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Posits that most studies have found a significant, yet weak, link between the compensation of the CEO and the company’s performance. Herein extends research by focusing on an individual industry, building a model using only data from healthcare organisations. This article tests the relationship using data from 23 healthcare organisations.

Explains the new US tax rules for calculating the required minimum distributions from employer‐sponsored qualified retirement plans, 403(b) plans and individual retirement accounts, pointing out that when the owner of a tax‐deferred retirement account dies the beneficiary of the fund becomes liable for tax. Gives numerical examples to illustrate the application of the rules.

Outlines the difficulty of retaining new employees covering the problems, costs and methods used to retain productive employees. Suggests that there is often insufficient data regarding initial employee performance and the lack of incentives for better performers who are often treated equally with under performers. Considers the costs and benefits of using employment agencies. Briefly considers the use of pay as an incentive, including bonuses and stock ownership and job satisfaction through good job design to increase variety.

Academics believe that shareholder and management interests can be productively aligned by directly linking CEO compensation to firm performance (Abowd [1990], Agrawal & Mankelder [1987], Lewellen, Loderer & Martin [1987], and Haugen & Senbet [1981]). Stockholders prefer CEOs pursuing strategies that maximise risk adjusted stock returns, but CEOs are assumed to be interested in strategies that maximise their personal wealth. If rewarded through their pay packages to increase the size of the firm, CEOs may overgrow the firm at shareholder expense to reach that end.

Summarizes previous research on the links between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, firm performance and industry; and compares pay‐performance relationships calculated by pooling data with those based on industry segmentation. Develops a model incorporating six factors which may affect CEO cash compensation (tenure, net company income, income variance, net sales, returns to shareholders and beta) and uses 1986‐1992 data from a sample of large US firms covering eight industries to test it. Shows, using Andrew’s Sine Technique regression, that there is a wide variation between individual industries which is obscured when data is pooled. Discusses the methodology used, consistency with other research, the limitations of the study and the underlying reasons for the findings.

Outlines some research on the effects of risk on portfolios for retirement planning and puts forward a method to help individuals “increase their chances of not outliving their retirement portfolios”. Uses numerical examples to show how calculations of the savings needed to achieve specific retirement incomes may prove inaccurate, and how regular portfolio assessment can be used to make any necessary adjustments during the accumulation and/or the retirement stage.

This paper examines the link between CEO cash compensation and company performance. We test for the influence of CEO pay on firm performance over a cross section of companies applying the same approach that is used by Lewellen, Loderer, Martin and Blum [1992]. In our study we account for the degree of common stock ownership by the CEO of each company as well. We find a positive and significant connection between the pay of CEOs and the performance of their respective firms. From our results it appears that CEO pay is used to align the interests of shareholders with company CEOs, reducing agency costs within the firm.

Explores a US bank CEO’s ideal compensation package as a way of attracting and retaining talented individuals. States that there must be a competitive base salary but that total compensation should include car, housing, retirement and health benefits., and stock options. Notes that the federal tax package has placed a limit on eligible compensation and mentions supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPS) as a way of compensating for this. Links pay with bank performance; the CEO’s cash bonuses are tied to the bank’s performance to ensure that the CEO acts in the best interests of the bank and its shareholders. Observes fluctuations in total compensation packages due to tenure, returns on average assets, bank revenues and net incomes or profits of the bank.

During the spring and early summer of 1991 the life insurance industry experienced an unprecedented series of major life insurer insolvencies. The objective of this paper is to determine whether or not policyholder panic resulted from these failures. The analysis shows that each of the failed companies which are evaluated had unique financial problems which caused their demise. And through the use of an event study methodology it is concluded that industry‐wide policyholder panic did not occur as a result of the life insurer failures.

This paper studies the relationship between NBA players’ salaries and their performance on the basketball court. In other industries executive compensation has been found to have a weak yet significant link to company performance. We find a positive and significant relationship between an NBA player’s salary and a player’s points per game and rebounds per game for 1997‐98 basketball season. These results may be improved by considering qualitative factors and including more years of data.