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The combination of improved PSO (IPSO) algorithm and artificial neural network (ANN) model for intelligent monitoring of the bearing performance of the hydrostatic turntable.

This paper proposes an artificial neural network model based on IPSO algorithm for intelligent monitoring of hydrostatic turntables.

The theoretical model proposed in this paper improves the accuracy of the working performance of the static pressure turntable and provides a new direction for intelligent monitoring of the static pressure turntable. Therefore, the theoretical research in this paper is novel.

Theoretical novelties: an ANN model based on the IPSO algorithm is designed to monitor the load-bearing performance of a static pressure turntable intelligently; this study show that the convergence accuracy and convergence speed of the IPSO-NN model have been improved by 52.55% and 10%, respectively, compared to traditional training models; and the proposed model could be used to solve the multidimensional nonlinear problem in the intelligent monitoring of hydrostatic turntables.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/ILT-03-2024-0081/

The government plays an important role in the financing process of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but the current government-enterprise cooperation (GEC) mechanism cannot well solve the financing problem of SMEs. In addition, since government-enterprise cooperation is a long-term dynamic process, this study aims to explore the cooperation strategy between the government and core enterprises in supply chain finance (SCF) under the dynamic structure.

Considering both parties have the characteristics of disappointment aversion, our research constructs a game theory model of government subsidy and the effort of the enterprise to implement SCF based on differential game and studies different game strategies in the non-cooperative game, the Stackelberg game and the cooperative game.

Our findings show that the government subsidy can significantly spur the enterprise in the supply chain to implement SCF. We also find that the limitation of the government subsidy exists. In addition, the optimal strategy, the optimal benefit and the total benefit of the financing system formed by the government and the enterprise in the cooperative game are better than those in the non-cooperative game. Pareto optimality is achieved.

The limitations of this paper are: (1) In theory, this paper only takes the government and enterprise as game subjects without considering other participants in the supply chain. In addition, only disappointment aversion is taken into consideration while in reality the participants often exhibit multiple behavior preferences. (2) In methodology, only the numerical solution is given through the solution algorithm and all parameters are assumed to be determined as time changes for the convenience of calculation.

The government can motivate enterprises in the supply chain to implement SCF by providing subsidies. However, it should be noted that excessive subsidy will make the enterprise dependent on the government and as a result, decrease the effort level to implement SCF. Thus, it is necessary for the government to keep track of the business conditions of the enterprise to make a subsidy strategy. In addition, the government can reduce the impact of disappointing aversion by making more targeted policies and taking risk management measures.

On one hand, it is necessary for the government to keep track of the business conditions of the enterprise to make a subsidy strategy. In addition, the government can reduce the impact of their own disappointing aversion by making more targeted policies and adopting risk management measures. On the other, it is important for the enterprise to improve the regulatory mechanism and optimize the compensation structure of decision-makers to inhibit the impact of decision-makers' disappointing aversion.

This study is the first to investigate the mechanism of GEC in the setting of SCF based on a differential game. Furthermore, our study provides a theoretical basis for the government and enterprises to cooperate in SCF.

This paper provides the latest systematic literature review (SLR) of prevailing studies on the interrelationship among executive compensation, financial performance and sustainable business practices. This SLR is done in three parts: (1) examine the theories employed by previous studies; (2) identify the unique variables employed by researchers in analysing this interrelationship and (3) explore potential opportunities for further study in the field.

This study conducted an SLR analysing studies from the Web of science, Scopus and EBSCO in over 20 countries from 2009 to 2022 published in several top-ranked journals. We utilised various search strings using the key phrases “executive compensation”, “CEO Pay”, “financial performance” and “sustainable business practices”. The initial sample of 27,210 was filtered with our meticulous inclusion and exclusion criteria to produce a list of 161 studies.

Our findings are as follows: first, most studies encompassing this subject area lack multi-theoretical perspectives with agency theory being the most dominant theoretical viewpoint; second, we observed the use of monotonous quantitative research methods, with studies heavily lacking qualitative and mixed-method research approaches; finally, there is a palpable gap in cross-country studies.

There are a few limitations that must be acknowledged. First, the inclusion criteria ensured that only articles published in the CABS journal ranking of three star and above. Thus, this review may not be a precise reflection of the EC, FP and SBPs literature scope. The inclusion criteria also limit our review to only accounting, finance, management and business-related studies about the topic. Therefore, future studies could explore studies ranked three star and below and from other subject areas.

This study contributes to the existing literature by conducting a comprehensive SLR that examines both the theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence on this topic. It builds upon previous research and extends our understanding of the interrelationship among executive compensation, financial performance and sustainable business practices.