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CEO compensation is shown to be not only related to size and performance but also to personal attributes. CEO compensation is found to be positively related to the number of years as a CEO and to the interaction of age and tenure and negatively related to tenure and to the interaction of age and number of years as a CEO.

Based on the idea that insiders (i.e., managers and controlling shareholders) engage in earnings management to mask their diversion and rent seeking activities from outsiders, this paper presents international evidence supporting both a “diversion hypothesis” where earnings management is decreasing in economic freedom, and a “penalty hypothesis” where earnings management is increasing in human development.

Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) argue that concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to smooth earnings. Consistent with their model, Defond and Park (1997) show that managers smooth earnings in consideration of both current and future relative performance. To provide a more direct evidence of anticipating smoothing and job security, we hypothesize that the extent of income smoothing will vary with managers' job security concerns as proxied by the level of the investment opportunity set or growth opportunities. Our results confirmed our predictions.