Case studies

Wall Street hedge fund manager Kim Meyer is considering investing in an SFA (slate financing arrangement) in Hollywood. Dave Griffith, a Hollywood producer, is pitching for the investment and has conducted a broad analysis of recent movie data to determine the important drivers of a movie’s success. In order to convince Meyer to invest in an SFA, Griffith must anticipate possible questions to maximize his persuasiveness.

Students will analyze the factors driving a movie’s revenue using various statistical methods, including calculating point estimates, computing confidence intervals, conducting hypothesis tests, and developing regression models (in which they must both choose the relevant set of independent variables as well as determine an appropriate functional form for the regression equation). The case also requires the interpretation of the quantitative findings in the context of the application.

HP sells configure-to-order products. With millions of part combinations going into an order, the challenge is deciding which parts to keep in the portfolio to balance costs with revenues. The case explains how one would approach this problem before product introduction, but focuses on managing the existing portfolio.

Students will develop a systematic, data-driven approach to decide on the best product portfolio to sell for a configure-to-order business. Which SKUs are candidates for a “global core” product offering? For an extended offering? For elimination?

Illinois Superconductor Corp. a technology start-up, came up with an innovative new superconducting filter for use in cellular base stations. It needed to estimate the demand for its filters. The manager came up with a simple chain-ratio-based forecasting model that, while simple and intuitive, was too simplistic. The company had also commissioned a research firm to develop a model-based forecast. The model-based forecast used diffusion modeling, analogy-based forecasting, and conjoint analysis to create a forecast that incorporated customer preferences, diffusion effects, and competitive dynamics.

To use the data to generate a model-based forecast and to reconcile the model-based forecast with the manager's forecast. Requires sophisticated spreadsheet modeling and the application of advanced forecasting techniques.

The case compares two U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) programs from the 1970s and 1980s: (1) “stealth” combat aircraft, capable of evading detection or engagement by anti-aircraft systems, and (2) precision attack of hardened ground vehicles from “standoff” distances, i.e., far behind the battle lines. Conceived at roughly the same time, motivated by the same strategic challenge, and initially driven by the same DoD organization, stealth combat aircraft progressed from idea to deployment in less than eight years---an astounding pace for a complex military system---while a demonstrated system for standoff precision strike against mobile ground targets was not fully implemented. The case highlights the critical role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), part of the DoD, regarded as one of the most innovative entities in the U.S. federal government.

The case highlights factors that facilitate rapid, successful implementation of radically innovative or disruptive concepts. Students are introduced to the organizational realities facing such projects, including issues of strategic clarity, interdepartmental competition and cooperation, executive leadership, and timing. Comparing the differences in implementation of the two programs in the case reveals issues relevant to any large organization seeking to bring innovative concepts to fruition.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

Within 18 months of exiting bankruptcy, Kmart's position was sufficiently strong to launch an acquisition of Sears, once the nation's largest retailer and also a core holding of ESL. Looks at a number of compelling issues related to Kmart's bankruptcy, restructuring, and rebirth under the control of ESL, a large hedge fund. Presents some of the key metrics that Eddie Lampert, head of ESL, had available to him as he made two decisions: first, in 2002, to amass a controlling stake in Kmart's defaulted debt during the restructuring; and second, in 2004, to launch a takeover of Sears. The first deal illustrates the decision-making process for a financial buyer, including the downside protection of Kmart's real estate holdings, whereas the second deal represents a traditional strategic acquisition. Illustrates the innovative use of real estate as a “hedge” for ESL in the event that the retail combination does not produce the required financial results. Also focuses on the role of investment bankers and the increasingly important position that hedge funds and LBO funds have carved out in the M&A market.

To outline the explosive growth in assets and influence of alternative investment managers, particularly LBO funds and hedge funds, and the transition of some larger hedge funds from shorter term trading strategies to longer term plays on distressed debt, restructurings, and turnarounds.

Jim Reynolds Jr. founded Loop Capital in 1997 as an investment bank specializing in bond sales for municipalities. Ten years later, with thirteen offices and almost 100 employees, Loop Capital was a national company and had brokered more than $800 billion of underwritings in equity, tax-exempt, and taxable fixed income markets. In the process of building its municipal finance and equity trading businesses, Loop Capital had developed close relationships with a number of government officials, large institutional money managers, and corporate executives. These customers began asking Loop Capital for help with other financial services, leading the firm to build corporate finance, tax-exempt, and taxable fixed-income platforms so it could offer a wider array of investment services. Municipal and corporate finance as well as equity, taxable, and tax-exempt trading were generating positive cash flow. In a field where failures were frequent, Loop Capital was thriving, and Reynolds saw great but untapped potential in the company's future. Over the past several years, Loop Capital had served as financial advisor to several municipalities that wanted to lease or sell public assets such as airports, toll roads, and seaports. Now he confronted several intriguing questions: Should he launch a $700 million infrastructure fund to invest in the types of deals the firm had helped structure? Did it make sense to invest in order to staff, market, and support the start-up of this new fund? If the fund was launched, should Loop Capital commit to the 1% investment likely to be required as the fund's general partner?

Learn how to start a new financial services firm/investment bank venture Learn how an investment banking firm becomes successful at doing a few things well Assess risks of expanding into a new line of business with a different business model Examine differences between investment banking and fund management, and between high-growth entrepreneurship and lifestyle entrepreneurship Examine the significance, if any, of being a minority entrepreneur

On April 22, 2005, Maytag Corporation's stock price fell 28 percent after the company reported disappointing first-quarter results and significantly reduced its earnings outlook for 2005. The company's sales were declining due to increased foreign competition and its production costs were increasing due to higher energy, materials, and distribution costs. Maytag's management and board clearly understood the need to make strategic decisions to turn around the fate of their company. Maytag could propose a drastic turnaround plan and remain independent, sell itself to either a large domestic competitor such as Whirlpool or a foreign firm such as Haier, or it could choose to go private by selling to a financial buyer (Ripplewood).

This case is designed to introduce and to practice concepts relating to the valuation of an acquisition target from the perspectives of a strategic investor and a private equity (leveraged buyout) firm. More specifically, the exercise is intended to address: (1) corporate strategy relating to takeover contests, (2) sources of value creation in acquisitions, and (3) valuation methodologies used to determine target company values.

Are hedge funds heroes or villains? Management of Blockbuster, Time Warner, Six Flags, Knight-Ridder, and Bally Total Fitness might prefer the “villain” appellation, but Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and HealthSouth shareholders might view management as the real villains and hedge funds as vehicles to oust incompetent corporate managers before they run companies into the ground or steal them through fraudulent transactions. Could the pressure exerted by activist hedge funds on targeted companies result in increased share prices, management accountability, and better communication with shareholders? Or does it distract management from its primary goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value?

To determine the benefits and disadvantages of activist hedge fund activity from the perspective of corporate management and shareholders; to examine if a hedge fund's suggested corporate restructuring could create greater shareholder value; and to explain the changing roles and perspectives of hedge funds.