Search results

We investigate whether external investment banks or internal key IPO insiders such as company directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions that hold an IPO's stock serve as effective monitors of IPO investments over the post-IPO period. We measure median changes in each group's holdings for the sample, finding large changes in these values during a long-run holding period. We find that long-run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) are positively related to the lead investment bank underwriter reputation and the gross spread demonstrating that the external monitoring by investment banking firms increases the post-IPO firm's value. Holding the underwriter reputation constant, we find that the BHARs are positively related to the gross spread, also indicative of the value of monitoring by external investment banks.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of different categories of ownership concentration on corporate voluntary disclosure practices in New Zealand.

The study applies panel data regression analysis to a sample of New Zealand listed companies from 2001 to 2005. Two‐stage least squares analysis (2SLS) is conducted. Ownership concentration is categorised into four mutually exclusive ownership structures.

The paper finds that firm‐year observations characterised by financial institution‐controlled ownership structure tends to make significantly fewer (more) disclosures at high (low) concentration levels supporting expropriation. In contrast, firm‐year observations in the high (low) concentration group with government‐ and management‐controlled ownership structures exhibit considerably higher (lower) voluntary disclosure scores, suggesting a positive monitoring effect at high ownership concentration level.

The results provide evidence for the proposition that the efficiency of large block holders' monitoring varies with the level of ownership concentration.

To promote transparency in capital markets, regulators can encourage or discourage certain types of large shareholding, while monitoring the level of ownership concentration by means of regulation. Investors, especially less sophisticated retail investors, will benefit from the findings that different ownership groups affect disclosure policies differently.

The findings strengthen the importance of differentiating ownership structures into various classes to infer the real impact of differential controlling properties on managerial disclosure decisions. Furthermore, the results reveal that the relationship between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure practices has a non‐linear pattern.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in China private listed companies.

By taking into account of the difference of managerial positions of large shareholders in listed companies (whether they assume the posts as presidents or general managers), and based on the two agency theories, the paper analyzes the state dependency of the relationship between ownership concentration and the company performance of listed companies with the samples of China private listed companies from 2003 to 2011.

The paper finds that if the large shareholders assume no posts in the listed companies, there is an inverted U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the inadequate or excessive monitoring to the companies by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios. If large shareholders assume posts in the listed companies, there is a U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the tunneling and propping to the small shareholders by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios.

This paper has not taken the influence of earnings management of the listed companies.

For strengthening the protection of investors, proper distinction shall be made among shareholders of different conditions, and difference of roles large shareholders play in the company under different conditions shall be understood correctly, so as to formulate and perfect market rules for corporate governance, rather than just restraining the power (rights) of large shareholders. The study in this paper is for helping understand the different roles large shareholders play under different corporate governance conditions.

First, different from the research paradigm of relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in existing literature, the paper discriminates the study background with the post-assuming conditions of large shareholders in listed companies and believes that relationship between ownership concentration and company performance shall be presented differently under different post-assuming conditions. Second, by using monitoring theory and tunneling and propping theory to explain the behaviors of large shareholders under different post-assuming conditions respectively, a new theory explanation view is provided for explaining the relation between ownership concentration and company performance.

Internet monitoring in organizations can be used to monitor risks associated with Internet usage and information systems in organizations, such as employees' cyberloafing behavior and information security incidents. Extant research has mainly discussed the effect of Internet monitoring in achieving the targeted goals (e.g. mitigating cyberloafing behavior and information security incidents), but little attention has been paid to the possible side effects of Internet monitoring. Drawing on affective events theory, the authors attempt to reveal that Internet monitoring may cause side effects on employees' Internet usage policy satisfaction, intrinsic work motivation and affective organizational commitment.

The authors conducted a field experiment in a software development company. In total, 70 employees participated in the study. Mann–Whitney U test was employed to analyze the data.

The results suggest that Internet monitoring decreased employees' satisfaction with the Internet usage policy, intrinsic work motivation, as well as affective organizational commitment.

This study contributes to the literature by examining the side effects of Internet monitoring on employees. It also has implications for organizations to make appropriate decisions regarding whether to implement Internet monitoring.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the quality of the credit process is sensitive to reaching a particular threshold level of non-performing loans (NPLs) and, more importantly, whether higher NPLs ratios could make the monitoring activity ineffective.

The empirical design is composed of two steps: in the first step, the authors introduce a monitoring performance indicator (MPI) of the credit process by combining the non-parametric technique Data Envelopment Analysis with some financial ratios adopted as input and output variables. As second step, the authors apply a threshold panel regression model to a sample of 298 Italian banks, over the time period 2006–2014, and the authors investigate whether the quality of the credit process is sensitive to reaching a particular threshold level of NPLs.

This paper finds that, first, when the NPLs ratio remains below the threshold value estimated endogenously, an increase in the quality of monitoring has a positive impact on the NPLs ratio. Second, if the NPLs ratio exceeds the estimated threshold, the relationship between the NPLs ratio and quality of monitoring assumes a positive value and is statistically significant.

Due to the lack of data, the investigation of NPLs in the Italian industry across loan types combined with the monitoring effort by banks management was not possible. The authors plan to investigate this topic in future studies.

The identification of the threshold has a double operational valence. The first regards the Supervisory Authority, the threshold approach could be used as an early warning in order to introduce active control strategies based on the additional information requested or by on-site inspections. The second implication is highlighted in relation to the individual banks, the monitoring of credit control quality, if objective and comparable, could facilitate the emergence of best practices among banks.

A high NPLs ratio requires greater loan provisions, which reduces capital resources available for lending, and dents bank profitability. Moreover, structural weaknesses on banks’ balance sheets still persist particularly in relation to the inadequate internal governance structures. This means that bank management must able to recognise in advance early warning signals by providing prudent measurement together with an in-depth valuation of loans portfolio.

The originality of the paper is twofold: the authors introduce a new proxy of credit monitoring, called MPI; the authors provide an empirical proof of the Diamond’s (1991) economic intuition: for riskier borrowers, the monitoring activity is an inappropriate instrument depending on the bad reputational quality of borrowers.

This study examines whether and how the legal origin of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) impacts corporate investment efficiency.

The study employs a large panel dataset of firms from 32 non-USA countries from 2005 to 2018. Financial and institutional ownership data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Global and Public Ownership databases in S&P Capital IQ, respectively. The study employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with year and firm fixed effects. In addition, two-stage least squares with instrumental variable regression (2SLS-IV) and propensity score matching (PSM) approaches were employed to address the potential endogeneity.

The findings of this study suggest that common- and civil-law FIIs differ in their monitoring capabilities to promote investment efficiency. The authors find evidence that increased equity ownership by common-law FIIs, not civil-law investors, strengthens the investment-Q sensitivity, resulting in higher investment efficiency. Consistent with the monitoring and information channel, the results further indicate that the positive impact of common-law FIIs on investment efficiency is stronger in host environments susceptible to agency conflicts and information asymmetry.

This study offers novel evidence on the heterogeneous monitoring role of FIIs with regard to their home countries' legal origins and their impact on investment efficiency in an international context.

This study identifies the factors responsible for obtaining price premium on privately placed equity in a developing market.

We examine a unique data set of a special case of private placement of equity, Qualified Institutional Placement (QIP) in India purchased at a premium. The study analyzed 188 equity issues offered between September 2006 and December 2014. On average, we find that QIP issues received a price premium of 4.38%. The study employed binary probit and ordinary least square regression models to analyze the probability and magnitude of the premium.

The study attributes the price premium of QIP to certification effect through group affiliation, signaling through promoters' ownership and monitoring effect through existing institutional investors. These factors influence the probability of premium for QIP issues. However, group affiliation and institutional ownership do not significantly influence the magnitude of the premium.

The private placement of equity is usually offered at a discount. Our findings contribute to the existing literature by evaluating the premium obtained on private placement as a unique scenario in emerging market supported through certification hypothesis, monitoring hypothesis and signaling.

This study is primarily aimed at investigating the asymmetric impact of institutional ownership on the relationship between stock liquidity and stock return. It was conducted by testing the hypotheses regarding efficient monitoring and adverse selection from Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

Using a panel smooth transition regression model and selecting 183 firms for the period from 2009 to 2019 from TSE, this study examined the data to explore the asymmetric impact of institutional ownership on the relationship between stock liquidity and stock return.

The results show a positive impact by institutional ownership on the relationship between stock liquidity and stock return in the first regime (threshold level 39%), whereas in the second regime, there is a negative impact by institutional ownership on the relationship between stock liquidity and stock return. Furthermore, the firms were divided into two groups based on the market value. The first group includes those with a market share less than the mean total market value of the sample. The second group includes firms with a market share higher than the mean total market value of the sample (large firms). The results illustrate that the threshold level is 32% and 44% for the first and second groups, respectively.

The findings of this study suggest that institutional ownership theories require closer inquiry.

Outlines previous research on the links between board composition, firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and presents a study of CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, board independence and performance in the US banking industry. Explains the methodology and presents the results, suggesting that for large bank holding companies with average performance, increased board independence reduces pay‐performance sensitivity because internal monitoring is sufficient without extra alignment incentives. Adds that when performance is poor this no longer holds true and compensation contracts are then used to align the interests of managers and shareholders.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the ownership structure and board governance on dividend policy in emerging markets. The authors test whether the effects of corporate governance on dividend policy change during crisis periods.

The authors use a panel regression approach on a sample of 362 non-financial listed firms from East Asian and Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

The results provide evidence that dividend payout decision increases with institutional ownership and board activity. The authors find that in emerging countries, dividend policy of firms with CEO duality and without CEO duality does not depend on the same set of factors. It is shown that the ownership concentration and board independency affect significantly the dividend policy of firms with COE duality. Finally, the results show that during the recent financial crisis, dividend decision is inversely related to CEO duality, board size and the frequency of board meetings.

Other variables of corporate governance and ownership structure can be studied more in depth. The results can be directly compared to an alternative sample of developed countries.

This study is of particular interest for managers and shareholders when adjusting their strategies of dividend payout during financial crisis.

The authors employ a specific approach to investigate the impact of CEO duality on dividend policy in East Asian countries. An important aspect of the results is that that for firms with CEO who is also the chairperson, the dividend decision is negatively related to ownership concentration and board independence. This research contributes to the understanding of dividend policy by testing whether the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy changes during crisis periods in emerging countries. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first to directly address this issue from this perspective.