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Two large sample surveys of chief information officers (CIOs) were sponsored by Arthur Andersen & Co. in the last three years to analyze the market served by its consulting practice. Beginning in April of 1986, and then again in February of 1988, samples of 120 companies representing both the service and industrial segments of the Fortune 500 were selected. CIOs from those organizations were interviewed on issues, trends, and problems in the deployment of information technology (IT) within their corporation. A clear profile of evolving CIO responsibilities and the roles that information and technology played in those organizations emerged from these surveys. Below we have summarized the results of each study, and outlined the concerns of the CIOs who were given the task of establishing IT plans. We then go on to offer some advice to general management for overcoming obstacles that we see as inherent in executing such plans.

Fundamental changes in product, process, and organization have rocked the manufacturing industry of this country during the last decade. In an effort to document the nature and extent of these changes, we conducted a survey of senior manufacturing executives. We wanted to determine exactly how U.S. manufacturing companies were changing and why. Our specific goals were to document the nature and extent of technological change that has occurred since 1980; to determine the likely direction of change through 1990; and to compile opinions on the strategic issues facing the industry as well as on the keys to success in dealing with these issues.

The purpose of this paper is to compare two elements of lay-off costs in a dynamic model of the labor market and analyze the differences for business cycle dynamics and welfare.

The paper builds a general equilibrium Real Business Cycle model and introduces firing costs and severance payments. Labor market frictions are assumed to follow the famous search and matching approach.

The paper finds that firing costs imply a higher volatility over the cycle and have stronger negative welfare effects. Severance payments have a lower volatility, reduce unemployment, and reduce welfare by a smaller amount.

Policy reforms should be aimed to use severance payments and reduce the ring cost component of lay-off costs.

Increasing welfare and a more stable business cycle could be supported by using severance payments instead of firing costs.

This paper develops a new theory arguing that party change results from ruptures in political parties’ ties to civil society organizations. I demonstrate the utility of this approach by using it to explain why the Rhode Island Democratic Party (RIDP) changed from a hierarchical machine to a porous political field occupied by multiple interlegislator cliques and brokered by extra-party political organizations and professionals. While others attribute party change to bureaucratization, electoral demand, or system-level changes, I analyze historical, observational, and interview data to find that a severance in the RIDP’s relationship with organized labor prompted party change by causing power to diffuse outward as leadership lost control over nominations and the careers of elected office holders. In the spaces that remained, interest groups and political professionals came to occupy central positions within the party field, serving as brokers of the information and relationships necessary to coordinate legislative activity. This analysis refines existing theories of party change and provides a historically-grounded explanation for the institutionalization of interest groups and political professionals in American party politics.

At the end of this chapter, learners should be able to:

• Explain the major components of executive compensation.

• Understand the role of objectives, costs and risk in designing executive compensation packages.

• Explain the influence of transparency, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices on executive compensation in an organisation.

Explain the major components of executive compensation.

Understand the role of objectives, costs and risk in designing executive compensation packages.

Explain the influence of transparency, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices on executive compensation in an organisation.

The Campus Infrastructure (CI) Department at the University of Calgary absorbed a 25 per cent reduction in its operating budget in 1995. As a result, it was forced to transform its business processes in order to provide the required level of services to the campus. Through its strategic planning process, it has implemented new technologies that have enabled the Department to meet this challenge.

The purpose of this paper is to present the relationship between supply chain linkages and supply chain performance (cost‐containment and reliability of supply chain partners).

Multivariate regression models are developed in order to identify the characteristics of determinants of linkages in the supply chain stakeholders (suppliers, internal stakeholders and customers). The survey was administered to individuals identified from a list of US executive officers, directors, presidents, or vice presidents. Among four hundred respondents, 122 were considered as valid from those who practice supply chain management for their business operations.

Internal integration is the most important contributor to cost‐containment while integration with the supplier is the best strategy to achieve supply chain reliable performance. Availability of electronic ordering systems for customers is an important strategy in cost‐containment. Fast and easy ordering is the best strategy for customer in performance reliability. Reliable delivery with supplier collaboration in managing a broad supply chain operation is the best way to link with suppliers. Access to the inventory information creates the most favorable environment in internal integration.

A vigorous multivariate statistical modeling process was employed to seek a possible linkage between the level of integration and the supply chain performances at a different linkage stage. This study would open an avenue for further investigation using micro data such as financial performances, and other key supply chain indicators to operationalize some of the findings that this study presented.

This paper explored the relationship between supply chain linkages and supply chain performance so that management will be able to pursue better supply chain strategies applicable directly to their business environment. Study results provide management with innovative insights for planning and executing applicable supply chain strategies.

This study presented overall and individual determinants of each linkage affecting supply chain performance. In addition, this study presented a valid and reliable measurement instruments that academicians as well as practitioners can use in measuring the supply chain performance.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

This paper aims to explore some of the practical challenges boards face in setting chief executive officer (CEO) pay to show why the failure to see considerable overlap between pay and performance may not be due to poor governance.

This paper critically explores the different types of pay reported in public sources (actual vs realized) and the types of performance measures used in CEO pay research. This paper then conceptually reviews the broader governance responsibility of boards, particularly the hiring and firing of CEOs and the impact these decisions have on CEO pay.

The authors suggest that much of the lack of overlap between pay and performance may be because of misaligned timing of the pay and performance measures, differences between internally promoted and externally hired CEOs and severance packages of fired CEOs. They conclude that the lack of overlap may not signal failure on the part of boards, but rather may reflect the risk and uncertainty those boards face in hiring and firing of CEOs.

The analysis shows how using publicly available sources of pay and performance data ignores the practical challenges that boards face in setting pay, and suggests greater care be given to future research purporting to show that boards are failing in their governance responsibilities.

CEO pay may not be as misaligned with performance as many researchers conclude, but may be due to the risks and uncertainty inherent in governance.

The distributive justice critique of CEO pay may not be valid.

As opposed to simply mining public databases, this paper more accurately describes some of the variables that impact how boards set CEO pay.

Objetivo – Este artículo explora alguno de los retos prácticos a los que se enfrentan los consejos de administración a la hora de fijar la retribución del CEO para mostrar que la falta de solapamiento entre retribución y resultados puede no deberse a un mal gobierno corporativo.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo explora de forma crítica los diferentes tipos de retribución disponibles en fuentes públicas (actual vs realizado) y el tipo de medidas de resultados empleados en la investigación en retribución de CEOs. A continuación el artículo revisa conceptualmente las funciones del consejo de administración, en particular la de contratar y despedir al CEO y el impacto que estas decisiones tienen en la retribución del CEO.

Resultados – Proponemos que mucha de la falta de solapamiento entre retribución y resultados puede deberse a una falta de sincronía temporal entre las medidas de retribución y resultados, a diferencias los CEOs promocionados desde dentro y los contratados fuera, y los paquetes de indemnización de los CEOs despedidos. Concluimos que la falta de solapamiento puede no estar indicando fallos en la acción del consejo de administración, sino el riesgo y la incertidumbre al que se enfrentan estos consejos a la hora de contratar y despedir CEOs.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Nuestro análisis muestra como usar fuentes públicas sobre retribución y resultados lleva a ignorar los retos prácticos a los que se enfrentan los consejos a la hora de definir la retribución, y sugiere que la investigación futura debe ser más cuidadosa cuando afirme que los consejos de administración no están realizando sus funciones correctamente.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO puede no estar tan mal alineada con los resultados tal y como muchos investigadores concluyen, sino que esto es un reflejo de los riesgos e incertidumbres inherentes al gobierno corporativo.

Implicaciones sociales – La crítica a la justicia distributiva de la retribución del CEO puede no ser válida.

Originalidad/valor – En oposición a simplemente explotar bases de datos públicas, este artículo describe con mayor precisión algunas de las variables que influyen en como los consejos definen la retribución del CEO.

Objetivo – Esse artigo explora alguns dos desafios práticos enfrentados pelos conselhos administrativos ao estabelecer a remuneração do CEO, a fim de mostrar porque a incapacidade de ver a correlação entre o pagamento e a performance pode não ser atribuída à má governança.

Design/método/abordagem – O artigo explora de forma crítica os diferentes tipos de remuneração relatados em fontes públicas (real vs já realizado), e os diferentes tipos de medidas de performance utilizadas em estudos sobre remuneração de CEO. O artigo também revisa conceitualmente as funções do conselho administrativo, especificamente a de contratar e demitir CEOs, e o impacto que essas decisões têm na remuneração do CEO.

Resultados – Nós sugerimos que grande parte da falta de correlação entre pagamento e performance ocorre devido ao desalinhamento entre as medidas de performance e o momento do pagamento, às diferenças entre CEOs promovidos internamente e contratados externamente, e a pacotes de indenização de demissão de CEOs. Nós concluímos que a falta de correlação pode não significar uma falha por parte do conselho administrativo, e sim um reflexo do risco e da incerteza que esses conselhos enfrentam ao contratar e demitir CEOs.

Limitações/implicações – Nossa análise mostra como o uso de base de dados de pagamento e de desempenho publicamente disponíveis ignora os desafios práticos que os conselhos administrativos enfrentam ao estabelecer a remuneração do CEO, e sugere que pesquisas futuras devem ser mais cuidadosas ao afirmarem que os conselhos administrativos estão falhando em suas responsabilidades de governança.

Implicações práticas – A remuneração do CEO pode não estar tão desalinhada com os resultados como concluem muitos pesquisadores, pois pode ser um reflexo dos riscos e incertezas inerentes à governança.

Implicações sociais – A crítica à justiça de distribuição do pagamento do CEO pode não ser válida.

Originalidade/valor – Em oposição a simplesmente explorar base de dados públicos, este artigo descreve de forma mais acurada algumas variáveis que impactam como o conselho administrativo estabelecem a remuneração do CEO.