Sandy Harianto and Janto Haman
The purpose of our study is to investigate the effects of politically-connected boards (PCBs) on over-(under-)investment in labor. We also examine the impacts of the supervisory…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of our study is to investigate the effects of politically-connected boards (PCBs) on over-(under-)investment in labor. We also examine the impacts of the supervisory board (SB)’s optimal tenure on the association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.
Design/methodology/approach
We constructed the proxy for PCBs using a dummy variable set to 1 (one) if a firm has politically-connected boards and zero (0) otherwise. For the robustness check, we used the number of politically-connected members on the boards as the proxy for PCBs.
Findings
We find that the presence of PCBs reduces over-investment in labor. Consistent with our prediction, we found no significant association between PCBs and under-investment in labor. We also find that the SB with optimal tenure strengthens the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor. In our channel analysis, we find that the presence of PCB mitigates over-investment in labor through a higher dividend payout ratio.
Research limitations/implications
Due to the unavailability of data in firms’ annual reports regarding the number of poorly-skilled and highly skilled employees, we were not able to examine the effect of low-skilled and high-skilled employees on over-investment in labor. Also, we were not able to examine over-(under-)investment in labor by drawing a distinction between general (generalist) and firm-specific human capital (specialist) as suggested by Sevcenko, Wu, and Kacperczyk (2022). Generally, it is more difficult for managers to hire highly-skilled employees, specialists in particular, thereby driving the choice of either over- or under-investing in the labor forces. In addition, in the firms’ annual reports, there is no information regarding temporary employees. Therefore, if and when such data become available, this would provide another avenue for future research.
Practical implications
Our study offers several practical implications and insights to stakeholders (e.g. insiders or management, shareholders, investors, analysts and creditors) in the following ways. First, our study highlights significant differences between capital investment and labor investment. For instance, labor investment is considered an expense rather than an asset (Wyatt, 2008) because, although such investment is human capital and is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet (Boon et al., 2017). In addition, labor investment is characterized by: its flexibility which enables firms to make frequent adjustments (Hamermesh, 1995; Dixit & Pindyck, 2012; Aksin et al., 2015), its non-homogeneity since every employee is unique (Luo et al., 2020), its direct impact on morale and productivity of a firm (Azadegan et al., 2013; Mishina et al., 2004; Tatikonda et al., 2013), and its financial outlay which affects the ongoing cash flows of a firm (Sualihu et al., 2021; Khedmati et al., 2020; Merz & Yashiv, 2007). Second, our findings reveal that the presence of PCBs could help to reduce over-investment in labor. However, if managers of a firm choose to under-invest in labor in order to obtain better profit in the short-term through cost saving, they should be aware of the potential consequences of facing a financial loss when a new business opportunity suddenly arises which requires a larger labor force. Third, our findings help stakeholders to re-focus on the labor investment. This is crucial due to the fact that labor investment is often neglected by those stakeholders because the expenditure of labor investment is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet as an asset. Instead, it is written off as an expense in the firm’s income statement. Fourth, our findings also provide insightful information to stakeholders, suggesting that an SB with optimal tenure is more committed to a firm, and this factor plays an important role in strengthening the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.
Social implications
First, our findings provide a valuable understanding of the effects of PCBs on over-(under-)investment in labor. Stakeholders could use information disclosed in the financial statements of a publicly-listed firm to determine the extent of the firm’s investment in labor and PCBs, and compare this information with similar firms in the same industry sector. Second, our findings give a better understanding of the association between investment in labor and political connections , which are human and social capital that could determine the long-term survival and success of a firm. Third, for shareholders, the appointment of board members with political connections is an important strategic decision to build political capital, which is likely to have a long-term impact on the financial performance of a firm; therefore, it requires thoughtful consultation with firm insiders.
Originality/value
Our findings highlight the role of PCBs in reducing over-investment in labor. These findings are significant because both investment in labor and political connections as human and social capital can play an important role in determining the long-term survival and success of a firm.
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Li Liu, Wen Qu and Janto Haman
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between firm performance and product market competition (PMC), and then examine the mitigation effect of corporate…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between firm performance and product market competition (PMC), and then examine the mitigation effect of corporate governance and/or state-ownership (SOEs) in the association between PMC and firm performance using Chinese listed firms.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors consider three determinants of the PMC that affect the nature of competition, and use market concentration, product substitutability and market size as proxies for PMC. The authors construct a corporate governance index which measures the extent of board independence, monitoring strength of supervisory board over board of directors, and monitoring strength of board of directors over CEO. The authors use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. The authors use a sample of 20,706 firm-year observations listed on the Chinese stock market between 2001 and 2016 to empirically investigate the research questions proposed in the paper.
Findings
The authors find that higher PMC is associated with lower firm performance. The authors find that good corporate governance practices moderate the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance. The association between higher PMC and lower performance is weaker for firms controlled by SOEs compared to non-SOEs. Further, the moderation effect of SOEs on the association between higher PMC and lower performance is more pronounced for firms with good corporate governance practices compared to firms with weak corporate governance practices.
Originality/value
Extant studies investigating the relationship between PMC and corporate governance suggest an either complementary or substitution relationship in developed economies. Our study highlights the interactive role played by SOEs and good corporate governance practices in firm performance in highly competitive product markets in an emerging economy. The findings provide insightful information to regulators of other emerging countries that SOEs with good corporate governance practices can play an important role in the economy by mitigating the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance.