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Cooperation strategy of government-enterprise supply chain finance based on differential game

Chen Chen, Zhou Yongsheng

International Journal of Emerging Markets

ISSN: 1746-8809

Article publication date: 14 January 2025

30

Abstract

Purpose

The government plays an important role in the financing process of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but the current government-enterprise cooperation (GEC) mechanism cannot well solve the financing problem of SMEs. In addition, since government-enterprise cooperation is a long-term dynamic process, this study aims to explore the cooperation strategy between the government and core enterprises in supply chain finance (SCF) under the dynamic structure.

Design/methodology/approach

Considering both parties have the characteristics of disappointment aversion, our research constructs a game theory model of government subsidy and the effort of the enterprise to implement SCF based on differential game and studies different game strategies in the non-cooperative game, the Stackelberg game and the cooperative game.

Findings

Our findings show that the government subsidy can significantly spur the enterprise in the supply chain to implement SCF. We also find that the limitation of the government subsidy exists. In addition, the optimal strategy, the optimal benefit and the total benefit of the financing system formed by the government and the enterprise in the cooperative game are better than those in the non-cooperative game. Pareto optimality is achieved.

Research limitations/implications

The limitations of this paper are: (1) In theory, this paper only takes the government and enterprise as game subjects without considering other participants in the supply chain. In addition, only disappointment aversion is taken into consideration while in reality the participants often exhibit multiple behavior preferences. (2) In methodology, only the numerical solution is given through the solution algorithm and all parameters are assumed to be determined as time changes for the convenience of calculation.

Practical implications

The government can motivate enterprises in the supply chain to implement SCF by providing subsidies. However, it should be noted that excessive subsidy will make the enterprise dependent on the government and as a result, decrease the effort level to implement SCF. Thus, it is necessary for the government to keep track of the business conditions of the enterprise to make a subsidy strategy. In addition, the government can reduce the impact of disappointing aversion by making more targeted policies and taking risk management measures.

Social implications

On one hand, it is necessary for the government to keep track of the business conditions of the enterprise to make a subsidy strategy. In addition, the government can reduce the impact of their own disappointing aversion by making more targeted policies and adopting risk management measures. On the other, it is important for the enterprise to improve the regulatory mechanism and optimize the compensation structure of decision-makers to inhibit the impact of decision-makers' disappointing aversion.

Originality/value

This study is the first to investigate the mechanism of GEC in the setting of SCF based on a differential game. Furthermore, our study provides a theoretical basis for the government and enterprises to cooperate in SCF.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

Funding: The paper is funded by Open Projects of the Institute of Systems Science, Beijing Wuzi University (BWUISS46).

Citation

Chen, C. and Yongsheng, Z. (2025), "Cooperation strategy of government-enterprise supply chain finance based on differential game", International Journal of Emerging Markets, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-04-2023-0538

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2024, Emerald Publishing Limited

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