Real Options Theory: Volume 24

Real options theory begins by drawing an analogy between real options and financial options. A financial option is a derivative security whose value is derived from the worth and characteristics of another financial security, or the so-called underlying asset. By definition, a financial option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified price (i.e., the exercise price) on or before a given date (i.e., the expiration date). Financial economists Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) pioneered a formula for the valuation of a financial option, and their methodology has opened up the subsequent research on the pricing of financial assets and paved the way for the development of real options theory.

We discuss recent developments in real options theory and its applications to strategic management research, examine the potential difficulties in implementing real options in theory and practice, and propose several areas for future research. Our review shows that real options theory has provided substantial insights into investment and exit decisions as well as into the choice of investment modes. In addition, extant research studies have contributed significantly to our understanding of whether and how organizations can benefit from real options. Future research that addresses difficulties in applications will further advance both real options theory and practice in strategic management. We call for future generations of research to enhance the impact of real options as an emerging dominant conceptual lens in strategic management.

The application of real options theory to international strategy has surged in recent years. However, it is still a relatively new and loosely defined field, and there are several constraints on practical applications of this powerful theory. To move forward this field, the paper first provides a systematic analysis of theoretical and empirical contributions of real options theory to three critical issues in international strategy: (1) valuing multinational networks, (2) assessing market entry modes, and (3) evaluating market entry timing. The paper further suggests that future studies can focus on a refined treatment of uncertainty and the development of a dynamic theory in international strategy. Five testable propositions are developed in these directions.

We provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real option (RO) literature on joint ventures (JVs), contributing in three main areas. First, we examine major alternative theoretical perspectives on JVs – learning, bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory – to elaborate how they complement or contradict RO predictions. Second, we compare arguments and variables used to explain different JV stages – initial RO explicitness and equity shares, JV stability, and performance consequences – and highlight research opportunities. Third, we discuss and extend research about behavioral aspects of making RO (JV) investments. Overall, we offer new predictions and suggestions for a better integration within the RO literature, and between RO and related literatures on JVs.

This paper categorizes and critiques the empirical research strategies that have been employed to test real options theory. Existing research has sought to detect valuable options in firms’ strategic investments as well as to investigate the payoffs from these investments. Our review highlights some of the evidence that has accumulated in recent years for real options theory. We flag some of the most important challenges and tradeoffs associated with the use of different empirical research approaches for testing real options theory in strategic management. The paper concludes by offering a number of research priorities to advance the theory by probing its descriptive validity as well as by addressing its normative aspirations to bridge corporate finance and strategy.

Performance of firms in network industries depends much on the creation of standards around their technologies, products, or services. Establishing standards requires committing large, irreversible, upfront investment while demand remains uncertain. This paper focuses on the real options involved in this investment problem. The conventional real options literature recognizes the waiting-to-invest option where firms could avoid regret by waiting until at least some of the uncertainty is resolved. However, early commitment of network investment has vital strategic effects on shaping the expectations of potential users and inducing them to adopt the standard, thus creating a strategic growth option. We develop a simple model to explore the tradeoff between this strategic growth option and the waiting-to-invest option. We solve for the optimal investment rules and find that for high uncertainty, the strategic growth option often dominates the waiting-to-invest option and reduces the investment threshold. Furthermore, the intensity of network effect enhances the strategic growth option. Our results have important implications to the strategies of firms in technology industries.

We examine a central tenet of real option theory – whether real options influence managerial thresholds for investment. In contrast to prior studies that have focused on whether real options influence discrete investment decisions, our focus is on empirically isolating real options’ effects on thresholds. In particular, we examine the real options inherent in acquisition decisions. Our model posits that there are good reasons why we might expect there to be information asymmetry around the value of real options. Accordingly, if managers have unique information about growth options we might expect to observe them lowering their thresholds, perhaps to the point where they are willing to accept negative market returns. We further expect that the degree of information asymmetry for firm-specific growth options should be higher than for industry-specific growth options. Finally, we believe that managerial thresholds will be more prone to influence from growth options than deferment options. While thresholds are unobservable, we are able to isolate the effects of real options on acquisition thresholds by borrowing a method used originally in labor economics to isolate the determinants of reservation wages. Using a sample of over 28,000 acquisitions in the U.S., we find strong support for the model. These findings suggest that firms with low thresholds may choose to acquire despite comparatively low expected performance.

This paper examines the application of real option theory to sequential investment decision-making. In an effort to contribute to the development of criteria that discriminate between investments that confer growth options from those that confer deferral options, we introduce a conceptual model that explains technological adoption as a sequence of embedded options. Upon the introduction of each successive technological generation, a firm may either defer investment and wait for the arrival of a future generation or invest immediately to obtain experience that provides a claim on adoption of subsequent generations. We propose that deferral and growth option value is dependent on the magnitude, frequency, and uncertainty of inter-generational change, and the nature of rivalry.

This paper proposes that patents are real options that allow holders of patents the right but not the obligation to sue others. We suggest that the likelihood of a patent being litigated is positively associated with value of the patent and the extent of disclosure (prior art cited) in the patent. However, under conditions of greater value, increases in disclosure reduce the likelihood of litigation of the focal patent. Similarly, under conditions of greater disclosure, increases in value reduce the likelihood of litigation of the focal patent. Rare events logit analyses of business method patents that were litigated, compared to patents that were not litigated, offer empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses.

This study analyses the determinants of the value of a portfolio of real options and explores implications for strategic management. It focuses the analysis on four elements: the number of real options in the portfolio, constraints on the number of options that can be exercised, the volatility of underlying assets, and the correlation between underlying assets. These elements are articulated around a trade-off between growth options and switching options and are applied to different strategic situations of technological, market, and macroeconomic uncertainty.

In this paper, we consider the relationship between the investment decision process and returns to investments in capabilities. We draw on characteristics of capabilities to develop a framework that identifies four components of the returns to an investment that are derived from industry-based versus firm-specific elements, and option and non-option elements. We then link these components to elements of the resource allocation process. In taking this approach we place the study of real options into the larger investment context, recognizing that they co-exist with and should be understood in conjunction with other investment characteristics. These arguments highlight the importance of connecting the investment process with realization of returns, thereby providing the conceptual foundations for a decision tool.

Scholars have begun to recognize the importance of integrating organizational issues into real options theory. In doing so, some argue that options are inappropriate for evaluating critical strategic investments. In a more in-depth analysis, we argue that the organizational form that an option takes has a profound effect on exercise decisions. When options are initially integrated, organizational elements such as routines and culture become increasingly intertwined over time, raising the cost of abandoning the option – in effect, pushing firms to exercise options. In contrast, initially isolated options become idiosyncratic and more costly to integrate over time – pushing firms to kill them. There are also reputational and social capital effects that may bias exercise decisions beyond the mere consideration of costs, leading to escalation or missed opportunities.

Accordingly, firms must first be able to manage the associated organizational costs and minimize systematic bias in exercise decisions. Real options theory is moving away from the limitations of the financial options analogy and is increasingly integrated with strategy and organization theory. This shift requires that researchers consider issues such as intermediate organizational forms, external monitoring of exercise decisions, portfolios of competing options, and group process interventions.

This article considers real options approaches through the lens of firm's resource reallocation processes. It explores some potential drivers and consequences of mismatches between initial resource allocation logics and subsequent reallocation realities, highlighting a process of rational escalation in the presence of sunk costs. It also presents a new perspective on the traditional stage-gate process, and considers some recent empirical evidence on the efficiency of resource reallocation processes in organizations.

This paper complements previous research on investment in firm-specific human capital by applying real options analysis. Our framework suggests that the parties receive valuable options to exit the contract when information becomes revealed in the future, but these options may be more valuable for one party than the other. Companies and workers attempt to reduce the value of the options through contractual mechanisms that either shift wealth to the party granting the option or prevent the option from being exercised. In both cases, the mechanisms cause the parties to invest in firm-specific capital, resulting in higher output and higher wages.

This paper applies and empirically tests a real options approach to conceptualizing the value of patents. Based on a theorem derived by Merton (1973), we propose that greater dispersion in the citations of a firm's patents represents greater flexibility for the firm to exercise the option rights embedded in the patents and thus enhances the option value of the patents. A test of this proposition using a sample of 128 US-based biotechnology firms found corroborative results.

The valuation of innovation investments still poses several unresolved questions. Although some authors have analyzed these problems within a framework based on real options theory, their work has not explicitly tested the value of specific real options. The model of firm market value presented in this paper formally includes a technology switching option, which allows a firm to exchange an existing technology with a new technology. We test the model on a panel of publicly traded British firms operating in different manufacturing industries. The results provide support to the claim that the stock market recognizes and evaluates a technology switching option.

Strategy is ultimately aimed at creating shareholder value. We examine the relationship among intrinsic (DCF) value, market value, and the value of growth options using a “perfect foresight” model. Our findings suggest that Kester's (1984) initial assessment of growth option values may not hold under alternative valuation models. We highlight important issues in the valuation of growth options related to market expectations, modeling assumptions and estimation methods. The findings suggest that the firm's growth option value depends on three factors, each of which impacts investor expectations: (1) the macroeconomic environment; (2) the industry in which the firm participates; and (3) firm specific factors.

This study empirically examines how firms manage real options over time in the context of the U.S. venture capital industry. It tracks the venture-capital funding histories of U.S. portfolio companies founded during 1989–1993, and their outcomes, until 2004. An examination of sequential investments suggests asymmetries in the management of successful and unsuccessful companies. Signals of a company's progress, such as the number of its patents, are significant predictors of VC investment practices in the case of successful companies, but not in the case of unsuccessful companies. In contrast, VC firm characteristics, such as experience in the company's industry, IPO experience, and geographic proximity, appear to explain variance in investment policies for unsuccessful companies, but not successful ones. This suggests that signals of progress are relatively easier to interpret when real options perform well over time, and investors can perhaps apply them equally effectively. In contrast, signals of failure are more ambiguous and complex; and firm-level differences are more pronounced in the management of unsuccessful options.