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The purpose of this paper we present a case study where the Swedish planning support system Citylab is applied to a Chinese case in Changzhou's Tianning District.

China's planning system is a vertical system based on policy development on the national level, policies which are to be implemented on local level. There is a gap between the ambitious central policies and the implementations on local levels. China is now exporting its planning model to other developing countries which makes it urgent to show examples of other strategies including more horizontal planning involving the public. The planning system in Sweden is based on a much more horizontal process. Therefore, the authors try to learn from Sweden's vertical planning system in the urban development environment of China.

A key message for policy makers in China is that systems like Citylab can play an important role in developing practical and scalable examples of more sustainable city districts. The paper concludes that a barrier for local sustainability planning in China is still lack of effective communication between local actors including the public.

The authors exemplified Changzhou Tianning District's practical exploration, thus proving the adapted Citylab method's practical operability. Based on the common problems faced by eco-city development in developing countries, the method framework of Citylab is applicable to other developing countries, with strong room for deduction and development.

Political factors play a crucial role in China's initial public offering (IPO) market due to its distinctive institutional context (i.e. “economic decentralization” and “political centralization”). Given the significant level of IPO underpricing in China, we examine the impact of local political uncertainty (measured by prefecture-level city official turnover rate) on IPO underpricing.

Using 2,259 IPOs of A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2019, we employ a structural equation model (SEM) to examine the channel (voluntarily lower the issuance price vs aftermarket trading) through which political uncertainty affects IPO underpricing. We check the robustness of the results using bootstrap tests, adopting alternative proxies for political uncertainty and IPO underpricing and employing subsample analysis.

Local official turnover-induced political uncertainty increases IPO underpricing by IPO firms voluntarily reducing the issuance price rather than by affecting investor sentiment in aftermarket trading. These relations are stronger in firms with pre-IPO political connections. The effect of political uncertainty on IPO underpricing is also contingent upon the industry and the growth phase of an IPO firm, more pronounced in politically sensitive industries and firms listed on the growth enterprise market board.

Local government officials in China usually have a short tenure and Chinese firms witness significantly severe IPO underpricing. By introducing the SEM model in studying China IPO underpricing, this study identifies the channel through which local government official turnover to political uncertainty on IPO underpricing.

This study aims to investigate whether firms purchase directors' and officers' liability (D&O) insurance when the country-level economic policy uncertainty (EPU) is high.

This study uses D&O insurance data from Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2019 to conduct regression analyses to examine the association between D&O insurance and EPU.

The results show that government EPU, despite being an exogenous factor, increases the likelihood of firms' purchasing D&O insurance, and this effect is more pronounced when firms are exposed to great share price crash risk and high litigation risk, suggesting that firms intend to purchase D&O insurance possibly due to the accentuated stock price crash risk and litigation risk associated with EPU. In addition, the results indicate that the effect of EPU on the D&O insurance purchase decision is moderated by the provincial capital market development and internal control quality.

The study highlights the role of uncertain economic policies in shareholder approval of D&O insurance purchases.

The study enriches the literature on the determinants of D&O insurance purchases by documenting novel evidence that country-level EPU is a key institutional factor shaping firms' decisions to purchase D&O insurance.

The purpose of our study is to investigate the effects of politically-connected boards (PCBs) on over-(under-)investment in labor. We also examine the impacts of the supervisory board (SB)’s optimal tenure on the association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.

We constructed the proxy for PCBs using a dummy variable set to 1 (one) if a firm has politically-connected boards and zero (0) otherwise. For the robustness check, we used the number of politically-connected members on the boards as the proxy for PCBs.

We find that the presence of PCBs reduces over-investment in labor. Consistent with our prediction, we found no significant association between PCBs and under-investment in labor. We also find that the SB with optimal tenure strengthens the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor. In our channel analysis, we find that the presence of PCB mitigates over-investment in labor through a higher dividend payout ratio.

Due to the unavailability of data in firms’ annual reports regarding the number of poorly-skilled and highly skilled employees, we were not able to examine the effect of low-skilled and high-skilled employees on over-investment in labor. Also, we were not able to examine over-(under-)investment in labor by drawing a distinction between general (generalist) and firm-specific human capital (specialist) as suggested by Sevcenko, Wu, and Kacperczyk (2022). Generally, it is more difficult for managers to hire highly-skilled employees, specialists in particular, thereby driving the choice of either over- or under-investing in the labor forces. In addition, in the firms’ annual reports, there is no information regarding temporary employees. Therefore, if and when such data become available, this would provide another avenue for future research.

Our study offers several practical implications and insights to stakeholders (e.g. insiders or management, shareholders, investors, analysts and creditors) in the following ways. First, our study highlights significant differences between capital investment and labor investment. For instance, labor investment is considered an expense rather than an asset (Wyatt, 2008) because, although such investment is human capital and is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet (Boon et al., 2017). In addition, labor investment is characterized by: its flexibility which enables firms to make frequent adjustments (Hamermesh, 1995; Dixit & Pindyck, 2012; Aksin et al., 2015), its non-homogeneity since every employee is unique (Luo et al., 2020), its direct impact on morale and productivity of a firm (Azadegan et al., 2013; Mishina et al., 2004; Tatikonda et al., 2013), and its financial outlay which affects the ongoing cash flows of a firm (Sualihu et al., 2021; Khedmati et al., 2020; Merz & Yashiv, 2007). Second, our findings reveal that the presence of PCBs could help to reduce over-investment in labor. However, if managers of a firm choose to under-invest in labor in order to obtain better profit in the short-term through cost saving, they should be aware of the potential consequences of facing a financial loss when a new business opportunity suddenly arises which requires a larger labor force. Third, our findings help stakeholders to re-focus on the labor investment. This is crucial due to the fact that labor investment is often neglected by those stakeholders because the expenditure of labor investment is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet as an asset. Instead, it is written off as an expense in the firm’s income statement. Fourth, our findings also provide insightful information to stakeholders, suggesting that an SB with optimal tenure is more committed to a firm, and this factor plays an important role in strengthening the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.

First, our findings provide a valuable understanding of the effects of PCBs on over-(under-)investment in labor. Stakeholders could use information disclosed in the financial statements of a publicly-listed firm to determine the extent of the firm’s investment in labor and PCBs, and compare this information with similar firms in the same industry sector. Second, our findings give a better understanding of the association between investment in labor and political connections , which are human and social capital that could determine the long-term survival and success of a firm. Third, for shareholders, the appointment of board members with political connections is an important strategic decision to build political capital, which is likely to have a long-term impact on the financial performance of a firm; therefore, it requires thoughtful consultation with firm insiders.

Our findings highlight the role of PCBs in reducing over-investment in labor. These findings are significant because both investment in labor and political connections as human and social capital can play an important role in determining the long-term survival and success of a firm.

This study aims to explore the advantage of foreignness in a digital world.

Usage data for 251 days of 32 travel mobile applications installed on a major mobile phone brand in China are examined. Results support the author’s arguments.

Foreign mobile apps enjoy higher daily usage time than local apps. Next, the author consider how foreign apps can maximize their advantage, that is, increase daily usage time. The author argue that a multinational enterprise (MNE) can digitally enter a country that has numerous immigrants from its home country because of the high number of potential long tail users. A high level of diversity of international experience of MNEs increases the ability to understand and satisfy the specific needs of long tail users, thereby increasing daily usage time of foreign mobile apps. To maximize the advantage of foreignness in a digital world, MNEs can also carefully select business models that do not heavily rely on network effect, given the difficulty of generating network effect by long tail users.

Previous studies focus on the liability of foreignness or outsidership that MNEs encounter in the digital world, whereas this study argues that foreignness brings certain benefits, such as the capability to satisfy the specific needs of long tail users.