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This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of control mechanisms in promoting collaborative performance by exploring the moderating effects of formal institutions (government support and legal enforcement in this study) and informal ties (business ties in this study) on the relationship between control mechanisms and collaborative performance.

A conceptual model is developed with the direct effects of contractual execution and relational norms on collaborative performance and the moderating effects of government support, legal enforcement and business ties on the above relationships. Hierarchical regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses based on 393 responses from Chinese computer and computer components distributors.

The empirical results generally support the conceptual model. First, consistent with most previous studies, both contractual execution and relational norms contribute to collaborative performance. Second, government support and business ties weaken the role of contractual execution, whereas legal enforcement strengthens it. Third, business ties enhance the effects of relational norms, and, unexpectedly, government support also fosters the relationship between relational norms and collaborative performance.

First, this study solves the problem of conflicting findings on the relationship between contract and performance by examining the effect of contractual execution, rather than contract design, on collaborative performance. Second, this study contributes to institutional theory by examining the moderating role of formal institutions. Third, this study deepens the understanding of the role of business ties by exploring its moderating effect on the relationship between control mechanisms and collaborative performance.

Given the pivotal influence of institutional forces, an important yet underexplored question in supply chain management literature is how contractual and relational governance jointly affect supplier performance under weak legislative environments. This study tends to solve the debate by distinguishing contractual definability from contractual enforceability and by considering the contingent role of legal development in China.

Using a combined dataset of secondary data and a survey of 224 buyer–supplier dyads in China, this study examines how contractual definability and contractual enforceability interact with relational governance differently in driving supplier performance, and assesses the contingent role of legal development.

This study finds that contractual definability complements yet contractual enforceability substitutes relational governance in affecting supplier performance. Moreover, legal development weakens the complementary effect but strengthens the substitutive effect.

The study firstly enriches supply chain management literature by classifying the roles of contracts into contractual definability and contractual enforceability and showing their differential interplay with relational governance. Second, the study contributes to the complements–substitutes debate by revealing the shifting role of legal development. Third, the research enriches the understanding of supply chain management in the Chinese market.

The nature of maintenance is complex and greatly influenced by relationship among various actors involved in execution of maintenance tasks. The relationship factor becomes more critical when outsourcing maintenance tasks. The most important success factor is creating mutual “goodwill trust” between partners. Another important factor is the use of economic incentives for both parties. A formal partnering process, top management support and relevant outcome measures are also important for a partnership to be positive. Partnering is a potential “tool” to create success. Based on a review of the partnering literature and experiences from Swedish railway sector, a partnering framework for maintenance contracts has been developed. The partnering framework considers four main factors, namely requirements and potential for partnering, the partnering process, success elements and measures on partnering success.

The purpose of this study is to identify the possible efficiency gains in using tokenization for the execution of public expenditure on governmental investments.

Through design science research methodology, the exploratory research produced a tokenized prototype in the blockchain, through the Ernst and Young OpsChain traceability solution, allowing automated processes in the stages of public expense. A focus group composed of auditors from the public sector evaluated the possibility of improving the quality of information available in the audited entities, where the tokens created represent and register the actions of public agents in the blockchain Polygon.

The consensus of the experts in the focus group indicated that the use of tokenization could improve the quality of the information, since the possibility of recording the activities of public agents in the metadata of the tokens at each stage of the execution of the expenditure allows the audited entities the advantages of the information recorded on the blockchain, according to the following ranking: first the immutability of audited data, followed by reliability, transparency, accessibility and efficiency of data structures.

This research makes an empirical contribution to the real use of tokenization in blockchain technology to the public sector through a value chain in which tokens were created and moved between the wallets of public agents to represent, register and track the operations regarding public expense execution.

Blockchain technology (BCT) is considered a promising tool to improve the productivity of construction project management. Existing research has studied its potential costs and benefits for the construction industry. However, the potential costs and benefits of BCT failed to be compared as actual costs and benefits of specific applications for stakeholders. To fill this gap, this study seeks to analyze the cost-effectiveness of BCT-based applications in construction project management.

This study is conducted with a customized systematic literature review based on transaction cost theory to enable qualitative comparison. With a deliberately designed structure confining extraneous variables, the costs and benefits of BCT-based applications are identified and compared. The inherent dependent relations of processes and the evolution relations of functions are identified. The cost-effectiveness of blockchain adoption is then analyzed.

Seven functions and six challenges are identified within five processes. The result suggests all identified functions are cost-effective except for manual instruction (coding smart contracts manually). The smart contracts require explicit definition and logic to be effective. However, the construction projects essentially require the institution to be flexible due to unpredictability. The adoption of smart contracts and corresponding additional requirements can increase the transaction cost of bounded rationality.

As manual instruction is fundamental to realize other functions, and its advanced substitute relies on its broad adoption, its cost-effectiveness must be improved for applications to be acceptable to stakeholders. The establishment of a universal smart contract model and a universal, legitimate and efficient database structure are recommended to minimize the cost and maximize the effect of applications.

This study contributes to the knowledge by providing a comprehensive analysis of BCT adoption’s cost-effectiveness in construction project management. The adopted review structure can be extended to analyze the qualitative benefits and challenges of management automation in the early stages.

The role of conventional contracts in achieving sustainability goals in public–private partnership (PPP) projects has been questioned. From the multifunctional perspective of contract theory, joint-contract functions that combine contractual control, coordination and adaptation may be a potential approach for improving PPP project sustainability performance. This research intends to investigate the link between the joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance, and their underlying mechanism, by analyzing the mediating role of relationship quality and moderating roles of environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty.

Based on 170 valid survey data collected from the Chinese PPP professionals, partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was adopted to test the hypothesis.

The results reveal that joint-contract functions are positively associated with the PPP project sustainability performance. This relationship is strengthened by environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Moreover, the relationship between the joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance is mediated by relationship quality.

This research extends contract governance theory and sustainability research in PPP projects. The research implications are as follows: (1) joint-contract functions are a second-order construct consisting of three first-order dimensions: control, coordination and adaptation and are positively associated with PPP project sustainability performance; (2) joint-contract functions enhance the sustainable benefits of PPP projects during environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty; (3) informal relationships are a critical bridge connecting formal institutions with the sustainability performance of PPP projects.

In general, these findings guide project participants who aim to achieve sustainable outcomes in PPP projects. (1) Project participants should consider the process of contract design and sign contracts that focus on joint-contract functions. (2) Project participants should investigate the degree of uncertainty of a PPP project before designing contracts, and design the contracts with corresponding complexity. (3) Project participants should work to enhance PPP sustainable benefits by improving the relationship between partners, such as encouraging mutual trust and joint problem-solving.

This research verifies the relationship between joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance, and the boundary and intermediary conditions between them.

This paper aims to examine alliance governance at different hierarchical levels.

The data is collected from both top-level and operating-level managers in 286 strategic alliances in China (a total of 572 managers). Hierarchical moderated regression models are adopted to test the hypotheses and two-stage regression analyzes are used to correct for endogeneity.

This paper finds that relational governance has a greater impact on alliance performance than contract utilization at the top level. Furthermore, the simultaneous use of relational governance at the top and operating levels have a detrimental impact on alliance performance. Finally, top-level contract utilization has a negative interaction with operating-level relational governance but a positive interaction with operating-level contract utilization.

First, the cross-sectional nature of the data collection approach provides only a snapshot of how each type of governance mechanism and its interactions affect alliance performance. Second, the sample is limited to firms located in emerging markets.

Managers should realize that the effectiveness of contract and relational governance mechanisms varies across different management levels and they should be cautious about the cross-level governance mechanism alignment.

This study advances the interfirm governance literature in that this paper examined alliance governance at different hierarchical levels and provides new insights into the ongoing debate on whether the contract and relational governance mechanisms function as complements or substitutes by exploring the governance alignment across different alliance hierarchies.

As outsourcing continues to grow, supplier management becomes critical to the success of manufacturing firms. Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that firms should choose supplier governance mechanisms to ensure fulfillment of contractual obligations and safeguard against opportunism for their outsourcing activities. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine how buying organizations govern supplier contracts to improve manufacturing competitiveness and financial performance. The relative effectiveness of two primary governance mechanisms, contractual governance (CG), and relational governance, are examined.

Expanding upon previous studies, this study delineates three relational governance mechanisms (negotiation efficiency (NE), problem solving relations, and information sharing (IS)) that are conceptually, statistically and pragmatically different. Based on the TCE literature, a conceptual model is developed to decipher the relationships between pre-contract conditions (supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty (EU)), governance mechanisms, performance ambiguity (PA), and performance. Using the data collected from 987 firms, the statistical results present several important findings that would advance current theory and practice in outsourcing.

The authors find empirical support for the effects of contractual and relational governance in improving manufacturing and financial performance. The governance of supplier contracts clearly facilitates manufacturers’ ability to leverage their resources to improve performance. The relative effectiveness of these two governance mechanisms is related to the levels of EU and supplier asset specificity. Relational governance displays greater influence on performance than CG does. However, CG appears to be complementary to relational governance.

The interplays between supplier asset specificity and EU should be examined in the future. The relationships among NE, IS, and problem solving should also be examined to facilitate the development of relational governance.

Managers should be aware of the situational performance of governance mechanisms. Moreover, it is important to realize how differently each of the three relational governance mechanisms and CG contribute to performance.

This study extends the academic discussion of supplier governance by investigating the alignment of governance mechanisms (relational governance and CG) with pre-contract conditions to reduce PA and, thereby, enhance manufacturing performance. Under the theoretical framework of TCE, the direct and indirect effects of pre-contract conditions and governance variables are fully examined and discussed. Moreover, relational governance involves multiple mechanisms that are conceptually and pragmatically different, and future studies should not treat it as one single construct.