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In a simulated organizational conflict, concession behavior by a negotiator's opponent was manipulated to examine how subsequent third party intervention would influence negotiator perceptions of process control, decision control, distributive justice, and the third party. Negotiators whose opponents made large concessions reciprocated by also making large concessions, suggesting a high level of movement toward agreement by the disputants; subjects whose opponents made few concessions reciprocated in kind, resulting in little movement toward agreement. Third parties, however, imposed outcomes on all negotiators prior to negotiated agreements. Perceptions of decision control, distributive justice, and the necessity of third party intervention were influenced by whether disputants were close to reaching an agreement on their own or not. Outcome imposed by the third party influenced almost all measures. The study suggests that behavior by the disputants (in the form of movement toward agreement), and not just behavior by the third party, can influence ratings of both procedures and outcomes.

In a simulated three‐issue organizational dispute, subjects were interrupted by a third party (their supervisor) who recommended—and eventually imposed—one of five different outcomes. Each outcome provided subjects the same overall payoff, though the arrangement of payoffs across each of the three issues varied. The design allowed us to evaluate four different perspectives regarding negotiators' perceptions of their outcomes. In addition, third parties provided justifications, apologies, or excuses for their actions. Fairness judgments and supervisory evaluations were most favorable when negotiators received an outcome reflecting favorable settlements on the majority of the issues, or the midpoint compromise; the least favorable reactions occurred when subjects received favorable outcomes on only their most important issue. Third parties who offered a justification for their actions were seen as fairer than those offering apologies or excuses. The findings reiterate the importance of considering both the symbolic characteristics of outcomes and the interactional justice inherent in different types of explanations.

We provide a brief review of how the concept of justice has evolved over time from a single construct (distributive justice) to one represented by four constructs (distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice). We then compare and contrast two recent meta‐analytic views of organizational justice, focusing on the relationships each documents between justice constructs and organizational outcomes. We conclude by arguing that the justice literature needs to focus on identifying moderators of the justice‐outcome relations noted in the meta‐analyses.

The present study extends recently‐acquired knowledge about the affective aspects of negotiations by examining the effects of defining negotiation outcomes in affective terms rather than numeric terms. Using a 2 x 2 experimental design, the researchers represented the negotiation outcomes in four different ways: happy faces, unhappy faces, positive numbers, and negative numbers. The results indicate that representing outcomes in affective terms leads to longer negotiation times and higher impasse rates. In addition, participants whose outcomes were represented as happy faces reported the highest levels of emotional involvement, the lowest levels of cooperation and trust, and most frequently experienced negative emotions. Emotional involvement and negative emotions also helped explain differences in negotiation time and individual outcomes over and above the effects of the experimental manipulations. The implications of these results for negotiation research are discussed.

The present study attempted to replicate the findings of Kolb's research identifying two groups of mediators, which she labeled “Dealmakers” and “Orchestrators.” Seventy‐seven mediators were presented with a written dispute and asked to react the likelihood that they would use each of nine different mediation techniques. The techniques corresponded to Sheppard's taxonomy of Process Control, Content Control, and Motivational Control techniques. They also rated the perceived effectiveness of each of these three types of control with the dispute. Based upon their responses, the mediators were separated into groups using average‐link cluster analysis. The results suggested four clusters: Cluster 1 members corresponded to Kolb's “Dealmakers,” relying upon Process, Content, and Motivational Control techniques. Cluster 2 members did not correspond to either of Kolb's classifications, choosing to use Content and Motivational Control strategies. Cluster 3 members were similar to Kolb's “Orchestrators;” members of this cluster relied upon Process and Content Control techniques only. Cluster 4 members were reluctant to use any of the control strategies. These findings suggest a partial replication and extension of Kolb's initial work. Implications for future research are discussed.

One aspect of attracting new employees that has historically been ignored by recruitment researchers is salary negotiations. In this study, we used a hypothetical scenario design to depict salary negotiation experiences in which we varied the levels of salary offer, the behavior of a company and its representative, and the deadlines for receiving a signing bonus. MBA students served as study participants who read the scenarios and responded to questions about perceived organizational attractiveness and job acceptance decisions—two important recruitment outcomes. As hypothesized, our results indicated that salaries, a company's responsiveness to candidate questions, and a company representative's expression of derogatory comments all impact recruitment outcomes. However, exploding signing bonuses had no significant effects, calling into question the negative connotation practitioners have of exploding compensation schemes. Our justice framework revealed that many of the effects that we found for our manipulations on participants' judgments regarding our recruitment outcomes were mediated by perceptions of organizational justice. Finally, we found some evidence of the frustration effect, as procedures that were considered fair worsened rather than mitigated the negative effects of unfair outcomes on job acceptance decisions.

Two studies in the context of English‐French relations in Québec suggest that individuals who strongly identify with a group derive the individual‐level costs and benefits that drive expectancy‐value processes (rational decision‐making) from group‐level costs and benefits. In Study 1, high identifiers linked group‐ and individual‐level outcomes of conflict choices whereas low identifiers did not. Group‐level expectancy‐value processes, in Study 2, mediated the relationship between social identity and perceptions that collective action benefits the individual actor and between social identity and intentions to act. These findings suggest the rational underpinnings of identity‐driven political behavior, a relationship sometimes obscured in intergroup theory that focuses on cognitive processes of self‐stereotyping. But the results also challenge the view that individuals' cost‐benefit analyses are independent of identity processes. The findings suggest the importance of modeling the relationship of group and individual levels of expectancy‐value processes as both hierarchical and contingent on social identity processes.

The present paper reviews the research literature on trust in bargaining and mediation. Several models of trust within the bargaining process are also described. It is concluded that trust means different things, depending upon the relationship under investigation. Trust among negotiators can refer to a personality trail (how trusting a negotiator is of others) or to a temporary state. Within the state perspective, trust often refers to one of three orientations: (1) cooperative motivational orientation (MO), (2) patterns of predictable behavior, (3) a problem‐solving orientation. Trust between a negotiator and constituents usually refers to a cooperative MO (i.e., shared loyalty) between these two groups. The addition of a mediator can impact both the opposing negotiators' relationship and each negotiator‐constituent relationship; the mediator also has direct and indirect relationships with the parties and their constituents. Future directions for research on trust are identified.

Communications regarding this column should be addressed to Mrs. Cheney, Peabody Library School, Nashville, Tenn. 37203. Mrs. Cheney does not sell the books listed here. They are available through normal trade sources. Mrs. Cheney, being a member of the editorial board of Pierian Press, will not review Pierian Press reference books in this column. Descriptions of Pierian Press reference books will be included elsewhere in this publication.

IN 1946 there was in the British Isles a clear image of librarianship in most librarians' minds. The image depended on a librarian's professional environment which was of the widest possible range, not less in variation than the organisations, institutes or types of community which required library services. Generalisations are like cocoanuts but they provide for the quickest precipitation of variant definitions, after the stones have been thrown at them. A generalisation might claim that, in 1946, public librarians had in mind an image of a librarian as organiser plus technical specialist or literary critic or book selector; that university and institute librarians projected themselves as scholars of any subject with a special environmental responsibility; that librarians in industry regarded themselves as something less than but as supplementing the capacity of a subject specialist (normally a scientist). Other minor separable categories existed with as many shades of meaning between the three generalised definitions, while librarians of national libraries were too few to be subject to easy generalisation.