Subject Index
Andrew N. Kleit
(Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA)
Modern Energy Market Manipulation
ISBN: 978-1-78743-386-1, eISBN: 978-1-78743-385-4
Publication date: 15 November 2018
This content is currently only available as a PDF
Citation
Kleit, A.N. (2018), "Subject Index", Modern Energy Market Manipulation, Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 219-225. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78743-385-420181015
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2019 Emerald Publishing Limited
INDEX
Note: Page numbers followed by “n” with numbers indicate footnotes.
Administrative agency, process at
, 48–49
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
, 48, 125, 142, 158
Affirmative defense
, 146
Agriculture Department
, 34
Alternative hypothesis
, 131, 163
Amaranth
, 124, 125
battle of economists
, 129
case (2007)
, 119, 125–127
Commission Decision
, 134–135
hedge fund
, 124
important of economists
, 129–130
lies, damn lies, and econometrics
, 130–132
Quinn and Fischel for defense
, 132–134
scienter
, 128–129
searching for manipulation
, 137–138
settlements and jurisdiction
, 135–137
side excursion on put options
, 127–128
staff’s case and Hunter’s rebuttals
, 125
theories of manipulation
, 123
trading
, 134
American Electric Power Service Corporation
, 89n4
Amicus curae
, 37
Ancillary market strategy
, 91–93
Ancillary markets
, 78–79
Anti-Manipulation Rule
, 170
Appeals Court
, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 49
Arbitrage
, 13–15, 93, 145–146
strategy
, 110, 117
Arbitrageurs
, 8
Artificial price
, 10, 44, 54, 57–58, 105, 110–113
Avista
, 48, 57, 65
trades on underlying during market close
, 55
trading strategy
, 56–57
Balanced schedules
, 94, 100
Balancing authority
, 69
Bankruptcy
, 5
Barclays
, 158, 212
Dean Hubbard’s statement
, 171–174
defense
, 165–167
district court’s decision on discovery
, 174–176
exchange between barclays and staff
, 165–169
FERC’s penalty order
, 169–171
process
, 158–159
show cause order
, 159–165
Baseline consumption
, 188
“Bid–ask spread”
, 9
“Black box” approach
, 150, 166
Black Oak decision
, 198
BP America
, 141
arbitrage and early trading
, 145–146
“framing the open” theory
, 143–145
manipulation and theory of firm
, 150–152
other issues
, 153
parties and proceedings
, 141–143
scienter
, 147–150
trading strategies
, 146–147
Bre-X Minerals Limited Canadian company
, 10
Bre-X stock rose
, 10
British Columbia Hydro
, 89
“Bury the corpse” effect
, 19, 35, 107
California energy crisis
, 67, 68
California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
, 69, 81
computing system
, 108
day-ahead ancillary market
, 92
market
, 110
system
, 83, 85
California’s electricity markets
, (see also Electricity markets), 81
ancillary market strategy
, 91–93
congestion-related strategies
, 89–91
electricity restructuring
, 81–87
energy procurement in day-ahead markets
, 95
ENRON
, 87–89
gaming
, 100–101
price arbitrage strategies
, 97–100
real-time prices
, 93–97
California–Oregon border (COB)
, 48
Call options
, 51, 52
Capacity markets
, 98n12
Cargill v. Harden (1971)
, 38–40
Cascade effect
, 26, 27, 53, 59, 60, 127, 147
Cash settled option contracts
, 51
Cash-settled index
, 7, 23
Cheap talk
, 47, 64
Chicago Mercantile Exchange
, 2
Chicago rye markets
, 32, 33
Chicago wheat market
, 24
Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA)
, 31
Commodity exchanges
, 22, 42, 59, 69
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
, 11, 31, 42, 44, 47, 134, 137
artificial price
, 57–58
misconstruing Cargill
, 63–64
misconstruing Henner
, 61–63
path to manipulation finding
, 57–64
Commodity market
, 1
actions as farmer
, 4
buying from exchange
, 5–6
challenges for commodity trader
, 7–9
challenges for exchange
, 6–7
hypothetical trading book for corn
, 9
selling to
, 1–4
trading
, 211
Commodity trader, challenges for
, 7–9
Competitive Energy Solutions (CES)
, 182
Congestion Revenue Rights (CRRs)
, 106
Congestion-related strategies
, 89
Death Star and Cut Schedules
, 90–91
load shifting
, 89–90
Congressional staffers
, 50
Constrained equilibrium
, 75
Convertible bonds
, 124
Corn contracts
, 12
“Corners”
, 11
Crop insurance
, 2n1
Cut Schedules
, 90–91
“Data snooping”
, 132
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
, 153
Day-Ahead Load Response Program (DALRP)
, 179–180, 185–187
rules
, 187–189
Day-ahead markets
, 75–77
DC Energy v. H. Q. Energy Services
, 114
De novo review
, 197–198
De novo trial
, 158, 175
Death Star
, 90–91
Deception
, 100
Degenerate pricing
, 110–113
Delivery/settlement period
, 27–28
Demand
, 72–75
reduction
, 181
Demand response
, 186
policy ISO-NE policy
, 179–181
“Dependent” variable
, 130
Deutsche Bank
, 105, 118, 206
arguments
, 107–108
“degenerate pricing” and “artificial” prices
, 110–113
legal standards
, 113
motivation
, 108–109
original intent rule
, 116–117
other issues
, 113
per se illegality
, 115–116
proceedings and FERC Staff’s arguments
, 106–107
prosecution’s case
, 105
reason for lose money
, 109–110
settlement with FERC
, 120
stand-alone profitability
, 113–114
subsequent FERC cases
, 117–118
US enforcement agencies
, 118–119
DiPlacido
, 47, 166, 212
CFTC’s path to manipulation finding
, 57–64
contending theories
, 50–57
parties and charges
, 48
process at administrative agency
, 48–49
weaknesses of procedure
, 49–50
Dreyfuss Show Cause Order and Consent
, 117
“Dummy” variables
, 130n12
Early trading
, 145–146
ECONLIT search engine
, 144
Econometrics
, 130–132
Economic theories of manipulation
, 17
early works
, 17–19
Pirrong creating field
, 19–25
works by Ledgerwood and coauthors
, 25–28
Efficient Markets Hypothesis
, 28, 161
eggs
, 34
Electricity
demand
, 68–69
price
, 185
Electricity markets
, 67, 211
ancillary markets
, 78–79
day-ahead and real-time markets
, 75–77
FTRs
, 77–78
required price for offering into reserve market
, 79
restructured
, 68–70
three-node model
, 70–75
Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)
, 68
Electricity restructuring in California
, 68, 81
monthly wholesale electricity prices during crisis
, 84
price caps and finger pointing
, 83–87
supply curves
, 86
“End game” of manipulation
, 21
Energy Information Administration
, 186
Energy Policy Act (2005)
, 134
ENRON
, 81, 87, 195
in California Crisis
, 88–89
strategy
, 99
ENRON Energy Services (EES)
, 99
Etracom
, 118
Ex ante profitability
, 113–114, 117
Ex post enforcement
, 203
Ex post profitability
, 113–114, 117
Exchange(s)
, 23
buying from
, 5–6
commodity
, 22, 42, 59, 69
fungible
, 3
rules
, 62
Exxon stock
, 19
Farming
, 1–2
“Fat Boy” strategy
, 99–100
Federal court system
, 213
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
, 49, 68, 81, 96, 105, 123, 125, 137, 141, 144, 151, 157, 179,
FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association
, 181
FERC v. Silkman
, 182, 191
penalty order
, 169–171
staff
, 105, 159
Federal Power Act (FPA)
, 170, 183, 202
Federal Reserve Board
, 42
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
, 49
Financial economics
, 28
Financial index market
, 159
Financial market manipulation
, 15
Financial risk
, 106
Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
, 77–78, 89, 105
Finger pointing
, 83–87
Firm compliance
, 152
Firms
, 110
First law of nature
, 33
Forney Perpetual Loop
, 90
“Framing the open” theory
, 143–145
Fraud
, 116
Freeport-McMoran Corporation
, 10
Gaming
, 89, 91, 100–101
rule
, 212
General Foods v. Brannan (1948)
, 32–34
“Get Shorty” ENRON
, 91–93
Grain Futures Act (1922)
, 31
Great Western v. Brannan (1953)
, 34–36
H. W. Miller and Company v. Benson (1958)
, 36
“Harming well-functioning market”
, 107
Hedge fund
, 124
Hedgers
, 8, 17, 18
Hedging
, 51–53
financial risk method
, 105
theory
, 56
Home-run strategy
, 206
Houston Ship Channel (HSC)
, 142
Hunt Brothers’ silver market episode
, 32, 40–45
Hunter v. FERC
, 136, 711 F. 3rd 155
Hurricane Katrina
, 124
Hydroelectric facilities
, 67
Independent System Operators (ISOs)
, 69
Independent variables
, 130
Index manipulation
, 158
Index period
, 158
Indicator variable
, 145
Individual trader, incentive of
, 151–152
Indonesian government
, 10
Informed party
, 17, 18
Instant message (IM)
, 126
Intermediate Microeconomics
, 150
“Invisible hand” (Smith)
, 68
ISO-New England (ISO-NE)
, 179
policy
, 179–181
Jurisdiction
, 135–137
Kaminski’s analysis
, 131–132
Kirchhoff’s law
, 67, 72
Kyle model
, 17
Laundering
, 93
“Law and economics” paradigm
, 35n3
LEXIS search terms
, 59
“Light” index
, (see NP off-peak)
Limit orders
, 26
Liquidity
, 8
Load serving entities (LSEs)
, 76
Load shifting
, 89–90, 105
London Metal Exchange (LME)
, 23
Long manipulations
, 22, 24
Loopholes
, 201–203, 207
Manipulation
, 1, 9, 39, 47, 105, 150–152
analysis
, 199–200
CFTC
, 11
commodity market
, 1–9
Ledgerwood and Kleit definitions
, 12
losing money
, 10
market
, 12
speculation, arbitrage, and market power
, 13–15
strategy
, 23
theory
, 53–54
wash trading
, 12, 13
Manipulator
, 11, 21, 24
Marginal costs (MCs)
, 72
Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation (MLSA)
, 197
Market
bid
, 9
design function
, 100
impact
, 14n10
maker
, 8
manipulation
, 12
monitors
, 70
participants
, 14, 23
power
, 9, 13–15
power manipulations
, 15
wholesale price
, 179
Market monitoring and information protocols (MMIP)
, 96
Merit order
, 77
Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO)
, 69
Minorco v. Hunt
, 14
Misconstruing Cargill
, 63–64
Misconstruing Henner
, 61–63
MLSA revenues
, 198–199
“Money for nothing” scheme
, 91
Monopsony behavior
, 94
Motives for violating bidders
, 59–60
My Cousin Vinny (movie)
, 153n14
Natural gas
, 145
“Neo-classical” theory of the firm
, 150
New Orleans contracts
, 36
New York Cotton Exchange
, 37
New York Mercantile Exchange contracts (NYMEX contracts)
, 48, 57
Nodes
, 71
“Nontransitory” market power
, 15
Null hypothesis
, 131
Ohms
, 71
Options
, 51–53
Original intent rule
, 116–117
“Out of merit” (OOM)
, 85
Overgeneration
, 99–100
Palo Verde (PV)
, 48, 55, 65, 91, 158
electricity
, 11
Payment system
, 196
Per se illegality
, 115–116
Per se rule
, 61
Peruvian government
, 43
Phantom congestion
, 108
PJM
, 195, 201–203, 205
Plaintiff
, 135
“Polar Vortex”
, 204
Post hoc rationalization
, 206
Power flow
, 73
Power supply
, 68
Powhatan
, 195
participants and proceedings
, 197–198
Powhatan’s response
, 200–206
show cause order
, 198–200
staff’s rebuttal and commission’s initial decision
, 206–208
transmission losses
, 195–197
Powhatan’s trades
, 203–204
Preliminary econometric model
, 166
Price arbitrage strategies
, 97
Overgeneration and “Fat Boy” strategy
, 99–100
“Ricochet”
, 97–99
Price caps
, 83–87
Price effect manipulation
, 43
Price impact
, 14n10
“Price Rebound” theory
, 132
Price slippage
, 14n10
Protective call
, 51
Protective put
, 53
Punishment and theory of firm
, 150–151
Put option
, 52
Quantity risk
, 2n1
Rate of return regulation
, 68
Real-time markets
, 75–77
Real-time prices
, 93–97
“Real-time” markets
, 76
Regional transmission operator (RTO)
, 67–70, 106, 181, 195
“Regulation” markets
, 79
Regulatory capture
, 42
Reserve markets
, 78, 91
Reserve payments
, 78
Resistance
, 70–72
Restructured electricity markets
, 68
rate of return regulation
, 68
restructured states
, 69
RTOs
, 68–70
RTOs in North America
, 70
Revenue equation
, 20
“Ricochet”
, 97
economic analysis
, 98
strategy
, 97
“Risk neutral”
, 21
Rumford and Silkman defense
, 185
DALRP
, 185–187
rules of DALRP
, 187–189
scienter
, 189–190
Rumford Paper
, 182
Rumford Show Cause Order
, 184
Scienter
, 35, 116, 128–129, 135, 147–150, 161–164, 189–190, 200
Secretary of Agriculture
, 32
Self-preservation
, 33
Self-regulating organization
, 205
Settlements
, 135–137
Short manipulation
, 24
Show cause order
, 117, 144n7, 157, 159, 182–185, 198
damages amount
, 164–165
manipulation analysis
, 199–200
scienter
, 161–164, 200
underlying case
, 159–161
UTC trading driven by MLSA revenues
, 198–199
Solar power
, 76
Southwest Power Pool (SPP)
, 69
Speculation
, 13–15
Speculators
, 8, 14, 17
Squeezes
, 11
Standard deviation
, 172
State Department of Water and Resources
, 83
State-mandated price
, 82
Statistical inference
, 130–131
Statistical significance
, 131
Stepwise regression
, 132
Sullivan & Long v. Scattered
, 108
Supply
, 72–75
curves in California
, 86, 87
power
, 68
Supplying reserve power
, 78
Surrebuttal analysis
, 133
“t-statistic”
, 131
Target
, 26
Theory of the firm
, 150
firm compliance
, 152
incentive of individual trader
, 151–152
punishment and
, 150–151
Three-node model
, 67, 70, 71
constrained equilibrium
, 75
flow across three transmission lines
, 74
power flow
, 73
resistance
, 70–72
supply and demand
, 72–75
Town eggs
, 34
Traders
, 151
Trading
, 22
book
, 8
strategies
, 146–147
Trading Places (Classic 1983 movie)
, 6n5
Transmission
lines
, 71
losses
, 195–197
Treasury bonds
, 19
Trigger
, 25–26
U.S. v. Addyston Pipe
, 116
Underscheduling Load
, 96
Uneconomic trading
, 10, 26, 27, 48
“Unintentional” squeeze
, 35
University of Utah
, 58
“Up-To-Congestion” contracts (UTC)
, 198
trading driven by MLSA revenues
, 198–199
US enforcement agencies
, 118–119
Violating bids
, 57, 58
CFTC
, 61
DiPlacido’s defense
, 60
motives for violating bidders
, 59–60
Violating offers
, 58, 59
Volkart Brothers (1962)
, 36
Wash trading
, 12, 13
Well-functioning market
, 195, 205–206
Western State Power Pool (WSPP)
, 92
Widget
, 150
Wind power
, 76
- Prelims
- Chapter 1 What is Manipulation? What is Not Manipulation?
- Chapter 2 Economic Theories of Manipulation
- Chapter 3 Some Historical Manipulation Cases, or Understanding Why the Hunt Brothers Did Not Manipulate the Silver Market
- Chapter 4 DiPlacido: The CFTC Confuses Manipulation and Hedging
- Chapter 5 Introduction to Electricity Markets
- Chapter 6 Were California’s Electricity Markets Manipulated, and by Whom?
- Chapter 7 Deutsche Bank: What Should the Legal Rule for Trading Financial Transmission Rights be?
- Chapter 8 Amaranth and Brian Hunter: You Certainly Look Guilty
- Chapter 9 BP America: Let the Best Story Win!
- Chapter 10 Barclays: The Defendant Meets Mr. Kafka
- Chapter 11 Rumford and Silkman: Money for Nothing, Kicks for Free
- Chapter 12 Powhatan: What is Manipulation?
- Chapter 13 Some Final Thoughts
- Name Index
- Subject Index