts on reporting quality.

Overall, this paper suggests that the tone of AC reports seems to convey information that affects the communication function of AC reporting and thereby helps to improve reporting quality.

Though the importance of AC disclosures in improving reporting quality is well recognised in policy guidelines and governance recommendations, no study has employed computer-based textual analysis of AC reports and investigated the effect of AC disclosure tone and the role it can play in achieving higher reporting quality.

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance and tone management in the annual report. This is based on the notion that managers, driven by personal interests, may use their ESG accomplishments by using an abnormal positive tone to enhance their reputation or career prospects.

Using panel data from Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2022, this study first investigates the relationship between ESG performance and abnormal tone management. The study then uncovers this relationship is mediated through the mechanisms of equity-based incentive and analyst coverage. The conclusions of this paper hold even after a series of robustness tests, such as propensity score matching, Heckman two-stage method and two-stage least squares with instrumental variables.

This study finds a positive correlation between ESG performance and the presence of abnormal positive tone in annual reports. Furthermore, the mechanistic analysis reveals that managers in companies with strong ESG performance are motivated to use an overly positive tone, largely due to their vested interests in equity-based compensation. Moreover, in an effort to alleviate the pressure stemming from heightened financial analyst coverage and enhance the impression conveyed through analysts' reports, managers with superior ESG performance also tend to inflate the tone within their annual reports.

This study provides significant insights into the ongoing dialogue surrounding ESG-related equity incentives, which incentivize managerial manipulation of stock prices through the use of abnormal positive tone. The findings call upon investors to exercise greater vigilance in examining narrative information in annual reports, as abnormally positive tones may not always faithfully represent performance but rather reflect managerial self-interest.

There is an emphasis on the importance of robust oversight mechanisms within corporate governance bodies to curb the manipulation of tone for managers’ personal gain.

This study enhances the theoretical foundation of ESG studies, offering a holistic perspective on the intricate interplay among ESG performance, managerial behavior and financial markets, with potential implications for researchers, investors and regulators.