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This study aims to examine the simultaneous effect of variations in the Capital Adequacy Ratio and Credit Risk of Islamic banks of the Gulf Cooperation Council under the influence of the Basel III regulations using an innovative approach.

This approach highlights the critical importance of the Basel III reform in preserving the stability of the regional and international financial sector in the Gulf Cooperation Council and globally by examining the complex dynamics between Capital Adequacy Ratio and Credit Risk and their interaction under regulatory constraints. The annual reports and financial performance of 26 Islamic banks were analyzed over the period 2013–2021.

The findings highlight the critical importance of the Basel III reform in preserving the stability of the regional and international financial sector in the Gulf Cooperation Council and globally by examining the complex dynamics between Capital Adequacy Ratio and Credit Risk and their interaction under regulatory constraints. The annual reports and financial performance of 26 Islamic banks were analyzed over the period 2013–2021.

The insights from findings help define effective strategies to manage and mitigate Credit Risk while strengthening solvency under Basel III prudential supervision. Policymakers, regulatory authorities and banking institutions can optimize the management of Credit Risk and create a robust and stable financial environment for Islamic banks.

The purpose of this paper is to review the development of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and examine the manner in which this has been implemented for investment firms in Malta. The paper also assesses the challenges that small and medium‐sized investment firms may face as a consequence of the proposed CRD IV, which seeks to safeguard the stability of the European banking sector.

A literature review of relevant EU and Malta legislation and policy documents has been carried out. The arguments made in the paper are the result of the author's reflections on the subject and discussions held with other policy experts on capital adequacy in Malta and the UK.

The paper considers the CRD from the perspective of small and medium‐sized investment firms and sheds light on the challenges faced by Malta with regards to the implementation of the CRD for these type of firms. It also examines the approach taken by the Malta Financial Services Authority in order to address these challenges.

Possible future challenges that might arise in view of CRD IV are also considered. It is a central argument of this paper that capturing investment firms, particularly small and medium‐sized firms, within the scope of regulation, the main purpose of which is to address systemic risk, may result in over‐regulation.

This study aims to investigate the effect of regulatory pressure on discretionary capital management measured with the discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) in public (PuBs) and Private (PrBs) banks in Tunisia. Three variables are used to proxy the regulatory capital constraints: (1) the change in capital requirements, (2) the beginning of the year capital ratio (3) and the end of year adjusted capital ratio.

To address our objective, we provide in a first step the DLLP estimation as done by Shantaram and Steven (2021). Then, in a second step based on hand-collected panel data on the 12 commercial Tunisian banks, linear dynamic model with interaction variables is conducted to discriminate between PuBs and PrBs behavior. The generelized method of moment (GMM) estimation is applied to show if the PuBs and PrBs behave differently to regulatory capital pressures. For robustness check, the discriminant analysis and the nonlinear probit and logit models are considered in a third step.

The three capital constraints affect differently the discretionary behavior of Banks. First, an increase in capital requirements makes PrBs under pressure to reduce their DLLP, which is not the case for PuBs. Second, a low capital ratio at the beginning of the year makes strong pressure on PuBs to reduce their DLLP. Third, neither PrBs nor PuBs decrease their DLLP to improve the end of year-adjusted capital ratio. The discretionary behavior of PrBs is influenced by pressures to appear well-capitalized while the behavior of PuBs is influenced by pressure to enhance their capital positions. These results are well strengthened by the discriminant analysis and the nonlinear probit and logit model investigations.?

A few studies examined incentives based on the regulatory theory in Tunisian banks and were carried out within static linear models. Contrary to Elleuch and Taktak (2015) who tested the regulatory incentives following the publication of the (IMF, 2002), this paper tests, within linear dynamic model and nonlinear model, the effect of national prudential rules on capital management between 2006 and 2016.

By reinforcing monetary policy independence, reducing international financing pressures and avoiding high-risk takings, capital controls strengthen the stability of the financial system and then reduce the volatility of capital inflows. The objective of this study was to conduct an empirical examination of this hypothesis. This topic has received strong support in the theoretical literature; however, empirical work has been quite limited, with few empirical studies that provide direct empirical support to this hypothesis.

This study analyzed quarterly data of 32 emerging economies over the period between 2000 and 2015 and proposes two methods to identify capital control actions. Using panel analysis, Autoregressive Distributed Lag and local projections approaches.

This study found that tighter capital controls may diminish monetary and exchange rate shocks and reduce capital inflows volatility. Furthermore, capital controls respond counter-cyclically to monetary shocks. Under capital controls, countries with floating exchange rate regimes have more potential to buffer monetary shocks. We also found that capital controls on inflows are more effective for reducing the volatility of capital inflows compared to capital controls on outflows.

This study contributes to the question of the effectiveness of capital controls in attenuating the effects of international shocks and reducing the volatility of capital flows. Previous studies have mostly focused on the role of macroprudential regulation; however, there is a lack of systematic effects of capital controls on monetary and exchange rate policies. To our knowledge, this is the first preliminary study to suggest that capital controls may buffer monetary and exchange rate shocks and reduce the volatility of capital inflows. This study investigates the novel notion that capital controls allow for a notable counter-cyclical response of monetary and exchange rate policies to international financial shocks.

In a bid to enhance the stability of banks, supervisory authorities in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) have also adopted international bank regulatory standards based on the Basel core principles. This paper aims to investigate the effectiveness of these regulations in mitigating Bank risk (instability) in SSA. The focus of empirical analysis is on examining the implications of four regulations (capital, activity restrictions, supervisory power and market discipline) on risk-taking behaviour of banks.

This paper uses two dimensions of financial stability in relation to two different sources of bank risk: solvency risk and liquidity risk. This paper uses information from the World Bank Regulatory Survey database to construct regulation indices on activity restrictions and the three regulations pertaining to the three pillars of Basel II, i.e. capital, supervisory power and market discipline. The paper then uses a two-step system generalised method of moments estimator to estimate the impact of each regulation on solvency and liquidity risk.

The overall results show that: regulations pertaining to capital (Pillar 1) and market discipline (Pillar 3) are effective in reducing solvency risk; and regulations pertaining to supervisory power (Pillar 2) and activity restrictions increase liquidity risk (i.e. reduce bank stability).

Given some evidence from other studies which show that market power (competition) tends to condition the effect of regulations on bank stability, it would have been more informative to examine whether this is really the case in SSA, given the low levels of competition in some countries. This study is limited in this regard.

The key policy implications from the study findings are three-fold: bank supervisory agencies in SSA should prioritise the adoption of Pillars 1 and 3 of the Basel II framework as an effective policy response to enhance the stability of the banking system; a universal banking model is more stability enhancing; and there is a trade-off between stronger supervisory power and liquidity stability that needs to be properly managed every time regulatory agencies increase their supervisory mandate.

This paper provides new evidence on which Pillars of the Basel II regulatory framework are more effective in reducing bank risk in SSA. This paper also shows that the way regulations affect solvency risk is different from that of liquidity risk – an approach that allows for case specific policy interventions based on the type of bank risk under consideration. Ignoring this dual dimension of bank stability can thus lead to erroneous policy inferences.

A functional financial sector is a major driver of economic development. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive understanding of existing research findings, gaps in knowledge and emerging trends in the field of banking and finance.

By conducting a systematic literature review, a total of 98 peer-reviewed articles whose focus and relevance match with the subject matter were reviewed and synthesised to answer the research questions. Multiple regression was also carried to investigate the relationship amongst the identified probable factors affecting financial inclusions.

The outcome of this study highlighted some factors mitigating the growth of the banking sector in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These include excessive or stringent regulations, market segmentation, high interest rates, information asymmetry, low credit status and uneven distribution of credit amongst others.

Some of the policy recommendations that could aid the development of the banking sector in SSA include: development and deepening of interbank markets, financial inclusion, improvement of overall market efficiency through redistribution of liquidity within the banking system, improvement of price and encouragement of competition. This study recommends financial inclusion by formulating policies that balances the capital adequacy requirements with the risk of insolvency to ensure credit flows and promotes financial stability via effective operations financial institutions.

This study contributes valuable insights to the understanding of banking and financial regulations in SSA, informing both academic research and policy development in the region.

This paper empirically examines the short-term and long-term associations between risk, capital and efficiency (R-C-E) in the Indian banking sector across 2008–2019 to answer the presence of causation or contemporaneousness in the R-C-E nexus.

The paper focuses on three objectives. First, the authors determine short-term causality in the risk–efficiency relationship by studying the simultaneous influence of a wide array of banking risks on DEA-based technical and cost efficiency in static and dynamic situations. Second, the authors introduce bank capital and contemporaneously determine the interplay between R-C-E using seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE) and three-staged least squares (3SLS). Last, the authors assess stability in inter-temporal associations using Granger causality in an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) generalized method of moments (GMM) framework.

The authors contend that high capital buffers reduce insolvency risk and increase bank stability. Technically efficient banks carry lesser equity buffers, suggesting a trade-off between capital and efficiency. However, capitalization makes banks more technically efficient but not cost-efficient, implying that over-capitalization creates cost inefficiencies, which, in line with the cost skimping hypothesis, forces banks to undertake risk. Concerning causal relationships, the authors conclude that inefficiency Granger-causes insolvency and increases bank risk. Further, steady increases in capital precede technical and cost efficiency improvements. The converse also holds as more efficient banks depict temporal increases in capitalization levels.

The paper is perhaps the first that acknowledges the influence of the “time” perspective on the R-C-E nexus in an emerging economy and advocates that prudential regulations must focus on short-term and long-term intricacies among the triumvirate to foster a stable banking environment.

The purpose of this paper is to examine insurance regulation theories, regulatory agency structures and measures.

This study investigates significance of regulatory agency structure, key regulatory measures, political stability and cultural dimension in insurance markets of 56 developed and developing countries for 2005‐2009.

It was found that insurance consumption is lower in countries with an authority exclusively for insurance regulation but life insurance consumption is higher when the agency is part of government or when another agency is jointly responsible for insurance regulation. Market entry regulation leads to lower consumption whereas market exit regulation has the opposite effect. Solvency regulation and required use of standard forms for insurer financials lead to greater consumption of insurance. A positive impact on the nonlife market is observed for accounting regulation and regulator's intervention power.

Price control regulation may lower consumption of insurance whereas tariff rating brings about a rise in the consumption. Regulation of insurance intermediaries or corporate governance may lower insurance consumption whereas the requirement that insurers employ an actuary or actuaries gives rise to the consumption.

The author found no difference between OECD and non‐OECD countries. However, corruption‐freeness and inflation impact insurance consumption. Using OECD country data only, a negative impact was found of the single agency structure and tariff regulation in the life insurance market and a positive impact of regulation by two or more agencies in the life insurance market and of price control regulation in the nonlife insurance market. Corruption‐freeness positively affects the loss ratio in the life insurance market and the combined ratio in the nonlife insurance market.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of regulation and market competition on the risk-taking Behaviour of financial institutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

The empirical framework is based on panel fixed effects/random effects specification. For robustness purpose, this study also uses the generalized method of moments estimation technique. This study tests the hypothesis that regulatory capital requirements have a significant effect on financial stability of Islamic and conventional banks (CBs) in the MENA region. This study also investigates the moderating effect of market power and concentration on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk.

The estimation results support the view that capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has no significant impact on credit risk of Islamic banks (IBs), whereas market competition does play a significant role in shaping the risk behavior of these institutions. This study report opposite results for CBs – an increase in the minimum capital requirements is followed by an increase in a bank’s risk level, which has a negative impact on their financial stability. Furthermore, the results support the notion of a non-linear relationship between banking concentration and bank risk. The findings inform the regulatory authorities concerned with improving the financial stability of banking sector in the MENA region to set their policy differently depending on the level of concentration in the banking market.

This study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulatory reforms (in this case, capital requirements) and market competition for bank performance and risk-taking. In regard to IBs, capital requirements are less effective in requiring IBs to adjust their risk level according to the Basel III methodology. This study finds that IBs’ risk behavior is strongly associated with market competition, and therefore, the interest rates. Moreover, banks operating in markets with high banking concentration (but not necessarily, low competition), will decrease their credit risk level in response to an increase in the minimum capital requirements. As a result, these banks will be more stable compared to their conventional peers. Thus, regulators and policymakers in the MENA region should restrict the risk-taking behavior of IBs through stringent capital requirements and more intense banking supervision.

The practical implications of these findings are that the regulatory authorities concerned with improving banking sector stability in the MENA region should proceed differently, depending on the level of banking market concentration. The findings inform regulators and policymakers to set capital requirements at levels that would restrict banks from taking more risk to increase their returns. They are also important for bank managers who should avoid risky strategies in response to increased regulatory pressure (e.g. increase in the minimum required capital level of 8%), as they may lead to an increase in the level of non-performing loans, and therefore, a greater probability of bank default. A future extension of this study will focus on testing the effect of bank risk-taking and market competition on the capitalization levels of banks in the MENA countries. More specifically, this study will investigates if banks raise their capitalization levels during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The analysis of previous research indicates that there is no unambiguous answer to the question of whether IBs perform differently than CBs under different competitive conditions. To fill this gap, this study examines the influence of capital regulation and market competition (both individually and interactively) on bank risk-taking behavior using a large sample of banking institutions in 18 MENA countries over 14 years (2005–2018). For the first time in this line of research, this study shows that the level of market power is positively associated with the level of a bank’ insolvency risk. In others words, IBs operating in highly competitive markets are more inclined to take a higher risk than their conventional peers. Regarding the IBs credit risk behavior, this study finds that market power has a limited impact on the relationship between CAR and risk level. This means that IBs are still applying in their operations the theoretical models based on the prohibition of interest.