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This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.

Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.

Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.

In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.

This study aims to examine how brands can leverage on advergames as an interactive marketing tool to foster prosumer culture and build a sacred brand. Drawing from game theory, this research scrutinizes how advergame format (cooperative vs noncooperative) influences consumers’ perceived brand sacredness by harnessing positive brand relationship quality (BRQ) and intention to prosume. It also examines how reward types moderate the relationship between advergame format and advergamers’ BRQ.

Three different studies were conducted. Study 1 develops a measure to capture advergamers’ intention to prosume. Study 2 uses survey to collect data from brand-controlled gaming community platform. Study 3 is an experiment that uses 2 (game format: cooperative vs noncooperative) × 2 (reward type: hedonic vs utilitarian) between-subject format.

Study 1 provides a reliable and valid measure to capture “intention to prosume.” The results of Study 2 elucidate that (non) cooperative advergame format generates strong cold (hot) BRQ, leading to intention to prosume, which, in turn, drives brand sacredness. The results of Study 3 elucidate that using (utilitarian) hedonic rewards strengthens the impact of (non) cooperative advergame format on (cold) hot BRQ.

This research has examined the roles of cooperative vs noncooperative game design formats and hedonic vs utilitarian reward formats. Future research may focus on other possible advergame design formats and reward types.

This research provides insights to advergame marketers toward designing appropriate hedonic or utilitarian game rewards to strengthen the impact of cooperative vs noncooperative advergame format on brand sacredness through enhancing BRQ and intention to prosume among the target advergamers.

This research applies game theory in the advergaming context to manoeuvre game format and rewards so that a sustainable prosumption culture is built, which has strong beliefs about the sacredness of the brand.

In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans.

This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics.

This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand.

This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.

Mobile ad hoc networks rely on cooperation to perform essential network mechanisms such as routing. Therefore, network performance depends to a great extent on giving participating nodes an incentive for cooperation. The level of trust among nodes is the most frequently used parameter for promoting cooperation in distributed systems. There are different models for representing trust, each of which is suited to a particular context and leads to different procedures for computing and propagating trust. The goal of this study is to analyze the most representative approaches for mobile ad hoc networks. It aims to obtain a qualitative comparison of the modeling approaches, according to the three basic components of a trust model: information gathering, information scoring and ranking, and action execution.

The paper identifies the different tasks required by a trust system and compares the way they are implemented when the system model itself is based on information theory, social networks, cluster concept, graph theory and game theory. It also provides a common nomenclature for the models. The study concentrates exclusively on the trust models themselves, without taking into account other aspects of the original articles that are beyond the scope of this analysis.

The study identifies the main components that a trust model must provide, and compares the way they are implemented. It finds that the lack of unity in the different proposed approaches makes it difficult to conduct an objective comparison. Finally, it also notices that most of the models do not properly manage node reintegration.

The best of our knowledge, the study is the first that uses information scoring and ranking as classification key. According to this key, approaches can be classified as based on information theory, clusters and social network theory, and cooperative and non‐cooperative game theory. It also provides a common nomenclature for all of them. Finally, the main contribution of the paper is to provide an analysis of the most representative approaches and present a novel qualitative comparison.

This paper aims to show that evolutionary game theory not only provides a general and unified theory of political philosophy and strategic management theories but also a positive theory of interactive behavior.

This study suggests a way of the evolutionary game-theoretical model.

The model presented in this paper demonstrates coopetition is derived from balance points in multi-actor games. As the political–philosophical address of those strategic games will of all becomes convention in this balance point at which common knowledge occurs global optimum.

This study explores the connections between several streams in philosophy and strategic management. What does a particular philosophy contribute to strategic management with respect to game theory? When addressing this question in historical or exploratory terms, or in a combination of both, the end result is similar: particular philosophical issues, properly explained, are discussed in relation to important questions in strategic management.

What are the psychological and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decisions of this kind? What type of cognitive frames and managerial mental models, such as the game-theoretical model, might enable or hinder the integration of real-world problems in strategic decision-making?

What explains the evolution of such mental models, as well as the development of philosophical ideas, in informing the origins? How does the evolution of social and political contexts influence change in the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decision-making?

This study highlights the overt power of strategic management ideas – competition, cooperation and coopetition – which have historically been built on the foundations of organizational theory, while also underlying the potential of philosophies, collective wisdom and Condorcet’s jury theorem and Rousseau’s (1998) correctness theory in games of evaluation. This study investigates whether the many produce better decisions than the wise few.

Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff's 1995 co‐opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments.

The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled.

The co‐opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff's model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative).

This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision‐ and policy‐makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies.

A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

Farmer-supermarket direct purchase (FSDP) is one of the significant innovative modes in the circulation of agricultural products. The previous studies on the FSDP mode were mainly premised on the assumption of power symmetry among cooperative players. Nevertheless, in reality, power asymmetry often exists among players because of restricted coalitions and diverse input resources. In this research, the influence of power asymmetry on profit distribution among various players in FSDP is explored.

The power asymmetry within FSDP is explored in two aspects: the distinct status of coalition structure and the varying degrees of dependence among players. Since FSDP is a typical cooperative mode, an average tree solution (abbreviated as “A-T solution”) of a cooperative game with a restricted coalition structure and the tripartite mutual deterrence model with a dependency factor are analyzed. Subsequently, the corresponding profit distribution strategies of FSDP are provided.

This research demonstrates that the cooperative coalition structure and/or location and the degree of dependence on other players can affect their profit-earning capacity during the FSDP process. Furthermore, the players' ability to distribute profits is negatively associated with the degree of interdependence (dependency factor). It is shown by the fact that cooperatives are at the center of FSDP, as farmers in China are a dispersed and powerless group; in a word, the FSDP supply chain is a restricted coalition structure. Even in an arbitrary coalition structure, farmers still remain in a weak position and lack the power of speech in the distribution of profits. Therefore, enhancing the position of farmers is necessary to stabilize cooperative relationships in supply chains.

These methods have broad potential applications to research power asymmetry in supply chain management. However, it is only applicable in situations where significant information on alliance structure and the dependence degree is available.

This study concentrates on the factors of power asymmetry and investigates the influence of power asymmetry on the profit distribution among players, thereby expanding the depth and width of the research on FSDP. The key contribution of this paper lies in explaining the “unfair” profit distribution scheme in FSDP from coalition cooperative game and bargaining game theory (a mathematical perspective). It provides a decision-making basis for enhancing the overall position of farmers in the agricultural supply chain.

In Canada, grain handling is an important agri-business that has traditionally been cooperative in nature (for example, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool). At the same time the industry is heavily regulated. There has been a dramatic change in the structure of the industry over the past 20 years and there are currently no major cooperatives present in the market. If the “yardstick effect” hypothesis of the role of cooperatives in an imperfectly competitive market is true, the disappearance of cooperatives could result in the ability of remaining firms to exercise market power over producers. To investigate the impact of changes in ownership structure in the market, we estimated two types of pricing games that might have been played between a cooperative, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP) and an investor-owned firm (IOF), Pioneer Grain (PG) in the Saskatchewan wheat-handling market over the period 1980–2004, with different assumptions about their pricing behavior imposed. We find that SWP and PG have likely been playing a Bertrand pricing game in the market over the period. We thus conclude that SWP, as the largest cooperative in the market, likely played a “yardstick effect” role in the market.

Rational choice theory has numerous implications for the analysis of organizational governance structures. This chapter reviews some of these applications. The main emphasis is on relational contracting. It will be argued that repeated games theory, that is, a variant of rational choice that deals with rational agents who repeatedly interact, can explain the outcomes of relational contracting. There is some controversy about the merits of rational choice explanations. Can they deal with inefficient structures and their (alleged) stability, with path dependence and mimetic processes? Many of these issues have been addressed by new sociological institutionalists. It is argued that rational choice analysis is in fact consistent with many of these observations. There is, in other words, some convergence between rational choice and institutionalist approaches.

This chapter will address (only) one issue from the 1960s substantivist/formalist debate, the treatment of choice. The substantivists rejected the economic universality of the neoclassical axioms of choice under scarcity and the isolated and selfish nature of the choice process. A common formalist response was that their model based on these axioms could be modified to include whatever specific conditions economic choice was being made under. This chapter rejects that claim, based on a consideration not included in the debate. It is argued that the mathematical structure of the standard formal neoclassical model prevents it from incorporating the substantivist criticisms, and that to modify it in accord with these criticisms would necessarily result in a model that is outside the neoclassical approach to economic decision-making.