Index
Experimental Economics and Culture
ISBN: 978-1-78743-820-0, eISBN: 978-1-78743-819-4
ISSN: 0193-2306
Publication date: 14 December 2018
This content is currently only available as a PDF
Citation
(2018), "Index", Experimental Economics and Culture (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 20), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 265-271. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620180000020011
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2019 Emerald Publishing Limited
INDEX
Accountability principle, 183
Age, demographics effect, 130–132
Anonymous interaction, grid and group for behavior in, 96
Anthropology, 13, 66
cultural, 91
Apartheid laws, 230
Archetypal analysis (AA), 65, 69, 73
advantages and limitations in comparison with methods, 72–73
algorithm, 70–71
associating individual cases with archetypes, 71
comparison of AA with methods, 71–72
determining number of archetypes, 71
measurement of Schwartz values, 74–76
Schwartz values model, 74
World Values Survey (WVS), 73
Archetypes, 14, 68
culture, 65, 68–69
from data, 69–73
distribution of archetypal cases, 80–81
for Japan and United States, 82
for Jordan, France, and South Korea, 82
multiple, 69
Archival social history, 28, 37
Backlash-aversion/social capital investment function, 210
Beliefs, 4–5, 30
on luck, 177–180, 201
variable, 173
Blameworthiness, 208
Bonus framing effects, 220–221
Capital, cultural, 28, 30
Capitalism, 41
Case studies, in-depth, 28, 37
Catholic, 34
Chat communications, 57
Citizenship
demographics effect, 130–132
experimental participants by, 108–109
Cluster analysis, 72
Collectivism, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Collectivist culture, 2
Collectivists, cultural type, 97
Computer program matching algorithm, 254
Conceptualization of culture, 29, 38–40
as form of capital, 30–33
Configuration of values, culture as
archetypes from data, 69–73
culture archetypes, 68–69
five global archetype profiles, 77–78
global archetypes, 65
homogenous group, 66–67
illustration of archetypal analysis, 73–76
Contemporary social anthropology, 90–91
Content analysis, 58
Convex ultimatum game, 100, 116–119, 126–127, 163–164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 152–153
two-role treatment, 158–159
Coordinated social interaction, 74
Corporate culture, 46
Cross-cultural
difference, 169, 182–184
experimental studies, 37
experiments, 170
psychology approach, 91, 137
studies, 10
Cross-ethnic difference, 90
Cross-national analysis, 5
Cross-national difference, 90
Cultural capital, intangible, 27–28
Culture
patterns, 67
static, 35–36
Culture-related economics literature, 64
Decision-making, 228
heuristics, 3
processes, 64
Decontextualized experiments, 216
Delegated decision-making, 228, 230
Demographics, 241
effect, 130–132
by race group, 254
Desert preferences, 207
Desert-utility function, 209, 210
Dictator game, 8–9, 14, 16, 43, 90–91, 100, 102, 124, 163, 185n11, 207, 212, 216, 242
age effect in meta-analysis, 132
anonymous dictator-game experiment, 210
donations in, 125, 131–132, 140n28
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 54, 102, 105–106
modified, 185
one-role treatment, 150–151
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
two-person, 175, 183
two-role treatment, 156–157
Differences, cultural, 206
Discrete uniform distribution, 171
Distribution of cultural types, 107–108, 110–111
Distributionists, cultural type, 97
Diverse societies, experiments across, 8–10
Dividing Rule, 152
Dominance hierarchies, 209
Econometric
approaches, 27
studies, 26
Economic(s), 91–93
culture, 6–13, 33, 40, 43
decisions, 206
economists, 3, 64
experimental economists
experimentalists, 42–44
phenomena, 40, 64
scenarios, 26–27
theory, 59
See also Experimental economics
Egalitarianism, strict, 183
Enculturation process, 26
“Envelope drop” game, 12
Epidemiological approach, 5
Equity, 239
Ethnicity, 229
group, 5–6
Ethnographies, 28, 37
European Social Survey, 4
European Values Study (EVS), 4
European Values Systems Study Group, 4
Experimental economics, 232–233
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
qualitative methods in, 53–54
Experimental economists, 28–29
Experimentalists, 42–44
Exploratory cluster analysis, 14
Eye-tracking method, 54
Fairness
ideals, 183
models, 209–210
Family, 5
Femininity, 91–92
Frame, 54, 57
bonus framing effects
culture, 27
Frameworks, cultural, 91–93
Games and hypotheses, 100, 105–106
dictator game. See Dictator game
trust games. See Trust games
ultimatum game. See Ultimatum game
Geertz, Clifford, 25, 46
Geertzian notion of culture, 32
General Social Survey (GSS), 4, 12, 98–99
Generalized morality, 4–5
Generalized trust, 4
Generosity, 102
Germany’s Protestant culture, 34
Gift-exchange game, 229–230
Global archetypes, 65
Globalization role in culture, 10–11
GLOBE study, 64
“Grid-group attributes and behavior in two-person games”, 107–108, 111–130
Grid-group cultural theory. See Grid-group model
Grid-group model, 91, 93
alternate grid/group questions, 165
cognitive/motivational characteristic, 94
cultural frameworks and economics, 91–93
culturally driven behavior, 95
demographic questions, 165–166
effect of demographics, 130–132
distribution of cultural types, 110–111
experimental participants by citizenship and citizenship clusters, 108–109
games and hypotheses, 100, 102–106
grid/group survey questions, 147–149
operationalizing grid and group, 96–99
procedures, 104, 107
results, 107
robustness check, 132–134
Group identity in intermediated interactions
amounts returned by receivers, 243–245
demographics, 241, 254
experiment protocol, 232–236
hypotheses, 237
literature, 228–230
modified trust game, 231
results, 241, 248
return decision by receiver, 237–238
screenshots of decisions in delegation game, 260–264
sender appointment by owner, 239–241
sender selection, 246–247
sender transfers, 245–246
transfer decision by sender, 239
treatment factors, 232
trust and race in South Africa, 242–243
Groups
in culture, 5–6
smooth functioning and survival, 74
Hawthorne effects, 55
High-grid individual, 97
High-group individual, 97
Homogenous culture, 34–35
Homogenous group, 66–67
Human economic behavior, 64–65
Human rights, 223
Hypothetical individual, 68
Identity, 232
Image tagging, 216
In-depth case studies, 28, 37
In-group bias, 229
Income, 168–169, 172
additional analysis, 199–203
beliefs about luck, 177–180
determinants of giving, 175–177
European governments, 167–168
experimental design and procedures, 170–171
and giving, 183–184
income-generating process, 184
individual giving, 172–175
inequality, 168, 183
literature, 169–170
personal characteristics and values, 180–182
questionnaire, 196–198
Individual
giving, 172–175
making decisions, 206
reference-dependent utilities, 210
Individualism, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Individualist
cultural type, 97
culture, 2
type, 139
Inductive approach, 90
Inglehart, R., 45n2, 83
traditional vs. secular-rational orientation, 92, 137n5
factor analysis, 18n2
value orientations, 92
Institutional culture, 18
Interviews, 39–40
guide, 56
open-ended, 28, 37, 41
post-experimental, 54–56, 59
postgame, 43
Knowledge, 232
Lab-in-field experiments, 12
Language as data, 57
Latent class analysis, 72
Learning from Strangers (Weiss), 56
Liberal egalitarianism, 183
Libertarianism, 183
Market as cultural phenomenon, 40–41
Masculinity, 91–92
Materialism, cultural, 64
Matrix algebra, 65
Meaning, pattern of, 38–39, 44–45
Mental models, 1, 7
Messages, 43
pay-off relevant, 58
Migration role in culture, 10
Model culture, 27
Modernization theory, 90
Modified dictator games, 185
Moral blame, 208
Moral dilemmas, 208–209
MTurk, 208
Multistage experiment, 208
Nash equilibrium, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects, 36
Nationality group, 5–6
Natural experiments, 12
Natural messages, 57–58
Nonparametric tests, 172
Norm-consistent behavior, 104
One-role treatment, 150
convex ultimatum game, 152–153
dictator game, 150–151
regular trust game, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 153–154
standard ultimatum game, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game, 231
Open-ended interviews, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale, 96–99
Own-group bias, 230
Owner, 237
business, 28
capital, 15, 231
expectations, 245
sender appointment by, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Accountability principle
, 183
Age, demographics effect
, 130–132
Anonymous interaction, grid and group for behavior in
, 96
Anthropology
, 13, 66
cultural
, 91
Apartheid laws
, 230
Archetypal analysis (AA)
, 65, 69, 73
advantages and limitations in comparison with methods
, 72–73
algorithm
, 70–71
associating individual cases with archetypes
, 71
comparison of AA with methods
, 71–72
determining number of archetypes
, 71
measurement of Schwartz values
, 74–76
Schwartz values model
, 74
World Values Survey (WVS)
, 73
Archetypes
, 14, 68
culture
, 65, 68–69
from data
, 69–73
distribution of archetypal cases
, 80–81
for Japan and United States
, 82
for Jordan, France, and South Korea
, 82
multiple
, 69
Archival social history
, 28, 37
Backlash-aversion/social capital investment function
, 210
Beliefs
, 4–5, 30
on luck
, 177–180, 201
variable
, 173
Blameworthiness
, 208
Bonus framing effects
, 220–221
Capital, cultural, 28, 30
Capitalism, 41
Case studies, in-depth, 28, 37
Catholic, 34
Chat communications, 57
Citizenship
demographics effect, 130–132
experimental participants by, 108–109
Cluster analysis, 72
Collectivism, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Collectivist culture, 2
Collectivists, cultural type, 97
Computer program matching algorithm, 254
Conceptualization of culture, 29, 38–40
as form of capital, 30–33
Configuration of values, culture as
archetypes from data, 69–73
culture archetypes, 68–69
five global archetype profiles, 77–78
global archetypes, 65
homogenous group, 66–67
illustration of archetypal analysis, 73–76
Contemporary social anthropology, 90–91
Content analysis, 58
Convex ultimatum game, 100, 116–119, 126–127, 163–164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 152–153
two-role treatment, 158–159
Coordinated social interaction, 74
Corporate culture, 46
Cross-cultural
difference, 169, 182–184
experimental studies, 37
experiments, 170
psychology approach, 91, 137
studies, 10
Cross-ethnic difference, 90
Cross-national analysis, 5
Cross-national difference, 90
Cultural capital, intangible, 27–28
Culture
patterns, 67
static, 35–36
Culture-related economics literature, 64
Decision-making, 228
heuristics, 3
processes, 64
Decontextualized experiments, 216
Delegated decision-making, 228, 230
Demographics, 241
effect, 130–132
by race group, 254
Desert preferences, 207
Desert-utility function, 209, 210
Dictator game, 8–9, 14, 16, 43, 90–91, 100, 102, 124, 163, 185n11, 207, 212, 216, 242
age effect in meta-analysis, 132
anonymous dictator-game experiment, 210
donations in, 125, 131–132, 140n28
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 54, 102, 105–106
modified, 185
one-role treatment, 150–151
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
two-person, 175, 183
two-role treatment, 156–157
Differences, cultural, 206
Discrete uniform distribution, 171
Distribution of cultural types, 107–108, 110–111
Distributionists, cultural type, 97
Diverse societies, experiments across, 8–10
Dividing Rule, 152
Dominance hierarchies, 209
Econometric
approaches, 27
studies, 26
Economic(s), 91–93
culture, 6–13, 33, 40, 43
decisions, 206
economists, 3, 64
experimental economists
experimentalists, 42–44
phenomena, 40, 64
scenarios, 26–27
theory, 59
See also Experimental economics
Egalitarianism, strict, 183
Enculturation process, 26
“Envelope drop” game, 12
Epidemiological approach, 5
Equity, 239
Ethnicity, 229
group, 5–6
Ethnographies, 28, 37
European Social Survey, 4
European Values Study (EVS), 4
European Values Systems Study Group, 4
Experimental economics, 232–233
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
qualitative methods in, 53–54
Experimental economists, 28–29
Experimentalists, 42–44
Exploratory cluster analysis, 14
Eye-tracking method, 54
Fairness
ideals, 183
models, 209–210
Family, 5
Femininity, 91–92
Frame, 54, 57
bonus framing effects
culture, 27
Frameworks, cultural, 91–93
Games and hypotheses, 100, 105–106
dictator game. See Dictator game
trust games. See Trust games
ultimatum game. See Ultimatum game
Geertz, Clifford, 25, 46
Geertzian notion of culture, 32
General Social Survey (GSS), 4, 12, 98–99
Generalized morality, 4–5
Generalized trust, 4
Generosity, 102
Germany’s Protestant culture, 34
Gift-exchange game, 229–230
Global archetypes, 65
Globalization role in culture, 10–11
GLOBE study, 64
“Grid-group attributes and behavior in two-person games”, 107–108, 111–130
Grid-group cultural theory. See Grid-group model
Grid-group model, 91, 93
alternate grid/group questions, 165
cognitive/motivational characteristic, 94
cultural frameworks and economics, 91–93
culturally driven behavior, 95
demographic questions, 165–166
effect of demographics, 130–132
distribution of cultural types, 110–111
experimental participants by citizenship and citizenship clusters, 108–109
games and hypotheses, 100, 102–106
grid/group survey questions, 147–149
operationalizing grid and group, 96–99
procedures, 104, 107
results, 107
robustness check, 132–134
Group identity in intermediated interactions
amounts returned by receivers, 243–245
demographics, 241, 254
experiment protocol, 232–236
hypotheses, 237
literature, 228–230
modified trust game, 231
results, 241, 248
return decision by receiver, 237–238
screenshots of decisions in delegation game, 260–264
sender appointment by owner, 239–241
sender selection, 246–247
sender transfers, 245–246
transfer decision by sender, 239
treatment factors, 232
trust and race in South Africa, 242–243
Groups
in culture, 5–6
smooth functioning and survival, 74
Hawthorne effects, 55
High-grid individual, 97
High-group individual, 97
Homogenous culture, 34–35
Homogenous group, 66–67
Human economic behavior, 64–65
Human rights, 223
Hypothetical individual, 68
Identity, 232
Image tagging, 216
In-depth case studies, 28, 37
In-group bias, 229
Income, 168–169, 172
additional analysis, 199–203
beliefs about luck, 177–180
determinants of giving, 175–177
European governments, 167–168
experimental design and procedures, 170–171
and giving, 183–184
income-generating process, 184
individual giving, 172–175
inequality, 168, 183
literature, 169–170
personal characteristics and values, 180–182
questionnaire, 196–198
Individual
giving, 172–175
making decisions, 206
reference-dependent utilities, 210
Individualism, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Individualist
cultural type, 97
culture, 2
type, 139
Inductive approach, 90
Inglehart, R., 45n2, 83
traditional vs. secular-rational orientation, 92, 137n5
factor analysis, 18n2
value orientations, 92
Institutional culture, 18
Interviews, 39–40
guide, 56
open-ended, 28, 37, 41
post-experimental, 54–56, 59
postgame, 43
Knowledge, 232
Lab-in-field experiments, 12
Language as data, 57
Latent class analysis, 72
Learning from Strangers (Weiss), 56
Liberal egalitarianism, 183
Libertarianism, 183
Market as cultural phenomenon, 40–41
Masculinity, 91–92
Materialism, cultural, 64
Matrix algebra, 65
Meaning, pattern of, 38–39, 44–45
Mental models, 1, 7
Messages, 43
pay-off relevant, 58
Migration role in culture, 10
Model culture, 27
Modernization theory, 90
Modified dictator games, 185
Moral blame, 208
Moral dilemmas, 208–209
MTurk, 208
Multistage experiment, 208
Nash equilibrium, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects, 36
Nationality group, 5–6
Natural experiments, 12
Natural messages, 57–58
Nonparametric tests, 172
Norm-consistent behavior, 104
One-role treatment, 150
convex ultimatum game, 152–153
dictator game, 150–151
regular trust game, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 153–154
standard ultimatum game, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game, 231
Open-ended interviews, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale, 96–99
Own-group bias, 230
Owner, 237
business, 28
capital, 15, 231
expectations, 245
sender appointment by, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Capital, cultural
, 28, 30
Capitalism
, 41
Case studies, in-depth
, 28, 37
Catholic
, 34
Chat communications
, 57
Citizenship
demographics effect
, 130–132
experimental participants by
, 108–109
Cluster analysis
, 72
Collectivism
, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Collectivist culture
, 2
Collectivists, cultural type
, 97
Computer program matching algorithm
, 254
Conceptualization of culture
, 29, 38–40
as form of capital
, 30–33
Configuration of values, culture as
archetypes from data
, 69–73
culture archetypes
, 68–69
five global archetype profiles
, 77–78
global archetypes
, 65
homogenous group
, 66–67
illustration of archetypal analysis
, 73–76
Contemporary social anthropology
, 90–91
Content analysis
, 58
Convex ultimatum game
, 100, 116–119, 126–127, 163–164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior
, 134–135
one-role treatment
, 152–153
two-role treatment
, 158–159
Coordinated social interaction
, 74
Corporate culture
, 46
Cross-cultural
difference
, 169, 182–184
experimental studies
, 37
experiments
, 170
psychology approach
, 91, 137
studies
, 10
Cross-ethnic difference
, 90
Cross-national analysis
, 5
Cross-national difference
, 90
Cultural capital, intangible
, 27–28
Culture
patterns
, 67
static
, 35–36
Culture-related economics literature
, 64
Decision-making
, 228
heuristics
, 3
processes
, 64
Decontextualized experiments
, 216
Delegated decision-making
, 228, 230
Demographics
, 241
effect
, 130–132
by race group
, 254
Desert preferences
, 207
Desert-utility function
, 209, 210
Dictator game
, 8–9, 14, 16, 43, 90–91, 100, 102, 124, 163, 185n11, 207, 212, 216, 242
age effect in meta-analysis
, 132
anonymous dictator-game experiment
, 210
donations in
, 125, 131–132, 140n28
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior
, 134–135
experimental design
, 101
hypothesis
, 54, 102, 105–106
modified
, 185
one-role treatment
, 150–151
regression estimation of decisions
, 114–115
two-person
, 175, 183
two-role treatment
, 156–157
Differences, cultural
, 206
Discrete uniform distribution
, 171
Distribution of cultural types
, 107–108, 110–111
Distributionists, cultural type
, 97
Diverse societies, experiments across
, 8–10
Dividing Rule
, 152
Dominance hierarchies
, 209
Econometric
approaches, 27
studies, 26
Economic(s), 91–93
culture, 6–13, 33, 40, 43
decisions, 206
economists, 3, 64
experimental economists
experimentalists, 42–44
phenomena, 40, 64
scenarios, 26–27
theory, 59
See also Experimental economics
Egalitarianism, strict, 183
Enculturation process, 26
“Envelope drop” game, 12
Epidemiological approach, 5
Equity, 239
Ethnicity, 229
group, 5–6
Ethnographies, 28, 37
European Social Survey, 4
European Values Study (EVS), 4
European Values Systems Study Group, 4
Experimental economics, 232–233
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
qualitative methods in, 53–54
Experimental economists, 28–29
Experimentalists, 42–44
Exploratory cluster analysis, 14
Eye-tracking method, 54
Fairness
ideals, 183
models, 209–210
Family, 5
Femininity, 91–92
Frame, 54, 57
bonus framing effects
culture, 27
Frameworks, cultural, 91–93
Games and hypotheses, 100, 105–106
dictator game. See Dictator game
trust games. See Trust games
ultimatum game. See Ultimatum game
Geertz, Clifford, 25, 46
Geertzian notion of culture, 32
General Social Survey (GSS), 4, 12, 98–99
Generalized morality, 4–5
Generalized trust, 4
Generosity, 102
Germany’s Protestant culture, 34
Gift-exchange game, 229–230
Global archetypes, 65
Globalization role in culture, 10–11
GLOBE study, 64
“Grid-group attributes and behavior in two-person games”, 107–108, 111–130
Grid-group cultural theory. See Grid-group model
Grid-group model, 91, 93
alternate grid/group questions, 165
cognitive/motivational characteristic, 94
cultural frameworks and economics, 91–93
culturally driven behavior, 95
demographic questions, 165–166
effect of demographics, 130–132
distribution of cultural types, 110–111
experimental participants by citizenship and citizenship clusters, 108–109
games and hypotheses, 100, 102–106
grid/group survey questions, 147–149
operationalizing grid and group, 96–99
procedures, 104, 107
results, 107
robustness check, 132–134
Group identity in intermediated interactions
amounts returned by receivers, 243–245
demographics, 241, 254
experiment protocol, 232–236
hypotheses, 237
literature, 228–230
modified trust game, 231
results, 241, 248
return decision by receiver, 237–238
screenshots of decisions in delegation game, 260–264
sender appointment by owner, 239–241
sender selection, 246–247
sender transfers, 245–246
transfer decision by sender, 239
treatment factors, 232
trust and race in South Africa, 242–243
Groups
in culture, 5–6
smooth functioning and survival, 74
Hawthorne effects, 55
High-grid individual, 97
High-group individual, 97
Homogenous culture, 34–35
Homogenous group, 66–67
Human economic behavior, 64–65
Human rights, 223
Hypothetical individual, 68
Identity, 232
Image tagging, 216
In-depth case studies, 28, 37
In-group bias, 229
Income, 168–169, 172
additional analysis, 199–203
beliefs about luck, 177–180
determinants of giving, 175–177
European governments, 167–168
experimental design and procedures, 170–171
and giving, 183–184
income-generating process, 184
individual giving, 172–175
inequality, 168, 183
literature, 169–170
personal characteristics and values, 180–182
questionnaire, 196–198
Individual
giving, 172–175
making decisions, 206
reference-dependent utilities, 210
Individualism, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Individualist
cultural type, 97
culture, 2
type, 139
Inductive approach, 90
Inglehart, R., 45n2, 83
traditional vs. secular-rational orientation, 92, 137n5
factor analysis, 18n2
value orientations, 92
Institutional culture, 18
Interviews, 39–40
guide, 56
open-ended, 28, 37, 41
post-experimental, 54–56, 59
postgame, 43
Knowledge, 232
Lab-in-field experiments, 12
Language as data, 57
Latent class analysis, 72
Learning from Strangers (Weiss), 56
Liberal egalitarianism, 183
Libertarianism, 183
Market as cultural phenomenon, 40–41
Masculinity, 91–92
Materialism, cultural, 64
Matrix algebra, 65
Meaning, pattern of, 38–39, 44–45
Mental models, 1, 7
Messages, 43
pay-off relevant, 58
Migration role in culture, 10
Model culture, 27
Modernization theory, 90
Modified dictator games, 185
Moral blame, 208
Moral dilemmas, 208–209
MTurk, 208
Multistage experiment, 208
Nash equilibrium, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects, 36
Nationality group, 5–6
Natural experiments, 12
Natural messages, 57–58
Nonparametric tests, 172
Norm-consistent behavior, 104
One-role treatment, 150
convex ultimatum game, 152–153
dictator game, 150–151
regular trust game, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 153–154
standard ultimatum game, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game, 231
Open-ended interviews, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale, 96–99
Own-group bias, 230
Owner, 237
business, 28
capital, 15, 231
expectations, 245
sender appointment by, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Econometric
approaches
, 27
studies
, 26
Economic(s)
, 91–93
culture
, 6–13, 33, 40, 43
decisions
, 206
economists
, 3, 64
experimental economists
experimentalists
, 42–44
phenomena
, 40, 64
scenarios
, 26–27
theory
, 59
See also Experimental economics
Egalitarianism, strict
, 183
Enculturation process
, 26
“Envelope drop” game
, 12
Epidemiological approach
, 5
Equity
, 239
Ethnicity
, 229
group
, 5–6
Ethnographies
, 28, 37
European Social Survey
, 4
European Values Study (EVS)
, 4
European Values Systems Study Group
, 4
Experimental economics
, 232–233
classification of natural messages
, 57–58
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview
, 56–57
language as data
, 57
post-experiment interview
, 54–56
qualitative methods in
, 53–54
Experimental economists
, 28–29
Experimentalists
, 42–44
Exploratory cluster analysis
, 14
Eye-tracking method
, 54
Fairness
ideals
, 183
models
, 209–210
Family
, 5
Femininity
, 91–92
Frame
, 54, 57
bonus framing effects
culture
, 27
Frameworks, cultural
, 91–93
Games and hypotheses, 100, 105–106
dictator game. See Dictator game
trust games. See Trust games
ultimatum game. See Ultimatum game
Geertz, Clifford, 25, 46
Geertzian notion of culture, 32
General Social Survey (GSS), 4, 12, 98–99
Generalized morality, 4–5
Generalized trust, 4
Generosity, 102
Germany’s Protestant culture, 34
Gift-exchange game, 229–230
Global archetypes, 65
Globalization role in culture, 10–11
GLOBE study, 64
“Grid-group attributes and behavior in two-person games”, 107–108, 111–130
Grid-group cultural theory. See Grid-group model
Grid-group model, 91, 93
alternate grid/group questions, 165
cognitive/motivational characteristic, 94
cultural frameworks and economics, 91–93
culturally driven behavior, 95
demographic questions, 165–166
effect of demographics, 130–132
distribution of cultural types, 110–111
experimental participants by citizenship and citizenship clusters, 108–109
games and hypotheses, 100, 102–106
grid/group survey questions, 147–149
operationalizing grid and group, 96–99
procedures, 104, 107
results, 107
robustness check, 132–134
Group identity in intermediated interactions
amounts returned by receivers, 243–245
demographics, 241, 254
experiment protocol, 232–236
hypotheses, 237
literature, 228–230
modified trust game, 231
results, 241, 248
return decision by receiver, 237–238
screenshots of decisions in delegation game, 260–264
sender appointment by owner, 239–241
sender selection, 246–247
sender transfers, 245–246
transfer decision by sender, 239
treatment factors, 232
trust and race in South Africa, 242–243
Groups
in culture, 5–6
smooth functioning and survival, 74
Hawthorne effects, 55
High-grid individual, 97
High-group individual, 97
Homogenous culture, 34–35
Homogenous group, 66–67
Human economic behavior, 64–65
Human rights, 223
Hypothetical individual, 68
Identity, 232
Image tagging, 216
In-depth case studies, 28, 37
In-group bias, 229
Income, 168–169, 172
additional analysis, 199–203
beliefs about luck, 177–180
determinants of giving, 175–177
European governments, 167–168
experimental design and procedures, 170–171
and giving, 183–184
income-generating process, 184
individual giving, 172–175
inequality, 168, 183
literature, 169–170
personal characteristics and values, 180–182
questionnaire, 196–198
Individual
giving, 172–175
making decisions, 206
reference-dependent utilities, 210
Individualism, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Individualist
cultural type, 97
culture, 2
type, 139
Inductive approach, 90
Inglehart, R., 45n2, 83
traditional vs. secular-rational orientation, 92, 137n5
factor analysis, 18n2
value orientations, 92
Institutional culture, 18
Interviews, 39–40
guide, 56
open-ended, 28, 37, 41
post-experimental, 54–56, 59
postgame, 43
Knowledge, 232
Lab-in-field experiments, 12
Language as data, 57
Latent class analysis, 72
Learning from Strangers (Weiss), 56
Liberal egalitarianism, 183
Libertarianism, 183
Market as cultural phenomenon, 40–41
Masculinity, 91–92
Materialism, cultural, 64
Matrix algebra, 65
Meaning, pattern of, 38–39, 44–45
Mental models, 1, 7
Messages, 43
pay-off relevant, 58
Migration role in culture, 10
Model culture, 27
Modernization theory, 90
Modified dictator games, 185
Moral blame, 208
Moral dilemmas, 208–209
MTurk, 208
Multistage experiment, 208
Nash equilibrium, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects, 36
Nationality group, 5–6
Natural experiments, 12
Natural messages, 57–58
Nonparametric tests, 172
Norm-consistent behavior, 104
One-role treatment, 150
convex ultimatum game, 152–153
dictator game, 150–151
regular trust game, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 153–154
standard ultimatum game, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game, 231
Open-ended interviews, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale, 96–99
Own-group bias, 230
Owner, 237
business, 28
capital, 15, 231
expectations, 245
sender appointment by, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Games and hypotheses
, 100, 105–106
dictator game. See Dictator game
trust games. See Trust games
ultimatum game. See Ultimatum game
Geertz, Clifford
, 25, 46
Geertzian notion of culture
, 32
General Social Survey (GSS)
, 4, 12, 98–99
Generalized morality
, 4–5
Generalized trust
, 4
Generosity
, 102
Germany’s Protestant culture
, 34
Gift-exchange game
, 229–230
Global archetypes
, 65
Globalization role in culture
, 10–11
GLOBE study
, 64
“Grid-group attributes and behavior in two-person games”
, 107–108, 111–130
Grid-group cultural theory. See Grid-group model
Grid-group model
, 91, 93
alternate grid/group questions
, 165
cognitive/motivational characteristic
, 94
cultural frameworks and economics
, 91–93
culturally driven behavior
, 95
demographic questions
, 165–166
effect of demographics
, 130–132
distribution of cultural types
, 110–111
experimental participants by citizenship and citizenship clusters
, 108–109
games and hypotheses
, 100, 102–106
grid/group survey questions
, 147–149
operationalizing grid and group
, 96–99
procedures
, 104, 107
results
, 107
robustness check
, 132–134
Group identity in intermediated interactions
amounts returned by receivers
, 243–245
demographics
, 241, 254
experiment protocol
, 232–236
hypotheses
, 237
literature
, 228–230
modified trust game
, 231
results
, 241, 248
return decision by receiver
, 237–238
screenshots of decisions in delegation game
, 260–264
sender appointment by owner
, 239–241
sender selection
, 246–247
sender transfers
, 245–246
transfer decision by sender
, 239
treatment factors
, 232
trust and race in South Africa
, 242–243
Groups
in culture
, 5–6
smooth functioning and survival
, 74
Hawthorne effects
, 55
High-grid individual
, 97
High-group individual
, 97
Homogenous culture
, 34–35
Homogenous group
, 66–67
Human economic behavior
, 64–65
Human rights
, 223
Hypothetical individual
, 68
Identity, 232
Image tagging, 216
In-depth case studies, 28, 37
In-group bias, 229
Income, 168–169, 172
additional analysis, 199–203
beliefs about luck, 177–180
determinants of giving, 175–177
European governments, 167–168
experimental design and procedures, 170–171
and giving, 183–184
income-generating process, 184
individual giving, 172–175
inequality, 168, 183
literature, 169–170
personal characteristics and values, 180–182
questionnaire, 196–198
Individual
giving, 172–175
making decisions, 206
reference-dependent utilities, 210
Individualism, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Individualist
cultural type, 97
culture, 2
type, 139
Inductive approach, 90
Inglehart, R., 45n2, 83
traditional vs. secular-rational orientation, 92, 137n5
factor analysis, 18n2
value orientations, 92
Institutional culture, 18
Interviews, 39–40
guide, 56
open-ended, 28, 37, 41
post-experimental, 54–56, 59
postgame, 43
Knowledge, 232
Lab-in-field experiments, 12
Language as data, 57
Latent class analysis, 72
Learning from Strangers (Weiss), 56
Liberal egalitarianism, 183
Libertarianism, 183
Market as cultural phenomenon, 40–41
Masculinity, 91–92
Materialism, cultural, 64
Matrix algebra, 65
Meaning, pattern of, 38–39, 44–45
Mental models, 1, 7
Messages, 43
pay-off relevant, 58
Migration role in culture, 10
Model culture, 27
Modernization theory, 90
Modified dictator games, 185
Moral blame, 208
Moral dilemmas, 208–209
MTurk, 208
Multistage experiment, 208
Nash equilibrium, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects, 36
Nationality group, 5–6
Natural experiments, 12
Natural messages, 57–58
Nonparametric tests, 172
Norm-consistent behavior, 104
One-role treatment, 150
convex ultimatum game, 152–153
dictator game, 150–151
regular trust game, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 153–154
standard ultimatum game, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game, 231
Open-ended interviews, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale, 96–99
Own-group bias, 230
Owner, 237
business, 28
capital, 15, 231
expectations, 245
sender appointment by, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Identity
, 232
Image tagging
, 216
In-depth case studies
, 28, 37
In-group bias
, 229
Income
, 168–169, 172
additional analysis
, 199–203
beliefs about luck
, 177–180
determinants of giving
, 175–177
European governments
, 167–168
experimental design and procedures
, 170–171
and giving
, 183–184
income-generating process
, 184
individual giving
, 172–175
inequality
, 168, 183
literature
, 169–170
personal characteristics and values
, 180–182
questionnaire
, 196–198
Individual
giving
, 172–175
making decisions
, 206
reference-dependent utilities
, 210
Individualism
, 4, 30–31, 91–92
Individualist
cultural type
, 97
culture
, 2
type
, 139
Inductive approach
, 90
Inglehart, R.
, 45n2, 83
traditional vs. secular-rational orientation
, 92, 137n5
factor analysis
, 18n2
value orientations
, 92
Institutional culture
, 18
Interviews
, 39–40
guide
, 56
open-ended
, 28, 37, 41
post-experimental
, 54–56, 59
postgame
, 43
Knowledge
, 232
Lab-in-field experiments, 12
Language as data, 57
Latent class analysis, 72
Learning from Strangers (Weiss), 56
Liberal egalitarianism, 183
Libertarianism, 183
Market as cultural phenomenon, 40–41
Masculinity, 91–92
Materialism, cultural, 64
Matrix algebra, 65
Meaning, pattern of, 38–39, 44–45
Mental models, 1, 7
Messages, 43
pay-off relevant, 58
Migration role in culture, 10
Model culture, 27
Modernization theory, 90
Modified dictator games, 185
Moral blame, 208
Moral dilemmas, 208–209
MTurk, 208
Multistage experiment, 208
Nash equilibrium, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects, 36
Nationality group, 5–6
Natural experiments, 12
Natural messages, 57–58
Nonparametric tests, 172
Norm-consistent behavior, 104
One-role treatment, 150
convex ultimatum game, 152–153
dictator game, 150–151
regular trust game, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 153–154
standard ultimatum game, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game, 231
Open-ended interviews, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale, 96–99
Own-group bias, 230
Owner, 237
business, 28
capital, 15, 231
expectations, 245
sender appointment by, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Lab-in-field experiments
, 12
Language as data
, 57
Latent class analysis
, 72
Learning from Strangers (Weiss)
, 56
Liberal egalitarianism
, 183
Libertarianism
, 183
Market as cultural phenomenon
, 40–41
Masculinity
, 91–92
Materialism, cultural
, 64
Matrix algebra
, 65
Meaning, pattern of
, 38–39, 44–45
Mental models
, 1, 7
Messages
, 43
pay-off relevant
, 58
Migration role in culture
, 10
Model culture
, 27
Modernization theory
, 90
Modified dictator games
, 185
Moral blame
, 208
Moral dilemmas
, 208–209
MTurk
, 208
Multistage experiment
, 208
Nash equilibrium, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects, 36
Nationality group, 5–6
Natural experiments, 12
Natural messages, 57–58
Nonparametric tests, 172
Norm-consistent behavior, 104
One-role treatment, 150
convex ultimatum game, 152–153
dictator game, 150–151
regular trust game, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 153–154
standard ultimatum game, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game, 231
Open-ended interviews, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale, 96–99
Own-group bias, 230
Owner, 237
business, 28
capital, 15, 231
expectations, 245
sender appointment by, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Nash equilibrium
, 103
“Nation-neutral” effects
, 36
Nationality group
, 5–6
Natural experiments
, 12
Natural messages
, 57–58
Nonparametric tests
, 172
Norm-consistent behavior
, 104
One-role treatment
, 150
convex ultimatum game
, 152–153
dictator game
, 150–151
regular trust game
, 154–155
send-all-or-nothing trust game
, 153–154
standard ultimatum game
, 151–152
See also Two-role treatment
One-shot trust game
, 231
Open-ended interviews
, 28, 37, 41
Operationalizing grid and group
, 96
grid and group for behavior in anonymous interaction
, 96
measuring grid and group via polythetic scale
, 96–99
Own-group bias
, 230
Owner
, 237
business
, 28
capital
, 15, 231
expectations
, 245
sender appointment by
, 239–241
Patterns, culture, 67
Pay-off relevant messages, 58
Penalty, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values, 180–182, 202–203
Placation, 217
preferences, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via, 96–99
Post-experiment interview, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values, 92
Postgame interviews, 43
Poverty, 168, 184
Power distance, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises, 163–164
testers, 107
Preferences
for desert, 207
for placation, 207
Price theory, 45
Priming studies, 11–12
Profession group, 5–6
Proposer, 151
reference point manipulation, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”, 40
Psychology approach, cultural, 137
Qualitative methods, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture, 37–44
classification of natural messages, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview, 56–57
culture, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture, 29
experimental economists, 28–29
experimental techniques, 26–27
importance of culture, 36–37
isolating culture, 33–34
language as data, 57
post-experiment interview, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous, 34–35
treating culture as static, 35–36
Quantitative approaches, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Patterns, culture
, 67
Pay-off relevant messages
, 58
Penalty
, 220–221
Personal characteristics and values
, 180–182, 202–203
Placation
, 217
preferences
, 207
Polythetic scale, measuring grid and group via
, 96–99
Post-experiment interview
, 54–56, 59
“Post-materialistic” values
, 92
Postgame interviews
, 43
Poverty
, 168, 184
Power distance
, 91–92
Pre-game
exercises
, 163–164
testers
, 107
Preferences
for desert
, 207
for placation
, 207
Price theory
, 45
Priming studies
, 11–12
Profession group
, 5–6
Proposer
, 151
reference point manipulation
, 217–220
“Protestant Ethic”
, 40
Psychology approach, cultural
, 137
Qualitative methods
, 29, 53–54
benefits to the study of culture
, 37–44
classification of natural messages
, 57–58
conceptualize culture as form of capital
, 30–33
conducting qualitative post-experiment interview
, 56–57
culture
, 25–26
drawbacks to getting at culture
, 29
experimental economists
, 28–29
experimental techniques
, 26–27
importance of culture
, 36–37
isolating culture
, 33–34
language as data
, 57
post-experiment interview
, 54–56
treating culture as homogenous
, 34–35
treating culture as static
, 35–36
Quantitative approaches
, 28
drawbacks of quantitative approaches to getting at culture
, 29–37
Race in South Africa, 242–243
Random shock, 171, 175
Reasoning, 206
Receiver, 237
reference point manipulation, 217
return decision by, 237–238
Reciprocity, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences, 207–208
desert, 210–211, 217–220
expectations, 205–206
experimental design and results, 216–217
experimental games, 206–207
fear of retaliation, 211–212
moral dilemmas, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects, 220–221
placation, 217
subject motivation, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model, 210
Reference-dependent utilities, 209–211
Regressions, OLS, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions, 114–115
of trust games decisions, 120–121
Regular trust game, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 154–155
two-role treatment, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect, 130–132
group, 5–6
Repugnance markets, 7
Reviewers, independent, 58
Ritualists, cultural type, 97
Schwartz values, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4, 83
model, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values, 75
transnational homogeneity, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five, 73–79, 81
Scree plots, 71
Self-expression value, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Sender, 237
appointment by owner, 239–241
selection, 246–247
transfer decision by, 239
transfers, 245–246
Shareholder, 229–230
Social
animals, 209
anthropology, 90–91
capital, 30
capital theory, 90
conventions, 3
incorporation, 93
norms, 207
preferences, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal, 35–36
vertical, 36
Societies, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across, 8–10
large-scale, 9, 13
small-scale, 6, 8
Sociology, 90
South Africa, trust and race in, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”, 35
Standard ultimatum game, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment, 151–152
two-role treatment, 157–158
Subjectivism, 37
Survival value, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Race in South Africa
, 242–243
Random shock
, 171, 175
Reasoning
, 206
Receiver
, 237
reference point manipulation
, 217
return decision by
, 237–238
Reciprocity
, 229
Reference point-dependent model of social preferences
, 207–208
desert
, 210–211, 217–220
expectations
, 205–206
experimental design and results
, 216–217
experimental games
, 206–207
fear of retaliation
, 211–212
moral dilemmas
, 208–209
penalty vs. bonus framing effects
, 220–221
placation
, 217
subject motivation
, 221–222
Reference-dependent fairness model
, 210
Reference-dependent utilities
, 209–211
Regressions, OLS
, 172, 173
Regression estimation
of amount divided by player 2 conditional on percentage
, 116–119
of amount returned by player 2 in regular trust game
, 122–123
of dictator and ultimatum game decisions
, 114–115
of trust games decisions
, 120–121
Regular trust game
, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 164
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior
, 134–135
one-role treatment
, 154–155
two-role treatment
, 160–162
Religion
demographics effect
, 130–132
group
, 5–6
Repugnance markets
, 7
Reviewers, independent
, 58
Ritualists, cultural type
, 97
Schwartz values
, 20n22, 64–65, 69, 71, 84
archetype A4
, 83
model
, 65, 68, 73–74
ten motivational values
, 75
transnational homogeneity
, 81
in World Values Survey Wave Five
, 73–79, 81
Scree plots
, 71
Self-expression value
, 92
Self-interested payoff maximizers
, 103
Self-transcendence/conservation
, 68
Send-all-or-nothing trust game
, 100, 127–129
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior
, 134–135
one-role treatment
, 153–154
two-role treatment
, 160
Sender
, 237
appointment by owner
, 239–241
selection
, 246–247
transfer decision by
, 239
transfers
, 245–246
Shareholder
, 229–230
Social
animals
, 209
anthropology
, 90–91
capital
, 30
capital theory
, 90
conventions
, 3
incorporation
, 93
norms
, 207
preferences
, 206, 207
Socialization
horizontal
, 35–36
vertical
, 36
Societies
, 64, 84–85, 93
experiments across
, 8–10
large-scale
, 9, 13
small-scale
, 6, 8
Sociology
, 90
South Africa, trust and race in
, 242–243
“Spirit of Junkanoo”
, 35
“Spirit of Rabbyism”
, 35
Standard ultimatum game
, 100, 124–126
one-role treatment
, 151–152
two-role treatment
, 157–158
Subjectivism
, 37
Survival value
, 92
Tautological theory, 207
Team culture, 46
Theory-derived value function, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys, 12–13
Trust, 30, 229
in South Africa, 242–243
Trust games, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions, 120–121
experimental design, 101
hypothesis, 103–106
modified, 231, 232
one-shot, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions, 120–121
regular, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment, 153–154
two-role treatment, 160
Two-person dictator game, 183
Two-person games, 100
behavior across four cultural types, 112–113
convex ultimatum game, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game, 124–126
Two-role treatment, 156
convex ultimatum game, 158–159
dictator game, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game, 160
standard trust game, 160–162
standard ultimatum game, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking, 222
Type II thinking, 222–223
Ultimatum games, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior, 8
convex, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment, 158–159
delegation in, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior, 134–135
experimental design, 101
experimental studies in culture, 36–37
hypothesis, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis, 92
regression estimation of decisions, 114–115
standard, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr), 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Tautological theory
, 207
Team culture
, 46
Theory-derived value function
, 211
Tit-for-tat strategy
, 212
Triangulations of experimental evidence and surveys
, 12–13
Trust
, 30, 229
in South Africa
, 242–243
Trust games
, 20n26, 26, 43, 90–91, 103–104
decisions
, 120–121
experimental design
, 101
hypothesis
, 103–106
modified
, 231, 232
one-shot
, 231
regression estimation of trust games decisions
, 120–121
regular
, 100, 122–123, 128–130, 154–155, 160–162, 164
send-all-or-nothing
, 100, 127–129, 134–135, 153–154, 160
one-role treatment
, 153–154
two-role treatment
, 160
Two-person dictator game
, 183
Two-person games
, 100
behavior across four cultural types
, 112–113
convex ultimatum game
, 126–127
grid-group attributes and behavior in
, 111
send-all-or-nothing trust game
, 127–128, 129
standard ultimatum game
, 124–126
Two-role treatment
, 156
convex ultimatum game
, 158–159
dictator game
, 156–157
send-all-or-nothing trust game
, 160
standard trust game
, 160–162
standard ultimatum game
, 157–158
See also One-role treatment
Type I thinking
, 222
Type II thinking
, 222–223
Ultimatum games
, 8–9, 12, 16, 19n11, 20n26, 27, 36–37, 90–91, 102–103, 163, 212
behavior
, 8
convex
, 100, 126–127, 131–133, 140n28
convex, one-role treatment
, 152–153
convex, two-role treatment
, 158–159
delegation in
, 228
effects of grid and group alternate measures on behavior
, 134–135
experimental design
, 101
experimental studies in culture
, 36–37
hypothesis
, 102–103, 105–106
meta-analysis
, 92
regression estimation of decisions
, 114–115
standard
, 100, 124–126, 131–133, 140n28, 151–152, 157–158
Uncertainty avoidance
, 91–92
Understanding the Culture of Markets (Storr)
, 27
Values, 4–5
cultural, 30
orientations, 92
system, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD), 6
World Giving Index, 184
World Values Survey (WVS), 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data, 65–66
Worldly asceticism, 46
Values
, 4–5
cultural
, 30
orientations
, 92
system
, 67
See also Configuration of values, culture as
Western Educated Industrial Rich Democracies (WEIRD)
, 6
World Giving Index
, 184
World Values Survey (WVS)
, 29, 34, 45, 65, 73, 92, 169, 183
Wave Five data
, 65–66
Worldly asceticism
, 46
- Prelims
- Introduction to Experimental Economics and Culture
- Why Use Qualitative Methods to Study Culture in Economic Life?
- A Note on Qualitative Methods in Experimental Economics
- Culture as a Configuration of Values: An Archetypal Perspective
- Cultural Values and Behavior in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games: An Experimental Study
- When Income Depends on Performance and Luck: The Effects of Culture and Information on Giving
- Tastes for Desert and Placation: A Reference Point-Dependent Model of Social Preferences
- Group Identity in Intermediated Interactions: Lessons from a Trust Game with Delegation in South Africa
- Index