Search results

The purpose of this paper is to show that “common sense” is rooted in genetic and memetic legacies developed early in life and is not so common based on where those legacies were developed. To show that managers who are unable to review and adjust their common sense are not likely to be effective managers locally or globally.

The logic developed here is based on eclectic literature sources in psychology, anthropology, and management and from personal consulting activities all over the globe. The logic converges on the border between common and uncommon “sense” and reports data from sessions held in every quarter of the globe.

This discussion finds that much of management behavior is based on “common sense” that is neither accurate nor effective. For example, managers who focus on visible professional behavior and results at the expense of feel, which is common sense to most, may find their results to be, ironically, less than they could be.

Managers can learn to be more self aware particularly at “Level Three,” to understand better the bases for their own behavior and that of others and let go of commonly held non‐sensical assumptions about the way the business world operates. If they can, and the data suggests that most cannot, do this, they have a chance to develop a world‐class performing organization operating on a new and more functional “common sense.”

While many of the individual concepts and sources are not new, the convergence of logic on the importance of distinguishing between visible behavior, conscious thought and underlying values, assumptions, beliefs, and expectations about the way the world is or should be and how those elements affect behavior is not widely nor commonly held “sense.” Hence, the links drawn in this discussion will likely be counter‐intuitive to the vast majority of managers. Examples of companies of all sizes who understand are introduced to ground the case made here.

The purpose of this paper is to provoke academic and practitioner thinking by asserting a set of leadership principles first in oneself and then in others.

The paper asserts a set of leadership principles, including a new definition of leadership, namely to manage energy. First, most managers seem to use more traditional definitions, like getting people to focus on a common goal, and, second, to focus on others at the expense of recognizing how their own energy level affects those around them.

Leaders and managers should first reflect on leading themselves and their own energy, while paying more attention to real buy‐in rather than superficial buy‐in. Moreover, leader/managers should pay more attention to the degree to which they live “outside‐in” and therefore behave less “leader‐like” on the inside. Leader/managers can begin to use “level three” techniques rather than the more superficial “level one” (visible behavior) and “level two” (conscious thought) techniques. In this way, managers change the way they think about managing themselves.

This paper builds on, and adds to, the work of Ed Schein, Albert Ellis, William Glasser, Tony Damasio, and others. The originality lies in the collection and integration of concepts raised by these writers, and others.

The American agricultural economist Marion Clawson advised the Israeli government during 1953–1955. Clawson, a protégé of John D. Black and Mordecai Ezekiel, criticized the government for ignoring economic considerations, and stated that Israel’s national goals – defense, Negev Desert irrigation, immigrant absorption via new agricultural settlements, and economic independence – were mutually contradictory. His major recommendations were to improve the realism of Israel’s agricultural plan; end expensive Negev irrigation; enlarge irrigated farms eightfold; freeze new settlements until the number of semi-developed settlements falls from 300 to 100; and limit new Negev settlements to 10 over 5–7 years. Thus, Clawson ignored political feasibility and made value judgments. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Minister of Agriculture Peretz Naphtali rejected Clawson’s recommendations because they ignored Israel’s national goals. By September 1954, Clawson shifted towards greater pragmatism: He acknowledged that foreign advisors should not question the national goals or make value judgments, and sought common ground with the Ministry of Agriculture. At his initiative, he wrote Israel Agriculture 1953/54 in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Israel Agriculture was a consensus document: Clawson eschewed recommendations and accepted that the government might prioritize non-economic goals. In proposing Israel Agriculture, Clawson made a pragmatic decision to relinquish some independence for (potentially) greater influence. Ultimately, Clawson was largely unsuccessful as an advisor. Clawson’s failure was part of a general pattern: Over 1950–1985, the Israeli government always rejected foreign advisors’ recommendations unless it was facing a severe crisis.

Whoosh, is that all there is? On the eve of becoming a partner at a well-known consulting firm (“the stuff MBA dreams are made of”), a senior executive starts to question what he is doing with his life. Walt Shill had graduated eight years earlier from the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Virginia and had worked his way up at McKinsey Consulting to become the first American partner in the Japanese office. Shill and his family move back to the United States, where he starts to question his goals. For the first time, it seems that Shill has no target to aim for. Having had reached his goals, Shill sets out on an adventure to seek his own meaning of life. He gets into good-enough shape to take a cross-country bicycle ride, which he completes. This undisguised case tells Shill's story and what he learned along the way. It ends with Shill's promise to himself to be less judgmental and to start walking through life with eyes wide open. A teaching note is available to registered faculty.

The Greenland case describes the experience of four young Norwegian men determined to set a world record for unsupported crossing of Greenland. The case describes the team, their preparations, and their experiences as they crossed in “good” weather that was often whiteout blizzard conditions with temperatures dropping as low as −78 degrees F. Throughout the case, one of the team members reflects on things he learned about himself, about the team, and about leadership from the experience (recorded in italics). The teaching note (available to registered faculty) is supplemented by a PowerPoint presentation that helps introduce the expedition to Greenland, other “risky recreation,” and the concepts related to resonance or flow. A video supplement is also available. The case lends itself to a profound discussion of leadership on its own and leads in nicely to a discussion of world-class performance and the purpose of life, which both startles and pleasantly surprises most students and participants.

Accounting historians continue to debate the development of cost accounting procedures in late nineteenth‐century US mass‐production industries. While conventional historians (economic rationalists) emphasize efficiency and co‐ordination, labour process and other “critical” scholars prioritize social, political, and ideological concerns. One neglected, but significant, aspect of this controversy is inside contracting. Clawson presented an important overview of inside contracting at several prominent US manufacturing establishments, including the Waltham Watch Company (WWC). Clawson’s work is significant because his most salient remarks have been cited by scholars who advocate the “new accounting history”. Discusses inside contracting in general terms within the socio‐political context of nineteenth‐century US mass‐production industries. Subsequently, evaluates specific WWC archival data from both the economic rationalist and labour process perspectives, the reasons for inside contracting’s abandonment, and the impact of inside contracting on cost accounting developments.

We explore: (1) the effects of work unit pressure on employees’ satisfaction with work–family balance (S-WFB); (2) the effects of individual-level job and family pressures on S-WFB; and (3) the extent to which schedule control moderates the negative influences of work unit pressure and other demands on employee S-WFB – among employees in a large healthcare system.

The data come from employee responses to the baseline survey (n = 3,950) administered in September 2012, and from administrative unit-level data (445 units) showing the extent to which units were “on-budget” (within 5 percent), “over-budget,” or “under-budget.”

Practices associated with cost containment in a healthcare system of 10,000 employees in the United States appear to have a negative impact on employee S-WFB. Working in a unit that is “under-budget” is negatively associated with individual S-WFB. Employees with high job demands, longer hours, responsibilities for children and/or adults, also reported lower S-WFB than employees without these characteristics.

Research is limited by lack of measures specific to healthcare workers, the use of baseline data only, and sample size for some of the analyses.

Schedule control makes a difference even under high work pressure. The lack of interactions among variables that typically moderate relationships between work pressures and S-WFB suggests the need for more support for healthcare workers under the strain of cost containment.

We include an objective indicator of unit-level job pressures on individual employees, thus identifying specific ways that work stress affects S-WFB.

This chapter revisits a debate about the relationship between work and family and the conditions under which workers believe their jobs in the new economy offer an escape from families.

In contrast to prior research, the chapter uses multiple methods, including a random sample survey, intensive interviews with 221 respondents, and 615 hours of observations at eight sites in the health care sector.

The chapter shows that low-wage women nursing assistants – more than those in other health care occupations – develop strong connections to coworkers and patients whom they come to talk about as “family.” It finds that more than doctors, nurses, or EMTs, the CNAs seek an escape from home and a pull to people at work not only because they develop strong relations on the job and have more inclusive notions of family, but also because they face more difficulties at home. These difficulties at home are created in part by the unpredictable schedules and low wages offered by their jobs. These make home life more difficult, which paradoxically leads them to turn to their jobs.

The analysis and findings show the ongoing power of unequal social relations – organized around class and gender and their intersection – in shaping the recursive relationship of jobs and families.