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This study investigated the effects of stay‐back on teachers’ professional commitment, in order to develop an effective means to measure teachers’ commitment to the teaching profession which, according to various studies, contributes to “quality education”. Other possible factors, such as age, gender, marital status, tenure, educational level and position, were also studied. Suggestions on ways to increase commitment, based on the statistical findings, were also made. The results of causal‐comparative, correlation and multiple regression analyses revealed that stay‐back was the one factor which was found to be the most highly and significantly related to commitment. Apart from educational stay‐back, marital status, age and tenure were also proved to relate significantly to commitment. In this research, the accuracy and reliability of the stay‐back data were improved through adjustment for a secondary analysis.

Although supplier-initiated punishment is widely used to manage distributors’ opportunism, its spillover effect on unpunished distributors (i.e. observers) within the same distribution network remains under-researched. Specifically, this paper aims to investigate the curvilinear effect of punishment severity on an observer’s opportunism, and how such an effect is contingent on the observer’s network position.

This paper uses regression analysis with survey data gathered from 218 distributors in China’s automobile industry.

Punishment severity has an inverted U-shaped effect on the observers’ opportunism, and such effect is weakened by both the observers’ network centrality and their degree of dependence on the supplier.

The findings should encourage suppliers to focus more on the spillover effects of punishment on observers. To this end, the supplier must deliberately initiate the appropriate level of punishment severity against its distributors because an inappropriate level of punishment severity (e.g. too lenient) may unexpectedly raise the unpunished observers’ level of opportunism. Moreover, the supplier should be fully aware that observers’ specific network positions may produce varying spillover effects of the punishment.

This study enriches the literature on channel governance by revealing the curvilinear mechanism through which punishment severity influences observers’ opportunism. By applying social learning theory to channel punishment research, this study unveils both the inhibitive learning and the imitative learning forces inherent in a single punishment event, and it delineates their joint effect on an observer’s opportunism. In addition, this study outlines the observer’s vertical and horizontal relationships within the distribution network and explores their contingent roles in determining the spillover effects of punishment.

This paper aims to understand the factors of the exchange relationship that influence a target-partner’s decisions to adopt virtual governance strategies.

Hypotheses are tested using an online panel of 259 key informants from manufacturing firms that sell goods to retailers. Data are analyzed using structural equation modeling.

The study confirms the hypotheses that the target partner’s trust in the initiating partner is a significant driver of supply chain management system (SCMS) adoption intention. While trust fully mediates the adverse effects of technological uncertainty on adoption intentions, asset specificity directly influences both trust and adoption intentions. Additionally, the initiating-partner’s incentive orientation mitigates these effects and encourages SCMS adoption.

This paper contributes to the study of virtual governance and interorganizational adoption decisions in two primary ways. First, it elucidates the relationship between transaction costs and relational norms. Second, it examines the role that the shadow of past incentives has on the target-partner’s decisions to electronically integrate with the initiating partner.

The findings from this study contribute to the virtual governance and interorganizational technology adoption literature by demonstrating the relevance of characteristics of the exchange relationship in the target-partner’s decision to adopt the SCMS technologies necessary for electronic integration. This study provides a better understanding of the function of transaction costs and relational norms that paves the way for further exploration of the choice to adopt virtual governance strategies.

Given that SCMSs enable virtual governance, the findings of this study make important contributions to understanding how transactional and relational elements of the exchange relationship influence a target-partner’s decisions to participate in vertical control strategies with an initiating-partner.

The purpose of this paper is to better understand the main effects of agent conscientiousness and reciprocity norm and the interaction effect of these two factors on contract adjustment decisions in buyer-supplier relationships.

Two scenario-based experiments with college students and business professionals were conducted. Three regression models were run to test three hypotheses proposed in the paper.

The limitations of this study are the use of single-agent decision scenarios and the specific focus on one aspect of agent personality – i.e. conscientiousness and its collective influence on contract adjustment decisions. In a broader picture, the results of this study support the cross-level analytical approach to investigating marketing channel relationships, in which individual-level and organizational-level factors interact and determine decision outcomes in business exchanges.

Recruiting and promoting managers who exhibit high levels of conscientiousness, coupled with proactively cultivating the norm of reciprocity with suppliers, are critical to a firm's thrust in attaining and sustaining marketing channel management practices with the emphasis on reciprocity-based exchange relationships.

While the extant literature focuses largely on interfirm governance and contract enforcement, this study examines what actually influences decision-making agents' contract adjustment decisions. This study expands the marketing literature by investigating the impacts of agent conscientiousness and reciprocity norm on contract adjustment decisions.

This study aims to enhance our understanding of how advanced IT improves the efficiency of contract governance in mitigating partners' opportunistic behaviors in interfirm cooperation and the moderating effects of boundary spanners' personal relationships and cooperative orientation.

Contract governance is divided into two subdimensions: contract completeness and contract execution safeguards. Then, the hypotheses are examined using partial least squares–based structural equation modeling based on survey data collected from manufacturers in supply chain relationships.

The results first demonstrate that advanced IT can improve efficiency in both the design of complete contracts and the provision of contract execution safeguards. Second, the results also show that both the personal relationships between boundary spanners and the cooperative orientation of the firm have different moderating effects. Finally, contract execution safeguards are effective in mitigating partners' opportunistic behaviors, whereas contract completeness is not.

This study enriches the contract governance literature in two ways. First, it unveils how advanced IT improves the efficiency of contract governance and the effects of two contingent factors (i.e. personal relationships and cooperative orientation), thus extending the research on contract governance. Second, it reveals the different effects of contract completeness and contract execution safeguards on partners' opportunistic behaviors, thus deepening our understanding of the role of contracts in interfirm cooperation.

This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of control mechanisms in promoting collaborative performance by exploring the moderating effects of formal institutions (government support and legal enforcement in this study) and informal ties (business ties in this study) on the relationship between control mechanisms and collaborative performance.

A conceptual model is developed with the direct effects of contractual execution and relational norms on collaborative performance and the moderating effects of government support, legal enforcement and business ties on the above relationships. Hierarchical regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses based on 393 responses from Chinese computer and computer components distributors.

The empirical results generally support the conceptual model. First, consistent with most previous studies, both contractual execution and relational norms contribute to collaborative performance. Second, government support and business ties weaken the role of contractual execution, whereas legal enforcement strengthens it. Third, business ties enhance the effects of relational norms, and, unexpectedly, government support also fosters the relationship between relational norms and collaborative performance.

First, this study solves the problem of conflicting findings on the relationship between contract and performance by examining the effect of contractual execution, rather than contract design, on collaborative performance. Second, this study contributes to institutional theory by examining the moderating role of formal institutions. Third, this study deepens the understanding of the role of business ties by exploring its moderating effect on the relationship between control mechanisms and collaborative performance.

This study aims to examine the effects of formal and informal institutional factors (i.e. marketization and guanxi culture) on interorganizational conflicts (IOCs) and their interaction effects.

Drawing on IOC literature and an institution-based view, the authors use a sample of 12,022 Chinese firms from the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey. A zero-inflated negative binomial regression was used to analyze the data.

The results suggest that guanxi culture has U-shaped effects, but marketization does not negatively affect IOCs. Furthermore, a low level of marketization weakens the U-shaped effect of guanxi culture on IOCs. A moderate level of guanxi culture can enable marketization to reduce IOCs.

This study provides a better understanding of the management of IOCs. Managers should fully understand the differential effects of the institutional environment in different regions and their interactions by adopting different response strategies.

This study enriches the literature on IOCs’ antecedents and contextual factors by examining the institutions’ direct and interaction effects on IOCs.

This study seeks to introduce the concept of collectivism, and to assess its impact on interfirm commitment in both high and low collectivist countries.

In evaluating the effects of bilateral power structures on commitment, the paper utilizes polynomial regression and the response surface approach.

Collectivism influenced a manufacturer's commitment to the relationship with its supplier only in Korea, but collectivism did not influence a manufacturer's commitment to the relationship with its supplier in the USA. On the other hand, for the USA sample, significant main effects of manufacturer power and supplier power, as well as a significant interaction between manufacturer power and supplier power on interfirm commitment were detected.

The results demonstrate that the bilateral power magnitude between a manufacturer and its supplier was germane to the manufacturer's commitment. An increase in the supplier's power contributes to manufacturer's commitment, particularly under high bilateral power conditions. Under low bilateral power conditions, manufacturers were shown to become less committed to a relationship.

It is important for global companies to understand the prevailing national culture. US companies operating in Eastern countries, such as Korea, should consider these cultural differences and manage their interfirm relationships on the basis of their long‐term perspectives.

This study facilitates a greater understanding of the influence of national culture on inter‐organizational commitment. Specifically, it evaluates the relative influences of collectivism and interfirm power structures on interfirm commitment in both high and low collectivistic cultures.

The purpose of this study is to enhance the understanding of the role of contracts in channel relationships. Treating contracts as a multidimensional construct, this study examines the effects of contractual issue inclusiveness and contractual obligatoriness on performance and opportunism, as well as the moderating effects of relational norms on the above relationships.

Based on the data of 206 samples collected from distributors of house furnishing, computer and computer components, moderated regression is used to test the hypotheses.

The empirical test generally supports the conceptual model and provides three findings. First, contractual issue inclusiveness is more profound in enhancing relationship performance than contractual obligatoriness, and contractual obligatoriness is more statistically powerful in mitigating opportunism than contractual issue inclusiveness. Second, relational norms can enhance the positive effect of contractual issue inclusiveness but not contractual obligatoriness on performance. Third, relational norms can strengthen the negative effect of contractual obligatoriness but not contractual issue inclusiveness on opportunism.

First, this study investigates only contractual issue inclusiveness and contractual obligatoriness, and future studies should consider other dimensions of contracts. Second, the influence of external environment is not considered in the model. Third, data from Chinese distributors limit the generalization of conclusions. Finally, data come only from buyers, and suppliers’ viewpoints are not included.

The results provide a framework for managers to use contracts and relational norms. Managers should pay attention to the alignment between contractual dimensions and firm objectives because various dimensions of contracts have different impacts on channel relationships.

Prior research has documented contracts’ role in coordinating channel relationships but has not achieved consistent conclusions on contracts’ effectiveness. Furthermore, extant research indicates that channel members will use contracts and relational norms simultaneously but has conflicting views on the combined effects of these two control mechanisms. The study contributes by addressing these issues.