Search results

Despite the growing body of empirical literature on earnings management in municipal bodies and enterprises on the municipal level, the theoretical foundations often remain limited. This article contributes to filling this research gap by discussing the agency relationships between entities, managers, politicians and the electorate based on the framework of political economy or, more specifically, economic theory of political action. It derives theoretical explanations for earnings management in municipally owned enterprises based on political-economic approaches and provides conceptual guidelines for further theoretical and empirical research in this field.

The article discusses three specific theoretical approaches of political economy (political budget cycles/election cycles, interest fragmentation and partisan ideology) and applies them to the governance structures of municipally owned enterprises. For each of the perspectives, predictions about the use of earnings management and its possible motivations are derived.

The study shows that political budget cycles/election cycles, interest fragmentation and partisan ideology in municipal decision-making bodies can serve as possible explanations as to which extent managers of municipally owned enterprises present manipulated financial statements. All three approaches can help to explain the prevalence of earnings management but lead to different results regarding the methods and aims of earnings management.

As a significant portion of the current literature on earnings management in municipally owned enterprises lacks a theoretical foundation, our article aims to fill this caveat. To do so, we introduce three new conceptual perspectives that explain the prevalence of earnings management in such enterprises and the political-economic environments that are more likely to produce manipulated financial statements.

This study aims to examine the determinants of the allowance for loan losses (ALL) and loan loss provisions (LLP) for banks in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region using both a two-stage approach and simultaneous equation system to address the potential problem of estimation bias introduced by estimating the ALL and LLP separately. The paper also tests three competing hypotheses: the earnings management hypothesis, the capital management hypothesis, and the signaling hypothesis.

The authors adopt a simultaneous equation and three-stage approaches to test whether MENA banks jointly determine LLP and ALL and the determinants of the two accounts. The sample consists of all available electronic data for 75 banks (451 bank-year observations) in nine MENA countries over the period 2000-2008.

Evidence suggests that the two accounts are jointly determined. The results support the earnings management hypothesis – meaning that MENA banks have engaged in year-to-year income smoothing. The authors also find that LLP and ALL provide signals about future earnings.

The authors acknowledge that the LLP account is only one of many accounts on the income statement that could be used for signaling or to manage earnings, and that the ALL is one of several accounts that could be used for signaling, earnings or capital management. Future studies could examine other accruals for their role in managing earnings, signaling and capital.

The results indicate that bank managers use LLP and ALL accounts to manage earnings management, policy makers may want to limit the ability of banks to manipulate earnings.

Prior research on the loan loss accounting practices has been based on single equation models of the determinants of LLP and ALL. An issue that has not been adequately addressed in this literature is that ALL and LLP may be interrelated and jointly determined by banks. If the two accounts are not independent of each other, failure to include one when estimating the other may lead to an omitted variable problem, while including both in the same equation induces a potential simultaneity bias. The study is the first empirical work examining whether ALL and LLP are jointly determined by banks. By jointly estimating LLP and ALL, the study permits an assessment of the magnitude of the potential error from adopting ordinary least squares estimation of a single equation model.

This paper aims at studying earnings management phenomenon in its wider social and economic context to get better understanding for the following points: whether there is “one-size-fits-all” earning management approach which can be widespread applied among nations and whether the Egyptian context affects managers’ trade-off between three different earnings management approaches: accounting, operational and investment.

The paper adopts interpretive approach and analyses data from official documents and 34 interviews with company executives; financial analysts; external auditors; and Stock Exchange regulators to inform our understanding of the influence of the Egyptian context on the trade-off between earnings management approaches.

The results show that there is no application for “one-size-fits-all” earning management approach; unlike the developed cultures, where R&D expenses and overproduction are extensively used for boosting profits, in Egyptian context they are not valid tools. The findings indicate that the Egyptian political and economic context remarkably affect managers trade-off earnings management approaches, leading executives to prefer operational manipulation compared with others.

This paper extends but adds to the literature by shedding light on the different implications of earning management theories based on the variation in the political, economic and operational contexts of firms; identifying that operational cash flows matter more to managers than accounting profits; focusing on the fact that managers differentiate and compare between three various earning management approaches: accounting techniques, investment activities and operational activities; and showing that changes in political and economic Egyptian context makes operational manipulation favorable to be adopted compared with others. It also overcomes the criticism of New Institutional Sociology Theory.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms use different earnings management approaches when facing financial difficulties and the effects of industry-specialist auditors in constraining those choices. The empirical results suggest that (1) firms with lower risk of business failure but with stronger incentives to adjust earnings upward tend to use real earnings management (REM) income-increasing approaches while (2) at the same time, using discretionary accruals for income-decreasing earnings management, due to constraints imposed by specialist auditors on the use of accrual-based earnings management (AEM). This is consistent with the findings of Chi et al., and the authors do not find similar evidence for the firms with higher risk of failure. Also, (3) regardless of the level of failure risk, firms turn to REM while interestingly, such REM behavior is effectively curbed by industry-leading specialist auditors (specialist auditors with the highest client market share) on financially distressed firms. These results extend the findings of Chi et al. (2011), suggesting that industry-specialist auditors have different tolerance levels for earnings management approaches by firms with different levels of business failure risk. That is, when auditing clients with higher risk of failure, specialist auditors are more likely to maintain higher audit quality through more stringent audit testing and use of more audit staff time to prevent an occurrence of audit failure.

The authors examine earnings management behavior across firms in Taiwan with different levels of business failure risk and the effects of audit partner industry specialization in constraining that behavior. Chi et al. (2011) studied low-risk firms with incentives to adjust earnings upward and found firms use REM when the auditors constrain AEM. The authors extend the work of Chi et al. and observe firms with different levels of failure risk.

The authors find (1) lower risk firms may use discretionary accruals to adjust earnings downward while the authors find no similar evidence for financially distressed firms, (2) lower risk firms may use REM when their industry-specialist auditors curb AEM and (3) the industry leaders among specialist auditors do the same for the financially distressed firms. The results demonstrate the extent to which industry-specialist auditors apply different tolerance levels for earnings management behaviors across firms with different levels of failure risk.

The study contributes to the literature in the following three ways: first, the authors fill a gap in the existing literature by comparing firms with higher risk of business failure to firms with lower risk of business failure to explore the possible difference in the two different kinds of earnings management behavior; second, the authors extend the findings of Chi et al. (2011) and examine whether specialist auditors, when auditing firms with higher risk of business failure, will input more audit effort to constrain their clients' use of REM and third, since business failures have a significant impact on the capital markets and any associated audit failures can have an even greater negative impact on investor confidence, the study provides information useful to auditors and regulators in the formation of salient policy regarding the use of REM by firms experiencing high risk of business failure.

This paper aims to understand real earnings management behavior in the context of a parent–subsidiary relationship. It explores the differences between business groups and firms that do not have controlled subsidiaries and provides potential explanations for any measured difference.

The study uses the random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimation to find the difference between the real earnings management behavior of business groups, represented by the ultimate parent firms and the nonparent firms from 73 countries.

The results show that ultimate parent firms have lower abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses than nonparent firms. In contrast, parent firms have higher abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) than nonparent firms. The results are unexpected because abnormal production costs usually have a dominant direct relationship with abnormal CFO. The results indicate that business groups use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses.

The results reveal that parent firms use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results can be used to extend the discussion to specific business group cases, such as tracing the route or allocation of real earnings management (REM) pressure from a parent firm to its listed and private subsidiaries, and if the consolidation of minority voting rights and the transitivity of control affect the behavior in its subsidiaries.

Instead of the degree of diversification or affiliation, this paper investigates REM behavior based on the parent firm's control of its subsidiaries. With this approach, the study argues that business groups prefer a route other than manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results may redirect the attention of regulators to the activities of parent firms that need more policing.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether audit quality is associated with real earnings management in the UK.

The authors apply the panel fixed effects method that controls for heterogeneity across firms to investigate whether audit quality is related to real earnings management for a large sample of UK manufacturing companies for the period 2010–2013. The authors utilized three proxies to measure real earnings management and two proxies to measure audit quality.

The results provide evidence that audit fees are negatively related to abnormal operating cash flows. Conversely, audit fees are positively related to abnormal discretionary expenses. Besides, audit quality proxies show insignificant relationship with abnormal production costs and real earnings management index. Overall, the study finds partial evidence of significant relationship between audit quality and real earnings management.

These results are important subject to the adequacy of the indicators of real earnings management and audit quality. Like previous research works that mostly focus on upward earnings management, the authors do not address the question of whether and how firms take real actions to manage earnings downwards in certain contexts.

The findings inform monitoring bodies that the imposition of higher levels of audit quality may result in unintended consequences. Therefore, monitoring bodies, such as audit committees, should consider the implication of imposing higher quality auditing, which may drive firms to potentially value-decreasing real earnings management practices. Managers should curtail real earnings management practices, especially abnormal operating cash flow, because attempt to use higher-quality auditors to mitigate such practice may destroy firm value. Also, managers’ employment may be threatened due to the potential deterioration of firm value caused by using higher-quality auditors to mitigate managers’ real earnings management practices. Moreover, shareholders are informed of the potential detrimental effects of imposing higher levels of audit quality which may lower the value of their investments.

The paper extends previous research on earnings management in several ways. First, while earlier studies usually use accruals methods to measure earnings management, the authors use the real earnings management approach as managers can switch from accruals to real earnings management when facing more scrutiny from auditors and/or more constrained regulations or standards that may limit their capability to use discretionary accruals. Second, this study reports new findings, as the authors find partial evidence of a significant relationship between audit quality and real earnings management. Third, it is one of the few studies to use a real earnings management index to measure earnings management and its link to audit quality.

This study sets out to examine the effect of the choice of auditors in constraining earnings management within a rule‐based reporting framework during the Asian financial crisis.

Using the iterative seemingly unrelated regression methodology, 383 firm‐observations of service‐oriented listed companies in Singapore are analysed.

The results show that service‐oriented companies engage in income decreasing earnings management during the crisis period. More importantly, the results indicate that only the Big‐6 firms are able to significantly constrain the earnings management of managers of such companies.

The ability of Big‐6 firms to constrain earnings management is perceived to add credibility to the quality of reported earnings, and hence contributes to the competitive advantage of the Big‐6 firms in the market for auditing services.

The evidence contributes to the literature on corporate governance and the competitiveness of the market for audit services in the context of an economy‐wide financial crisis from an Asian perspective.

In this study, the author examines the effect of managers’ perception of product market competition on accruals and real earnings management.

The author develops a new text-based measure of the emphasis managers place on product market competition by conducting a textual analysis of firms’ 10-K filings. Using this measure, the author conducts a battery of econometric analyses and robustness checks to investigate the impact of this measure of product market competition on measures of accruals and real earnings management.

This study finds robust evidence that when management perceives more competitive threats, they are more likely to engage in accruals-based earnings manipulation but are less likely to engage in real earnings management activity. The author argues that these findings are due to managers’ career concerns enticing them to manage earnings via accrual when competition is high, but that greater product market competition discourages real earning management activity as it can diminish firms’ competitiveness.

The findings of this paper have important policy and practical implications since it signals that managers’ perceptions of product market competition is able to affect accounting choices, information environments and economic outcomes in firms.

This study develops a new text-based measure of managers’ perception of product market competition with the aid of GPT-4. The author then using this measure provides firm-level evidence on how this relates to earnings management.

The purpose of this paper is to examine three different responses to the Finnish 2005 tax reform that, among other things, reduced the corporate tax rate and hiked dividend taxation. Focus lies on the factors influencing the decision to change the fiscal year-end and whether earnings management is more prevalent when the decision is not taken.

This study uses the financial statement data of Finnish private firms and studies 350 fiscal year-end changing firms and 700 non-changing firms with logistic and linear regression analysis. Discretionary accruals are the proxy for earnings management.

The results suggest that firms seize the window of opportunity and extend fiscal years depending on the magnitude of the expected tax savings. Firms that do not change their fiscal year-end engage in more tax-induced earnings management. In terms of economic consequences, the earnings management approach is less economically significant.

This study only examines a limited number of firms that change their fiscal year-end, hence, care has been exercised in generalising the findings.

The findings may be considered when structuring future tax reforms, particularly when considering transition rules relating to changes in fiscal year-ends. The study may also have implications beyond tax reforms since the evidence of opportunistic changes in the fiscal year-end can be informative for tax authorities, independent auditors and creditors.

This study contributes to the relatively scarce literature on private firm responses to tax policy changes by analysing both upward and downward earnings management, as well as changes in the fiscal year-end. This is in contrast to previous research that mainly focusses on listed firms and absolute earnings management or earnings management in one direction.

This study examines whether a firm’s management earnings forecasts affect its technical innovation activities. Our study also examines whether the cost of debt plays a mediating role between the management earnings forecasts and the innovation nexus.

We obtained data from 1,032 Chinese non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2005 to 2022 (i.e. 18,576 firm-year observations). We used various econometrics techniques, such as Heckman’s (1979) two-stage selection method and two-stage least square, to examine the relationship between management earnings forecasts and the firm’s technical innovation activities.

We find a positive relationship between management earnings forecasts and the firms' technical innovation. We also find that the cost of debt mediates the relationship between management earnings forecast and technical innovation. Further analysis indicates that frequent earnings forecasts provide incremental information regarding a firm’s future value and cash flows, thus reducing the volatility and uncertainty in cash flow calculations. Our findings are robust to several tests.

Our study has implications for policymakers, practitioners and high-level management of Chinese firms, enabling them to understand the relationship between management earnings forecasts and firms' innovation activities.