Mark Amorosi, George Zornada, Todd Gibson, Joel Almquist and Pablo J. Man
To analyze the recent SEC no-action relief allowing a non-US investment company to invest as a feeder fund in a US registered open-end management investment company without…
Abstract
Purpose
To analyze the recent SEC no-action relief allowing a non-US investment company to invest as a feeder fund in a US registered open-end management investment company without complying with all of the conditions of Section 12(d)(1)(E) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Design/methodology/approach
This article discusses the various conditions that a non-US investment company investing as a foreign feeder in a US registered open-end management investment company must satisfy in order to avoid complying with certain provisions of Section 12(d)(1)(E) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In addition, the article analyzes certain potential tax and regulatory challenges facing firms seeking to rely on the relief.
Findings
This article concludes that the SEC no-action relief is an incremental step in reducing barriers to global distribution of US registered funds and may marginally increase the use of cross-border master-feeder arrangements as contemplated by the no-action letter. Nevertheless, this article cautions that significant impediments to global distribution of US registered funds remain, including tax withholding and non-US law issues.
Originality/value
This article contains valuable information about the regulatory impediments to global distribution of US registered funds, as well as learned assessments of the impact of recent developments in this space by experienced securities lawyers.
Details
Keywords
This paper is about how a command system allocated resources under profound uncertainty. The command system was the Soviet economy, the period was Stalin's dictatorship, and the…
Abstract
This paper is about how a command system allocated resources under profound uncertainty. The command system was the Soviet economy, the period was Stalin's dictatorship, and the resources were designated for military research & development. The context was formed by the limits of the existing aviation propulsion technology, the need to replace it with another, and uncertainty as to how to do so. We observe the formation of a quasi-market in which rival agents proposed projects and competed for funding to carry them out. We find rivalry and rent seeking, imperfectly regulated by principals. As rent seeking spread and uncertainty was reduced, the quasi-market was closed down and replaced by strict hierarchical allocation and monitoring. In theory, a dictator cannot commit to refrain from taxing the returns from today's effort tomorrow; therefore, we expect agents in a command system to seek only short-term returns from quasi-market activity. Agents’ willingness to invest in the Soviet quasi-market for inventions is ascribed to a reputation mechanism that enforced long-run returns.