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The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to amplify the imperativeness for a re-oriented regulatory approach that prioritizes constructive engagement with the regulated communities, harnessing the existing pool of savings and retention of market participation.

The paper adopts a doctrinal legal research design with data drawn from primary and secondary sources of law. The primary sources include case laws and statutes, and the secondary sources include book chapters, journal articles and other internet-sourced materials.

The paper finds that the status quo in Nigeria if left to continue would spell severe economic disaster for Nigeria’s securities administration, but a well-structured realignment of the regulations would boost the country’s securities market effectiveness.

The research’s conclusions and suggestions might only be applicable to Nigeria’s particular situation with regard to capital market development and securities regulation. Other nations or locations with distinct regulatory systems, market structures and economic situations may not be able to immediately adapt it. When extending the research results outside of the Nigerian environment, caution should be exercised. For regulatory agencies and policymakers, the research offers insightful suggestions. The analysis may pinpoint certain areas where policy changes are required to address reoccurring problems and improve the chances for a healthy capital market.

For Nigeria’s regulatory frameworks controlling securities to be strengthened, this paper would be crucial. To make sure they are in line with global best practices, this entails examining and revising current laws, rules and standards. A stronger regulatory environment may also result from the implementation of harsher enforcement procedures and consequences for noncompliance. It is also required for creating market infrastructure, fostering market integration and cooperation, facilitating access to capital, monitoring and evaluation. It would also benefit investor education and protection.

Addressing these persistent issues and potential remedies in Nigeria’s capital market development and securities regulation would have various advantageous social effects. These include improved market infrastructure, more financial inclusion, improved investment protection for investors and improved market openness and integrity. Such results will help Nigerian society as a whole by fostering economic expansion, job creation, wealth distribution and general social progress.

This paper is the original work of the authors and has not been published anywhere nor submitted to another journal for publication.

The purpose of the paper is to explore the legal and institutional frameworks for optimal regulation of capital market beyond compliance-based regulation, to enable the market to deliver on its strategic role as the enabler of efficient allocation of resources and economic growth.

The paper relies on doctrinal approach to assess the existing regulatory approaches and prospects for the future.

The paper found that the regulatory authorities unduly concentrate on compliance-based and sanction-based regimes without sufficient emphasis on innovations and transformative solutions that foster diversification and efficiency in the market. The paper also found that the deployment of innovations and transformative solutions complemented with robust regulation is positively correlated with capital market growth.

The paper offers fresh insights on the optimal approaches to regulation of capital market that transcend compliance-based and sanction-based regimes to reliance on innovative tools that expand, diversify and effectuate the functionality and utility of capital market.

The purpose of this paper is to examine insurance regulation theories, regulatory agency structures and measures.

This study investigates significance of regulatory agency structure, key regulatory measures, political stability and cultural dimension in insurance markets of 56 developed and developing countries for 2005‐2009.

It was found that insurance consumption is lower in countries with an authority exclusively for insurance regulation but life insurance consumption is higher when the agency is part of government or when another agency is jointly responsible for insurance regulation. Market entry regulation leads to lower consumption whereas market exit regulation has the opposite effect. Solvency regulation and required use of standard forms for insurer financials lead to greater consumption of insurance. A positive impact on the nonlife market is observed for accounting regulation and regulator's intervention power.

Price control regulation may lower consumption of insurance whereas tariff rating brings about a rise in the consumption. Regulation of insurance intermediaries or corporate governance may lower insurance consumption whereas the requirement that insurers employ an actuary or actuaries gives rise to the consumption.

The author found no difference between OECD and non‐OECD countries. However, corruption‐freeness and inflation impact insurance consumption. Using OECD country data only, a negative impact was found of the single agency structure and tariff regulation in the life insurance market and a positive impact of regulation by two or more agencies in the life insurance market and of price control regulation in the nonlife insurance market. Corruption‐freeness positively affects the loss ratio in the life insurance market and the combined ratio in the nonlife insurance market.

This is the second of two papers which examine the question of whether Arab securities regulations can be the subject matter of a methodological study in comparative securities regulation, especially with reference to EU regulations. Part One was published in Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance Volume Eight, Number Four. This paper addresses the specific juridical impact of Shari'a on capital markets, before looking at its impact on capital market laws of Jordan, Kuwait and Oman. In order to provide an empirical insight into existing Arab securities regulations, the paper also surveys the securities and company laws in the aforementioned countries. Such a discussion also includes a brief examination of market conditions, especially the early factors that accompanied the genesis of such Arab securities markets, notably in Kuwait. The paper concludes by addressing the question of the suitability of the Arab markets selected for this study to comparative studies in EU securities regulation, especially in the context of contemporary internationalisation of securities regulation. It explains in the process why the European experience is relevant (particularly in light of the many EU—Arab association agreements to take effect from 2010, together with EU ‘harmonisation’, ‘minimum standards’, and ‘single passport’ regulatory concepts).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the regulation of advertising by considering market‐driven firms (those seeking to keep within the boundaries set by social and industry norms) and market drivers (those seeking to stretch boundaries to gain a competitive advantage). Thought is also given to the costs of regulation and tolerance to the social purse, and the benefits gained by compliance and violation.

The authors develop a conceptual argument for boundary stretching where market drivers are present in a marketplace dominated by market‐driven firms. The authors then apply a game theory model to examine the conditions, the firm responses, and Government responses. In doing so the authors investigate incentives for non‐compliant behavior in a self‐regulated market and show that a firm can achieve a market advantage by stretching advertising boundaries.

Results suggest that when government takes a “wait‐and‐see” approach of partial tolerance, then the market driver can become the focal point for the market‐driven, and a shift will take place in the regulatory boundary. If the government is the boundary shifter then social engineers are taking advantage of artificial boundaries they know will not be enforced, with implications for campaigns such as drink‐driving, smoking, and domestic violence. Also, the market driver will gain a competitive advantage by entering a market‐driven marketplace through boundary shifts, even after incurring an initial penalty.

The research demonstrates a need for research into marketing regulation to consider firm types, violation types, and tolerance levels. The study contributes to our understanding of marketer activity with two implications; first the firm is shifting the boundaries and redefining the market focal point as themselves, rather than violating the boundaries and setting themselves outside the rules. Second, depending on the level of tolerance that government has with the regulation of advertising, there is a cost to both the social purse and to market‐driven firms associated with boundary shifters.

A market driver, looking for growth opportunities, should try to enter markets dominated by market‐driven firms, and which have self‐regulation, while market driven firms should either look for regulatory protection or act collectively to wield power over third parties – for example forcing media outlets not to carry market driver advertising.

By introducing the concept of boundary stretching and allowing for market drivers and market driven firms, the authors show the effects of regulation (or tolerance) in a realistic setting and allow for the real‐world dynamics of a marketplace where new ideas create new focal points for social acceptance. This study also provides a clear illustration of the usefulness of game theory in marketing studies.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Based on the attention-based view (ABV), this study examines the mechanism of external pressure and internal managerial interpretation affecting the promotion of green entrepreneurial orientation (GEO) of agricultural enterprises.

Based on data collected from 208 agricultural enterprises in China, the conceptual model was tested by using hierarchical regression.

The results show that managerial interpretation can affect the promotion of GEO. Command and control regulation, market-based regulation and green market pressure are important external pressures that affect the promotion of GEO. In addition, managerial interpretation mediates the relationship between command and control regulation and GEO, market-based regulation and GEO, as well as green market pressure and GEO.

This study proposes a key path for promoting the adoption and implementation of GEO by agricultural enterprises. The research results provide experience for emerging and developing countries to promote the GEO of agricultural enterprises, which is helpful to alleviate the environmental problems caused by the development of agricultural enterprises.

For the first time, this study introduced the ABV into the research of GEO. The research results enrich the theoretical perspective of GEO and expand the research field of the ABV. In addition, this study fills the research gap that existing research has not paid enough attention to the internal driving factors of GEO and opens the black box between the external pressure and GEO.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 and the dual role of the government in this process.

When the government is simultaneously the owner and regulator of the securities market, the evolution of securities market regulation follows a path of compulsory institutional change. China's Government authorities have played a dual role in this process by acting both as the securities market regulator and the controlling owner of the stock exchanges. The paper uses the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 to illustrate this theoretical framework.

Using the case of China, this paper provides unique evidence of how securities regulation evolves in response to government direction and supervision if the government is both the owner and the regulator of the securities market.

The paper offers insight into issues of securities market regulation in China and other emerging markets.

Regulatory and institutional changes, restructuring and/or privatization of the erstwhile vertically integrated electricity networks have been adopted by all Sub‐Saharan African (SSA) countries in their pursuit of rural and urban electrification, poverty reduction and economic growth. But advances with the reforms remain limited and the results are at best debatable. The purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of deregulation in Sub‐Sahara electricity markets.

The paper examines the experiences with deregulation of the electricity industries in developed and developing economies and surmises on the factors that have contributed to the success of reforms in some industrialized countries and identifies the factors that have contributed to the failure of reforms in SSA. The “evidence‐based economics” (EBE) methodology is used to analyze the existing models of regulation and their differences particularly as they are practiced in SSA and developed economies. A gap analysis is realized by highlighting the differences between best practices and the existing level of knowledge. Two case studies are analyzed and the collection of information is assessed in a way that is useful for the development and implementation of the most appropriate models of regulation for SSA.

The paper finds that the current trend to the regionalization of the electricity markets in SSA and the creation of regional power pools make possible the creation of a genuine regional electricity market which would provide new opportunities for the adoption and adaptation of more advanced models of regulation (2‐G and/or 3‐G) similar to the ones currently employed by some developed economies in Europe and North America. To do so, regulators in SSA need to adopt a more dynamic approach to regulation.

Given the comparative approach of this paper, it is not possible to prove that SSA countries will succeed in their electricity reforms by adopting the 2‐G and 3‐G regulatory models. Nonetheless, if they do follow the dynamic approach to regulation, as suggested in the paper, their chances to succeed are much better.

The analysis of this paper has major implications for governments, regulators, shareholders, customers and employees of the electricity industry. A better understanding of the reasons for the failure of previous reforms and the identification of major advantages and disadvantages of the electricity markets in SSA provide new opportunities and challenges. The success of the application of the 3‐G model may increase the competitiveness of the electricity industry and productive capacity of Sub‐Saharan countries.

Electricity is an essential input in any industrial and commercial process. Its availability reduces costs, enhances productivity and creates jobs in other sectors. The social well‐being of Sub‐Saharan countries would increase by adopting the 3‐G model suggested in this paper.

To the best of the author's knowledge, there are no recent studies dealing with the same issues particularly for Sub‐Sahara Africa. This paper fulfils the gap that exists in the literature.

This paper aims to question the disappearance of sector‐specific regulation in European electronic communications markets.

To show that sector‐specific regulation will remain, five arguments are developed based on different disciplines: law, economics, political science and sociology.

It is found that sector‐specific regulation has already been in place for 15 years and there is no concrete indication that it will end soon. Competition law has intrinsic limitations, which, arguably, do not make it possible for authorities to resort only to that body of the law to ensure a smooth functioning of the electronic communications markets. The balance of power in the EU leads to sector‐specific regulation being maintained in the years ahead as the ideal way for European institutions to intervene in electronic communications markets. The electronic communications market requires regulation going beyond competition law in order to ensure the realization of non‐economic purposes. The implementation of sector‐specific regulation might contribute to concentrating the electronic communications markets.

Contrary to the claims of the European institutions that sector‐specific regulation in the electronic communication markets will lose its relevance, this paper argues that it is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.

The paper shows that deregulating a sector is not an easy task and that ex ante regulation is a key legal instrument for the proper functioning of a market.