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This paper aims to compare US market reactions to the restatement announcements of foreign firms listed in the USA and those of US firms by applying the Capital Market Liability of Foreignness (CMLOF) concept. It further investigates the incremental effect of an improved information environment, proxied by analyst following, on mitigating the negative market reaction to a restatement for foreign vs domestic firms.

Regression tests are performed on a matched-sample, which matches foreign and domestic firms based on industry and firm size. Market reaction is defined as three-day abnormal stock returns calculated using a market model. The sources of CMLOF are defined as institutional distance, information costs, unfamiliarity costs and cultural distance.

Results suggest that, on average, the magnitude of the market reaction to a restatement is 1.8 per cent lower for foreign firms than for domestic firms. Information and unfamiliarity costs contribute to the differing market reactions. In addition, it appears that the improved information environment created by a higher analyst following is more important for foreign firms who face CMLOF than for domestic firms.

While prior research establishes a negative market reaction to restatement announcements, comparing the market reactions for foreign and domestic firms provides evidence regarding whether US investors treat foreign and domestic firms differently. Additionally, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines CMLOF using restatement announcements.

A long-time ethical issue in financial accounting is earnings management. Two popular ways that earnings are managed include use of accruals (Kothari et al., 2016) and real activities management (RM). This study examines the association between RM and short selling and an association between short sellers and RM behavior related to earnings management. Instead of using accruals, RM is accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions and thereby alter reported earnings. Our results show that short sellers avoid targeting firms with a high level of RM, but this only holds for those firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts. This result suggests that short sellers interpret RM as a signal used by companies to convey their “good news” and confidence in their future performance. On the other hand, the authors document that heavily shorted firms engage in a lower amount of RM, which is consistent with the notion that short selling plays an external disciplinary role in constraining firms’ RM behavior for earnings management. This chapter would be of interest to anyone concerned with earnings management, such as financial market analysts, investors, academic researchers, and, in particular, regulators, who are involved in setting rules on short selling.

The purpose of this paper is to re‐examine the issue of financial analysts' reaction to enterprise resource planning (ERP) announcements by employing actual firm data and archival earnings forecast observations. As an extension of prior ERP studies, this paper also tests whether forecast revisions vary with the timing of adoption.

Based on 188 firms that announced ERP plans during the years 1993 through 2002, this paper investigates the financial analysts' reaction to ERP announcements by comparing their earnings forecasts issued immediately before and after the ERP announcement. To examine the effect of adoption timing, this paper partitions the sample into three groups: early (1993‐1997), middle (1998‐1999) and late (2000‐2002) adopters.

Results show that significantly positive revisions occur in longer term forecasts (i.e. three‐year‐ahead forecasts) but not in the shorter term predictions such as one‐ and two‐year‐ahead forecasts. In addition, there is some weak evidence that financial analysts react less positively to middle adopters than to early or late adopters. This finding could be attributed to the fact that many firms adopted ERP systems to work out the Y2K problems during the 1998‐1999 period.

The main finding confirms that financial analysts consider ERP implementations beneficial to the adopters in the long term. Companies contemplating ERP adoption should take this time horizon into account.

Barton and Simko argue that the balance sheet information would serve as a constraint on accrual‐based earnings management. This paper aims to extend their argument by examining whether the balance sheet constraint increases managers' propensity to use either downward forecast guidance or real earnings management as a substitute mechanism to avoid earnings surprises.

Following Barton and Simko, the paper uses the beginning balance of net operating assets relative to sales as a proxy for the balance sheet constraint. The argument is that because of the articulation between the income statement and the balance sheet, previous accounting choices that increase earnings will also increase net assets and therefore the level of net assets reflects the extent of previous accrual management. Models from Matsumoto and Bartov et al. are used to measure forecast guidance. Following Rochowdhury and Cohen et al., a firm's abnormal level of production costs and discretionary expenditures are used as proxies of real earnings management. The empirical analysis is conducted based on the 1996‐2006 annual data for a sample of nonfinancial, nonregulated firms.

The paper finds that firms with higher level of beginning net operating assets relative to sales are more likely to guide analysts' earnings forecasts downward, and more likely to engage in real earnings management in terms of abnormal increases in production costs and abnormal reductions in discretionary expenditures.

Overall, the paper's evidence suggests that managers turn to real earnings management or downward forecast guidance as a substitute mechanism to avoid negative earnings surprises when their ability to manipulate accruals upward is constrained by the extent to which net assets are already overstated in the balance sheet.

This study adds to prior literature that examines how managers trade off different mechanisms used to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations. It also contributes to the extant literature by providing further insights on the role of balance sheet information in the process of managing earnings and/or earnings surprises.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit tenure and how clients manage the annual earnings surprise.

A sample of 5,029 firm‐year observations from 1996 to 2003 were employed to examine whether audit tenure is negatively related to the incidence of accrual‐based‐upward earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises; and whether audit tenure is positively related to the incidence of downward forecast guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises.

Empirical results indicate a substitution of downward forecast guidance for upward earnings management as audit tenure lengthens.

The paper provides evidence that, as the auditor‐client relationship lengthens over time, firms turn to downward forecast guidance as a substitute for upward earnings management. One possible limitation of the sample period involves the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Because of the increased financial reporting scrutiny on both management and auditors that accompanies SOX, it is likely that constraints on earnings misstatements increase after SOX. Any decrease in upward earnings management resulting from SOX would thus work against finding a relation between audit tenure and the substitution of downward forecast guidance to prevent negative earnings surprises.

This paper supports the notion that audit tenure affects firms' choices among various tactics in their attempts to avoid negative earnings surprises. The results also contribute to the ongoing debate on mandatory audit firm rotation by showing that audit quality increases with audit tenure.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between audit committee characteristics and a firm’s ability to guide analysts’ forecasts downward to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.

The authors expect that a more effective audit committee would be able to reduce managers’ propensity to use downward forecast guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises. Four committee characteristics are used to measure its effectiveness: independence, diligence, expertise and size.

For the pre-SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) period (1996-2002), none of the four audit committee characteristics are significantly associated with managers’ propensity to use downward forecast guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises. For the post-SOX era (2003-2004), however, the likelihood of engaging in downward forecast guidance is significantly lower for firms with larger and more independent audit committees. In addition, the likelihood is significantly lower for audit committees that are more diligent and have a higher proportion of the committee members with accounting or finance-related expertise.

Overall, the authors results suggest that, in response to the increased regulatory and listing requirements in the post-SOX era, audit committees have played a more active role in scrutinizing earnings guidance. Our results also suggest that a more effective audit committee in the post-SOX era curbs managers’ tendency to use downward forecast guidance to meet or beat quarterly earnings targets.

To the authors knowledge, this study is one of the first to examine the role of the audit committee in reviewing managerial earnings guidance. As earnings guidance plays an important role in the overall financial reporting process over time and given the increasing importance of downward forecast guidance in earnings surprise games in recent years, the authors believe this study addresses an important question and adds to prior literature. Also, this study contributes to their understanding of the changing nature and scope of audit committee oversight activities since the passage of SOX.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms manage the total value of stock option grants downward after the implementation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123R to reduce their reported option expenses.

All Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms with available stock option data in 2004 and 2006 are included in the analysis. The authors analyze if the total value of options granted, the per share fair value of options granted, the number of options granted as well as each individual input assumption have changed from the pre-SFAS 123R (i.e. 2004) to the post-SFAS 123R (i.e. 2006) period. We compare post-SFAS123R option pricing assumptions and per share fair value of options granted with their respective expected values to verify the results. We also analyze whether SFAS 123R has differential effects on firms which chose to disclose option expense only in footnotes (“disclosing firms”) versus firms which voluntarily recognized option expense (“recognizing firms”) prior to SFAS 123R.

The results show that after SFAS 123R, the total fair value of stock options granted for disclosing firms declined significantly. The decrease appears to result from managerial discretion over volatility and dividend yield assumptions as well as the reduction in the number of options granted. The evidence suggests that firms engage in not only assumption-based manipulations but also real activities to lower reported stock option expenses. It was also found that disclosing firms lower the total fair value of stock options granted to a greater extent than recognizing firms.

This study adds to prior literature that examines the opportunistic incentives for managers to use discretion in reporting stock option expenses. This study contributes to the earnings management literature by providing another example of manipulating earnings through real activities. Finally, our study should be of interest to regulators and investors.

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the readability of annual reports on firms’ ability to obtain trade credit from suppliers. Particularly, the authors conjecture that annual report readability helps firms obtain more trade credit from suppliers.

The authors use the Gunning Fog Index as the primary measure of annual report readability and the ratio of accounts payable to the book value of total assets as the measure of trade credit.

Results from the study of 4,754 firms during the 2004–2016 period indicate that suppliers extend more trade credit to firms with more readable financial reports. The authors’ results are robust to alternative measures of trade credit and annual report readability. The authors’ results remain robust when we control for firm fixed effects and potential endogeneity problems using the instrumental variable approach. A further test shows that the level of trade credit is higher for firms in business service industries, and that this relation is weakened when firms disclose less readable 10-K filings.

The authors’ findings provide new insight into the role of financial report readability in firms’ ability to obtain trade financing from suppliers. The authors’ results are also in line with the SEC’s encouragement that firms use plain English and easy language in financial reporting.