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This study aims to investigate the relationship between integrated reporting, environmental innovation and the mediating effect of shareholder scores within the context of Japan.

SEM on panel data are used to study the impact of the role of shareholder scores in mediating the effect of integrated reporting on environmental innovation. This empirical study was based on a sample of 420 companies operating in Japan for the period spanning 2010 and 2022.

Drawing upon empirical results, this research uncovers the pivotal role of the shareholder's score as a mediating factor in this relationship. A higher shareholder score signifies a governance structure that values shareholder input and fairness in treatment. Empowered shareholders leverage their influence to advocate for transparent reporting practices that encompass environmental considerations. Consequently, firms with elevated shareholder scores are more inclined toward environmental innovation, aligning their strategies with sustainability imperatives.

The findings contribute to understanding of how corporate governance mechanisms, particularly shareholder empowerment, interact with reporting practices to drive environmental initiatives, providing valuable implications for sustainable business practices globally.

This study aims to facilitate the development of a better understanding of how controlling shareholders respond to the mandatory system of corporate governance rating (CGR) for all firms listed on Taiwanese stock markets and the incentives of controllers to apply corporate governance best practices.

Using CGR data for all Taiwanese listed firms from 2014 to 2020, this study examines whether controlling shareholders determine a firm’s CGR.

Single-family-controlled firms have the lowest CGRs, and management-controlled firms have the highest ratings. Blockholder-controlled firms are more likely to have top 20% ratings than single-family-controlled firms and bottom 20% ratings than single-family and management-controlled firms. All three categories of firms have unfavorable (favorable) ratings because of substitute governance effects (signaling effects).

Management-controlled firms, in which agency problems refer to principal-agent conflicts, are more likely to have good ratings than single-family controlled firms, in which agency problems refer to principal-principal conflicts. Blockholder-controlled firms have extreme ratings, suggesting that multiple large shareholders develop corporate governance practices consistent with their best interests to increase firm value or expropriate wealth. Low cash flow rights and high control-ownership divergence lead firms to adopt additional governance arrangement(s) to make shareholders trust firms with capital and signal to shareholders that they can trust them with their capital.

Shareholder activism is gaining popularity across the globe especially in today’s context where the option of giving up and selling shares to exit the company has become obsolete. Hence, the purpose of this research paper is two-fold, firstly, to investigate the extent to which the minority shareholders of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius adopt and make use of the various tools of activism; and secondly, to compare the UK laws on shareholder activism with that of Mauritius.

To achieve these objectives, this study adopted the qualitative research method. Primary data was collected by conducting a survey on minority shareholders of Mauritian listed companies to figure out the extent to which they resort to activism tools, while secondary data was collected through a qualitative legal, document and content analysis to scrutinise regulatory provisions and existing literature on the researched topic.

The results show a moderate implementation level of shareholder activism by the minority investors in Mauritius although it was noted that minority shareholders are more likely to resort to the internal tools of activism rather than external methods. Further to the comparative study conducted, this research recommends a more active participation of the Mauritian regulatory bodies, amendments to the Mauritius Code of Corporate Governance and Mauritius Companies Act and the establishment of a commission responsible for overseeing the exercise of shareholders’ powers and promoting derivative lawsuits among minority shareholders.

Few researchers like Beebeejaun and Koobloll (2018) analysed shareholder activism through the lens of corporate governance with the view of providing recommendations to bring amendments in the Mauritian corporate law landscape. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has yet been effectuated on the extent to which shareholder activism is practised by the minority investors in developing countries, for which this existing study aims at filling in the research gap.

Environment, social and governance (ESG) practices and shareholder activism are making significant strides in the decision-making policies and processes for all firms. This study aims to assess the impact of ESG on the dividend payout decisions of firms in India. In addition, it also aims to determine how shareholder activism influences the impact of ESG on dividend distribution decisions.

The authors gather relevant data from 78 non-financial listed Indian firms from 2016 to 2020. This study undertakes longitudinal data analysis, with fixed effects and calculation of robust standard errors. In addition, the slope test is used to examine the effects of the interaction between ESG and shareholder activism.

It is found in the study that not only does ESG positively impact the dividends but also shareholder activism positively impacts the dividend distribution decisions. Surprisingly, the authors see a significant but negative interaction impact of shareholder activism on the positive association of ESG with dividend distribution decisions. In other words, ESG impacts dividend distribution decisions differently at levels of shareholder activism. When shareholder activism is low, ESG positively influences dividend distribution decisions. However, when shareholder activism is high, ESG negatively influences dividend distribution decisions.

This result has significant implications for all the stakeholders, including shareholders. A shareholder expecting a dividend could decide correctly through the current study’s findings. In cases of high shareholder activism, investors may skip picking a stock if investors expect high ESG to influence the dividend distribution decisions favourably. On the contrary, investors may choose a stock if shareholder activism is low and all else remains the same.

Literature has some evidence of the influence of shareholder activism and ESG (in silos) on the dividend distribution decisions in the firms. This study attempts to contribute by bringing forth the interaction effects of shareholder activism and ESG on dividend distribution decisions.

The purpose of this article is to synthesize the topics, conceptualizations and measurements of value-based management (VBM) and to suggest a research agenda covering its next evolution as sustainable governance.

The authors conducted a systematic literature review of 80 seminal studies published between 1979 and 2022. The authors synthesized the studies by their conceptualizations of VBM in an inductively developed framework.

The authors find that scholars explore diverse topics related to VBM with a prevailing focus on shareholder primacy. There is a paucity of studies that focus on the integration of shareholder maximization and stakeholder management practices. The authors explain which studies will form a promising foundation for advanced research on sustainable governance that will reach beyond current VBM research.

The authors' research agenda addresses new future topics on conflicting goals within and between shareholder groups, offers specific suggestions for using new research methods and untapped data sources for VBM and paves the way to substantially extend the boundaries of the firm in VBM research to include stakeholders, strategic alignment and new sustainability measures.

This study aims to investigate the effect of the classification of origin country of institutional shareholder (domestic, developed and developing country) and its status on stock exchange (listed and unlisted) on environmental disclosure level in Indonesian companies.

The data set comprises 474 non-financial firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period of 2017 to 2019. The study uses an environmental disclosure checklist to measure the extent of environmental disclosure in companies’ reports. Panel regression analysis technique is adopted to investigate the association between total percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders based on the classification of origin country and the status in stock exchange, and the extent of environmental disclosure.

The study reveals that the extent of environmental disclosure is positively and significantly associated with institutional investors from domestic, developed countries, listed and unlisted institutional investors. Further analysis shows interesting results that institutions from developing countries have a negative and significant relationship with environmental disclosure in non-sensitive industries.

The authors recognize the issue of authors’ subjectivity in the measurement process of environmental disclosure. The sample for this study encompasses Indonesian listed firms. Thus, the results may not be generalized to Indonesian unlisted firms and other countries or regions.

This study suggests managers to engage more with institutional shareholders because they have greater concern for environmental disclosure practices. The current study also suggests managers to make strong environmental policies as they are important to ensure that institutional shareholders’ investments are safe.

Given the positive impact institutional shareholders have on the level of environmental disclosure, it indirectly indicates that institutional shareholders have a strong motivation to make the world a better place.

This study offers in-depth insights into the effect of institutional ownership on environmental disclosure based on the classification of origin country and listing status of institutional investors.

The purpose of this study is to comparatively analyze the effect of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Shariah-compliant (SC) and noncompliant (NC) nonfinancial firms in Pakistan.

All the nonfinancial firms listed on the Pakistan stock exchange have been taken as a sample for 2016–2021. The Karachi Meezan index screening criteria were applied to screen SC firms. Based on the BPLM and Hausman test results, the authors used the fixed-effect and pooled OLS model for SC and NC firms, respectively. The F-test was used to compare the effect of each dividend policy variable on shareholders’ wealth for both firm types.

The findings reveal that the dividend policy does affect the shareholders’ wealth in both firm types. Dividend per share (DPS), dividend yield (DY) and earnings per share significantly affect the shareholders’ wealth in SC firms. For NC firms, the dividend payout, DPS and DY are critical. Moreover, the F-test results show that the DPS, DY and leverage effect on the shareholders’ wealth significantly differ for both firm types.

This study fills the research gap in the Pakistani context specifically as well as globally by providing important insights into the relationship between a firm’s dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth for SC and NC firms. In addition, this study comprehensively compares the results for both firm types, which is also lacking in the existing literature. Because this study is based in Pakistan, the generalizability of the results would be limited.

The findings of this study are helpful for the management of SC and NC firms in devising their dividend policies that can maximize their shareholders’ wealth. This study also provides guidance and knowledge to investors in choosing companies for their investments that can maximize their wealth.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth for SC firms in Pakistan. It is also the first study that comprehensively compares the dividend policy relationship with shareholders’ wealth for SC and NC firms. In addition, using the F-test for joint hypotheses to compare the specific effect of each dividend policy variable is a methodological contribution of the study.

This study examines shareholder and board motivations regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) to understand boards' stewardship approaches to environmental issues.

Using content analysis, the authors classify CSR motivations in all environmental shareholder proposals and board responses of Fortune 250 companies from 2013 to 2017 from do little (a shareholder primacy perspective) to do much (a stakeholder pluralism perspective). The authors calculate the motivational dissonance for each proposal-response pair (the Talk Gap) and use cluster analysis to observe evidence of board stewardship and subsequent environmental disclosure and performance (ED&P) changes.

Board interpretations of stewardship are not uniform, and they regularly extend to stakeholders beyond shareholders, most frequently including profit-oriented stakeholders (e.g. employees and customers). ED&P changes are highest when shareholders narrowly lead boards in CSR motivation and either request both action and information or information only. The authors observe weaker ED&P changes when shareholders request action and the dissonance between shareholders and boards is larger. When shareholders are motivated to do little for CSR, ED&P changes are weak, even when boards express more pluralistic motivations.

The results show the important role that boards play in CSR and may aid activist shareholders in determining how best to generate change in corporate CSR actions.

This study provides the first evidence of board stewardship at the proposal-response level. It measures shareholder and board CSR motivations, introduces the Talk Gap, and examines relationships among proposal characteristics, the Talk Gap, and subsequent ED&P change to better understand board stewardship of environmental issues.

In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder can actively participate in corporate governance and protect the interests of investors, its impact has not been fully understood. This research investigates how shareholding ratio and ownership type of the second largest shareholder moderate the relationship between controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio and cash dividends.

The authors conducted econometrics analysis based on a panel data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017.

The authors find that the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio has a significant negative impact on cash dividends. However, this influence is conditional on the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder. The negative impact is weakened when the second largest shareholder holds a large proportion of shares or when the shareholding gap between the second largest and the controlling shareholder is small.

This research extends the existing literature by highlighting the nuanced moderating effect of the second largest shareholder on the relationship between the controlling shareholder and cash dividends, thus making a unique contribution to the understanding of corporate governances in the emerging financial market in China.

This study investigated the impact of corporate ownership structure on agency costs in the insurance industry.

The study sample included 23 insurance companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2010 to 2019. Panel regression was used to account for the firm- and time-specific unobservable variables and system-GMM estimation was used to address endogeneity concerns.

The results show that managerial ownership positively (negatively) affects selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (assets turnover), implying that unmonitored managers engage in activities that serve their own interests rather than those of shareholders. The largest shareholder's ownership has no impact on agency costs, implying that the ownership of the largest shareholder is irrelevant. However, as the wedge between the percentage of capital owned by the largest shareholders and managers increases, SG&A expenses (efficiency ratio) decrease (increases), indicating that the existence of large non-management shareholders reduces agency costs. After accounting for the endogeneity problem, the impact of ownership structure on agency costs measured by asset turnover remains robust.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to provide unique evidence and useful insights into the determinants of agency costs from a frontier market in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with a focus on the insurance sector. Additionally, this study uses a new measure of separation between ownership and control by calculating the wedge between managers' and large shareholders' ownership.