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In a simulated organizational conflict, concession behavior by a negotiator's opponent was manipulated to examine how subsequent third party intervention would influence negotiator perceptions of process control, decision control, distributive justice, and the third party. Negotiators whose opponents made large concessions reciprocated by also making large concessions, suggesting a high level of movement toward agreement by the disputants; subjects whose opponents made few concessions reciprocated in kind, resulting in little movement toward agreement. Third parties, however, imposed outcomes on all negotiators prior to negotiated agreements. Perceptions of decision control, distributive justice, and the necessity of third party intervention were influenced by whether disputants were close to reaching an agreement on their own or not. Outcome imposed by the third party influenced almost all measures. The study suggests that behavior by the disputants (in the form of movement toward agreement), and not just behavior by the third party, can influence ratings of both procedures and outcomes.

In a simulated three‐issue organizational dispute, subjects were interrupted by a third party (their supervisor) who recommended—and eventually imposed—one of five different outcomes. Each outcome provided subjects the same overall payoff, though the arrangement of payoffs across each of the three issues varied. The design allowed us to evaluate four different perspectives regarding negotiators' perceptions of their outcomes. In addition, third parties provided justifications, apologies, or excuses for their actions. Fairness judgments and supervisory evaluations were most favorable when negotiators received an outcome reflecting favorable settlements on the majority of the issues, or the midpoint compromise; the least favorable reactions occurred when subjects received favorable outcomes on only their most important issue. Third parties who offered a justification for their actions were seen as fairer than those offering apologies or excuses. The findings reiterate the importance of considering both the symbolic characteristics of outcomes and the interactional justice inherent in different types of explanations.

We provide a brief review of how the concept of justice has evolved over time from a single construct (distributive justice) to one represented by four constructs (distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice). We then compare and contrast two recent meta‐analytic views of organizational justice, focusing on the relationships each documents between justice constructs and organizational outcomes. We conclude by arguing that the justice literature needs to focus on identifying moderators of the justice‐outcome relations noted in the meta‐analyses.

The present study extends recently‐acquired knowledge about the affective aspects of negotiations by examining the effects of defining negotiation outcomes in affective terms rather than numeric terms. Using a 2 x 2 experimental design, the researchers represented the negotiation outcomes in four different ways: happy faces, unhappy faces, positive numbers, and negative numbers. The results indicate that representing outcomes in affective terms leads to longer negotiation times and higher impasse rates. In addition, participants whose outcomes were represented as happy faces reported the highest levels of emotional involvement, the lowest levels of cooperation and trust, and most frequently experienced negative emotions. Emotional involvement and negative emotions also helped explain differences in negotiation time and individual outcomes over and above the effects of the experimental manipulations. The implications of these results for negotiation research are discussed.

In this article, we focus on alternative dispute resolution procedures, in particular third party procedures. We describe eight different procedures and provide examples of how these procedures are used in different cultural contexts. We then evaluate the procedures in terms of how they impact four key criteria that have been noted in the literature related to negotiation: process criteria, settlement criteria, issue-related criteria, and relationship criteria. We subsequently explore the potential impact of culture on evaluations of these criteria. We finish with a discussion of future directions for research and practice, emphasizing that procedural recommendations should be made carefully when the criteria for effectiveness and applicability are derived from US-centric research. In other words, there is not “one best choice” for third party procedures universal to the myriad cultures on our planet.

The present study attempted to replicate the findings of Kolb's research identifying two groups of mediators, which she labeled “Dealmakers” and “Orchestrators.” Seventy‐seven mediators were presented with a written dispute and asked to react the likelihood that they would use each of nine different mediation techniques. The techniques corresponded to Sheppard's taxonomy of Process Control, Content Control, and Motivational Control techniques. They also rated the perceived effectiveness of each of these three types of control with the dispute. Based upon their responses, the mediators were separated into groups using average‐link cluster analysis. The results suggested four clusters: Cluster 1 members corresponded to Kolb's “Dealmakers,” relying upon Process, Content, and Motivational Control techniques. Cluster 2 members did not correspond to either of Kolb's classifications, choosing to use Content and Motivational Control strategies. Cluster 3 members were similar to Kolb's “Orchestrators;” members of this cluster relied upon Process and Content Control techniques only. Cluster 4 members were reluctant to use any of the control strategies. These findings suggest a partial replication and extension of Kolb's initial work. Implications for future research are discussed.

Fred R. Blass is an Assistant in Management at Florida State University. He received a Ph.D. in Management from Florida State University, and before joining the faculty at Florida State, served on the Department of Management faculty at the United States Air Force Academy. Blass has research interests in power and influence in organizations and organizational socialization. He has published his research in such journals as Human Resource Management and The Leadership Quarterly. Also, he has presented his research at both national and regional professional conferences.

One aspect of attracting new employees that has historically been ignored by recruitment researchers is salary negotiations. In this study, we used a hypothetical scenario design to depict salary negotiation experiences in which we varied the levels of salary offer, the behavior of a company and its representative, and the deadlines for receiving a signing bonus. MBA students served as study participants who read the scenarios and responded to questions about perceived organizational attractiveness and job acceptance decisions—two important recruitment outcomes. As hypothesized, our results indicated that salaries, a company's responsiveness to candidate questions, and a company representative's expression of derogatory comments all impact recruitment outcomes. However, exploding signing bonuses had no significant effects, calling into question the negative connotation practitioners have of exploding compensation schemes. Our justice framework revealed that many of the effects that we found for our manipulations on participants' judgments regarding our recruitment outcomes were mediated by perceptions of organizational justice. Finally, we found some evidence of the frustration effect, as procedures that were considered fair worsened rather than mitigated the negative effects of unfair outcomes on job acceptance decisions.

Two studies in the context of English‐French relations in Québec suggest that individuals who strongly identify with a group derive the individual‐level costs and benefits that drive expectancy‐value processes (rational decision‐making) from group‐level costs and benefits. In Study 1, high identifiers linked group‐ and individual‐level outcomes of conflict choices whereas low identifiers did not. Group‐level expectancy‐value processes, in Study 2, mediated the relationship between social identity and perceptions that collective action benefits the individual actor and between social identity and intentions to act. These findings suggest the rational underpinnings of identity‐driven political behavior, a relationship sometimes obscured in intergroup theory that focuses on cognitive processes of self‐stereotyping. But the results also challenge the view that individuals' cost‐benefit analyses are independent of identity processes. The findings suggest the importance of modeling the relationship of group and individual levels of expectancy‐value processes as both hierarchical and contingent on social identity processes.