IS EXCHANGEABLE ARBITRATOR BEHAVIOR NECESSARILY DELIBERATE?

Abstract

Interest arbitration is a collective bargaining procedure in which an independent arbitrator determines the terms of a binding contract. Because the union and employer each has the power to veto arbitrators from participating in future cases, the arbitrator exchangeability hypothesis suggests an arbitrator strategy of rendering awards similar to those awarded by past arbitrators to avoid veto. Arbitration theory, however, predicts that arbitrators will tend to select similar awards even if such strategy is not deliberately pursued This paper produces empirical evidence that arbitrators will tend to choose the same awards with or without the use of past awards as a guide.

Citation

Marburger, D.R. (1994), "IS EXCHANGEABLE ARBITRATOR BEHAVIOR NECESSARILY DELIBERATE?", International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 181-191. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022742