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A difference is noted by comparing the net loans to the non-financial sector in the two sets of institutions. The post-global financial crisis (GFC), literature agrees on a reduced lending pace by financial institutions (FIs) as a result of stricter capital regulations. At the same time, an increasing volume of outstanding loans, directed even to advanced countries, characterize the balance sheet of several multilateral development banks (MDBs).

This paper observes how a different degree of banking regulation might have shaped the economic response to the GFC by FIs and MDBs.

The authors indicate that MDBs’ financing, with a coherent objective of countercyclical support to the economies hit by the GFC, seems to have filled a market gap caused by the FIs’ pro-cyclical lending reduction.

While a controversial issue is whether Basel standards should be imposed on MDBs, a harmonization amongst MDBs of their transparency and reporting standards might be beneficial: some preliminary consideration has been portrayed.

A psychological contract (PC) reflects the relationship(s) between employees and their employers and involves a personal interpretation of the obligations and rewards between those parties. Within the auditing profession, while the actual “employers” of auditors are the auditing firms that pay the auditor’s salary, auditors engage in multiple functionally interdependent affiliations in which PCs are developed: auditor to auditor; auditor to the profession and its overseers; and auditors to the company being audited. Unfortunately, another party (society), which should be viewed as a critical part of the audit relationship, is often ignored. This paper poses the idea that the PCs existing between employees within auditing firms and between auditing firms and external parties may be important, but less recognized, underlying causes of the profession’s problems. Current auditor PCs appear to be internally contradictory and out-of-sync with the demands of the investing public and society in general. Suggestions are made about how PCs and relationships may be modified to be more attune to societal needs.

After the precipitated decline of the Soviet Empire and its satellite states, a system change seemed to be called for, and many countries embarked on social and political reforms focussing on property structures in the economy. This raised the issue of governance in the institutions that would constitute the structures in which production would have to take place. In particular, some Central European countries opted for mass privatisations of the means of production, on the face of it so as to have the people participate in the wealth of the nation. In fact, the wealth of the nation depends on the structures in which it is constituted. Dissipation of property rights will reduce the value of the nation's productive capital, whereas an intelligent structure that creates good governance structures at the same time, increases the value of the producing capital. This relatively simple insight lies at the heart of our understanding of how to analyse different processes of mass privatisation. This essay develops a theoretical framework by which different governance structures can be analysed. The framework consists of a blend of the economic theory of property rights, new institutional economics and Austrian economic theory.

This study aims to examine the impacts of board chairman characteristics on the decision to finance with debts.

Based on historical data from 173 active nonfinancial firms listed on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Stock Exchange Markets during 2012–2019, this research uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and dynamic system-generalized methods of moments to test its hypotheses. The final dataset comprises 1,384 firm-year observations from 10 major nonfinancial industry classifications.

Results indicate a negative impact of board chairman ownership on the decision to finance with retained earnings (RE). Negative effects of the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) from the same family on the decision to finance with RE, whereas positive effects of the chairman and CEO from the same family on the decision to finance with debts are observed. In addition, a negative effect of the chairman from a royal family on the decision to invest with debts is found.

Many board chairmen characteristics, such as age, gender, experience, education level, periodic change and ethnicity, are unaddressed. Financial decisions (FDs) are also limited to two decisions (internal financing with RE and external financing with debts).

Findings of this study provide an improved understanding of the role of chairman characteristics in FDs in GCC. Investors and lenders dealing with companies in GCC markets benefit from the authors' results because of the effects of chairman characteristics on FDs when making investment decisions in company stocks.

The study clarifies how each of the three board chairman characteristics (i.e. chairman ownership, chairman and CEO from the same family and the chairman from the royal family) affects FDs, especially the decisions to finance with debts and RE.

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) commonly struggle to acquire needed financial, human, and technological resources. The above being stated, recent scholarly research argues that SMEs that are able to successfully navigate the legitimacy threshold are better able to gather the resources they need to survive and grow. This article provides an empirical test of that claim by examining whether the presence of a corporate parent positively influences SME resource acquisition. Results of the study show that SMEs with corporate parents, when compared to like-sized independent SMEs, have higher credit scores, have more complete management teams, use more computers, and are more likely to be on the Internet. These differences are most pronounced for very small firms and diminish in significance as firm size increases. Study implications include the notion that presence of a corporate parent likely represents a successful navigation of the legitimacy threshold, positively increasing SME resource acquisition.

Using the backdrop of an (apparently) extended visit to the West Indies, analogies with key concerns of internal audit are drawn. An unusual and refreshing way of exploring the main themes ‐ a discussion between Bill and Jack on tour in the islands ‐ forms the debate. Explores the concepts of control, necessary procedures, fraud and corruption, supporting systems, creativity and chaos, and building a corporate control facility.

Using the backdrop of an (apparently) extended visit to the West Indies, analogies with key concerns of internal audit are drawn. An unusual and refreshing way of exploring the main themes ‐ a discussion between Bill and Jack on tour in the islands ‐ forms the debate. Explores the concepts of control, necessary procedures, fraud and corruption, supporting systems, creativity and chaos, and building a corporate control facility.

This paper aims to investigate auditor choice in those Italian non-listed firms adopting the “traditional” model of corporate governance. In Italy, non-listed firms can choose between two types of auditor: the Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA), that is the statutory auditors, or an “external” auditor. At the same time, a BSA conducts the administrative auditing for all companies with equity exceeding €120,000.

The paper estimates a logistic regression model of firm auditor choice between an external auditor and the BSA, which incorporates variables proxying for both agency conflict and organizational complexity effects.

The results show that of the potential agency factors, only board independence drives auditor choice, whereas organizational complexity and risk factors including firm size, investment in inventories, subsidiary status and complexity drive auditor choice. These results may be explained in the administrative audit role of the BSA, which monitors both day-by-day firm operations and the financial statements preparation “project”. Stakeholders as a result are reassured that, in general, their interests are protected. Finally, it was found that legal form and voluntary International Financial Reporting Standards compliance exert an impact on auditor choice.

The paper provides support for an internal yet independent auditing body such as the Italian BSA as a wider model for corporate governance in European non-listed firms (OECD, 2004 and 2015). The BSA as an administrative and financial auditing body made up solely of independent highly qualified professionals can work within the firm on an operational basis, and in so doing can increase stakeholder protection.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Essex has one of the country's largest library systems with 92 libraries and issues running at over 18 million per annum. A system of this size was bound to represent a challenge to any system supplier. After a period of evaluation Essex chose Geac to supply a system to meet their needs. The article describes the selection and implementation of the system, some of the benefits which have accrued and the developments, both current and future.