Social Theory as Politics in Knowledge: Volume 23

The title of this volume is a deliberate paraphrase of Louis Althusser's defense of a specific form of discourse, which he calls philosophy, and which I, like Bob Antonio, call social theory. Like Antonio, I use the term to distinguish this discourse, these discourses, from sociological theory; to insist on its critical potential; to insist on its public significance. I also use the term to insist on its necessarily conflictual character; and to insist on its ubiquity in all discourses, from the most esoteric to the most banal, as well as its articulation by all subjects, from the most “expert” to the most “vulgar.”

There is no argument among serious researchers that a mongoloid stock first colonized the New World from Asia. Nor is there controversy about the fact that these continental pioneers used the Bering Land Bridge that then connected the Asian Far East with Alaska.– Gerald F. Shields, et al.American Journal of Genetics (1992)

Theorists often point to social theory's normativity, but Gouldner's later works provide the most explicit, comprehensive treatment of it as post-traditional normative discourse – a practice distinct from sociology and sociological theory, yet linked historically and analytically to them. His argument about the need for a discourse space to debate social science's normative directions and to strengthen its connections to civil society is relevant today. Because Gouldner's approach has gaps and is somewhat fragmented I will reconstruct his argument about social theory per se. Although I point to problems that derive from his incomplete pragmatic turn, his approach offers an excellent departure point for discussing the meaning of social theory.

Machiavelli's dictums in The Prince (1977) instigated the modern discourse on power. Arguing that “there's such a difference between the way we really live and the way we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to study the ideal will learn to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation” (Machiavelli, 1977, p. 44), his approach is a realist one. In this text, Machiavelli (1977, p. 3) endeavors to “discuss the rule of princes” and to “lay down principles for them.” Taking his lead, Foucault (1978, p. 97) argued that “if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few…who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships.” He believed that we should “investigate…how mechanisms of power have been able to function…how these mechanisms…have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful…in a given context for specific reasons,” and, therefore, “we should…base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 100–102). Conceptualizing such techniques and tactics as the “art of governance”, Foucault (1991), examined power as strategies geared toward managing civic populations through shaping people's dispositions and behaviors.

For sociological perspectives on globalization to do justice to its many facets, they must be informed by an understanding of modern societies as simultaneously complex, contingent, and contradictory – as modern capitalist societies. As is becoming ever more apparent, such an understanding of modern societies is the necessary precondition for identifying the defining features of globalization. Yet, for the most part, the history of the social sciences did not produce research agendas, theories, and methods designed to grasp complexity, contingency, and contradiction as core dimensions of modern social life that continually reinforce each other. The social sciences did not evolve as ongoing efforts to grasp the gravity each dimension exerts on concrete forms of political, economic and cultural life, and how the force of each depends on the constant exchange of energy with the other two. To the extent that scrutinizing the impact of globalization on the future – and possible futures – of human civilization is the primary challenge for social scientists to confront today, the current condition presents a unique, and perhaps most unusual opportunity to conceive anew the promise of each and all the social sciences, as elucidating how the complex, contingent, and contradictory nature of modern societies, in the name of advancing social justice, has engendered a regime of managing “social problems.”

This chapter examines the significance of the fact that the fundamental outlook of modern religion according to Bellah, is compatible with the description of reality and the system of analytic concepts crystallized by Giddens and Habermas in their analysis of modern society. The conceptual common denominator between these three researchers indicates that Bellah's as well as Giddens’ and Habermas’ thought include an anti-nomological reflexive scientific-educative narrative that reflects a vision of the desired face of human society. A vision calling for the encouragement of continual reflexivity and the personal involvement of the individual in constructing his social reality. This common denominator brings to light a transition in the sociological-theoretical arena – flexing past borders created between theoretical streams in light of the fact that the roots of Bellah's thought lie in the Functionalistic tradition, Giddens’ in the Positivistic tradition and Habermas’ in the neo-Kantian tradition.

Zygmunt Bauman's work is a case study in the possibilities of postmodernism for sociology. Characterized on the one hand by a gloomy epistemology about knowledge and morality in a postmodern world and on the other, by provocative new concepts to empirically describe a postmodern world, Bauman's work evidences a key tension within postmodern thought. Is it possible to reconcile Bauman's pessimistic epistemology with his optimistic sociology? My argument is that if we recast Bauman as a critical theorist and his method as dialectical immanent critique, we can see how his positive empirical concepts are based on his negative epistemology. In this way we can make sense of the complexity of Bauman's work and appreciate his prophetic abilities. The complexities and possibilities of postmodern thought in general become clearer as well.

Of all the aspects of theories that contain “postmodern sensibilities,” none seems to engender as much unease and resistance in its critics as the presumed celebration of moral deficit and the supposed debunking of ethical universalism. The charge of nihilism is usually traced back to a number of thinkers broadly associated with postmodern or poststructural theory. Nietzsche and his attempt to go “beyond good and evil,” as well as Foucault's disdain for the centered epistemological subject, are frequently cited as examples of postmodern theory's inability to grapple with the ubiquity of ethical issues, concerns for responsibility and the necessity of making moral valuations. While concerns for ethics do not appear, at first glance, as central issues, theory that is broadly associated with postmodernism is, I contend, often deeply aware of issues surrounding ethics and morality.