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The purpose of this paper is to present some results of the development of parametrical regulation theory elements for computable general equilibrium models (CGE models), taking into consideration their peculiarities.

Theoretical results have been obtained by means of applying geometrical methods for variational problems and methods of the theory of discrete dynamic systems. These results have been used for solving concrete practical problems.

The authors proved a statement on the existence of solution for variational calculus problem on the choice of the optimal laws of parametrical regulation within the given finite set of algorithms for discrete dynamic systems. A statement has been proved on sufficient conditions for the existence of an extremal's bifurcation point of variational calculus problem on the choice of the optimum laws of parametrical regulation within the given finite set of algorithms for discrete dynamic systems. Optimal laws of parametrical regulation (on the level of one and two parameters) of economic system evolution on the basis of the examined mathematical model have been defined. The bifurcation line was constructed for the given area of uncontrolled parameter values.

The research results can be applied for the choice and realization of an effective state budget and tax policy.

The paper elaborates the elements of parametrical regulation theory of economic system development on the basis of CGE models and shows the effectiveness of parametrical regulation theory application on the example of one CGE model.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential for emissions control policy using the example of the power generation sector in China.

The analytical model is developed using a joint production function, where carbon emissions and electricity are jointly produced using capital and fossil fuel inputs. Abatement of emissions can be achieved by investment in production capital that improves the production efficiency or abatement capital that removes the emissions. The results are estimated using data from China's electricity generation sector.

The analytical model shows that economic growth can be achieved while still keeping the emission stock at a stable level. The results show that the level of the tax required to stabilize emissions depends greatly on the efficiency of abatement activities. As an illustration of this result, one finding shows that the required emission tax would be reduced greatly from 16 to 5 yuan/ton of emission when the abatement technology is improved from removing 10 to 30 percent of emissions flow.

The lack of carbon capture and storage technology in the real‐world limits the ability to estimate some of the results from the economic growth model.

Unlike many other papers, the empirical analysis is based on conditions from the economic model. In contrast to previous work that models emissions as an input into the production process, the model and estimation are consistent with the joint nature of electricity and emissions production.

This paper aims to examine the enforcement practices of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA) and argue that self-regulation simply does not work in the financial sector, as the sanctions available are neither applied with sufficient severity nor are the responsibilities for enforcement adequately divided between self-regulation, provincial securities commissions and the police.

The core compliance data for the study came from the IDA’s tribunal cases that were heard between 1984 and June 2008. The theoretical approach involves the invocation of classic articles by the likes of Stigler, Posner and Becker, the essence of whose conclusions is that institutions will act in their own best interests and cannot be expected to act in the public interest.

The findings show that over the period from 1984 to 2008, the severity of the sanctions increased consistently over the period. When penalty ceilings were increased, penalties increased. When in the latter phase of the period, public members (i.e. non-members of the industry) chaired the tribunals, penalties also increased.

Researchers can use the data to write a paper which asks “Why did the IDA tribunal penalties increase so consistently with time?” Future research could canvass various possible explanations, including the one presented in this paper, to focus sustained attention on the issue of self-regulation.

This study is the first to systematically examine the enforcement performance of the IDA.

This paper aims to provide a snapshot of key learnings about paid online peer-to-peer accommodation trading, as it relates to tourism and hospitality, and to identify future research questions.

The paper paints a picture and discusses research conducted in the past, which relates to paid online peer-to-peer accommodation, in brief. It also lists a number of specific research questions which should be investigated in future.

Some of the key topics, such as the business model of facilitators of peer-to-peer trading and the necessary regularly responses, have been extensively studied. The focus should now turn on how peer-to-peer trading of travel-related services can best be leveraged to the benefit of economies, communities and people.

The main value of this perspective paper lies in offering a succinct overview of research into paid online peer-to-peer accommodation and pointing to key questions for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the operational decisions of a manufacturer who produces multiple products and the government's selection of cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations.

This paper explores the production decisions of a multi-product manufacturer under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations in a cap-dependent carbon trading price setting and compares carbon emission, the manufacturer's profits and social welfare under the two regulations. Game theory and extreme value theory are used to analyze our models.

First, the authors find that the optimal profit of the manufacturer (the optimal cap) increases and then decreases with the cap (the unit carbon emission of product). Second, if the environmental damage coefficient is moderate, the optimal cap of unit environmental damage coefficient is independent of the product carbon emission or other related product parameters. Ultimately, cap-and-trade regulation always generates more carbon emission than carbon tax regulation. And cap-and-trade regulation (carbon tax regulation) can generate more social welfare if the environmental damage coefficient is low (high), and the social welfare under the two regulations is equal to each other, or otherwise.

This paper contributes the prior literature by considering the inverse relationship of the allocated cap and the carbon trading price and discusses the social welfare under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations. Some important and new results are found, which can guide the government's implementation of the two regulations.

INTRODUCTION During the past dozen years a relatively large theoretical literature has grown out of the models proposed by Averch‐Johnson (2) and, to a lesser extent, Wellisz (90). Averch‐Johnson (here‐after A‐J) pointed out the now famous overcapitalization effect‐that a monopoly subject to rate of return regulation has an incentive to use more than the cost minimizing value of capital. The A‐J model was at first regarded as simply a theoretical explanation of what was long thought to be a significant cost of regulation. After languishing in this state for several years, the model achieved some popularity as a vehicle for theoretical explorations of various aspects of rate regulation. To date, the A‐J model has given rise to nearly forty papers on what has come to be called “the theory of regulatory constraint.”

The purpose of this paper is to offer the theory of a parametrical regulation of market economy development, and the results of the theory development and usage.

Theoretical results of the abstract have been obtained by way of applying the theory of ordinary differential equations, geometrical methods in variation tasks and the theory of dynamic systems. These results have been used for solving a number of practical tasks.

The market economy development parametrical regulation theory structure has been offered. The approach to parametrical regulation of a nonlinear dynamic system's development has been suggested. An assumption about the existence of solution to the task of calculus of variations on the choice of the optimum laws of parametrical regulation within the given finite set of algorithms has been set forward. An assumption about the conditions sufficient for the existence of an extremal's bifurcation point of the task of calculus of variations on the choice of the optimum laws of parametrical regulation within the given finite set of algorithms is presented, formulated and proved. Theory application samples have been provided.

Future papers would be focused on studies of rigidness of other mathematic models of economic systems.

The research findings could be applied to the choice and realization of an effective budget and tax as well as monetary and loan state policy.

The market economy development parametrical regulation theory has been offered for consideration for the first time.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze manufacturers' production decisions and governments' low-carbon policies in the context of influencer spillover effects.

This paper investigates the impact of the social influencer spillover effect on manufacturers' production decisions when they collaborate with intermediary platforms to sell products through marketplace or reseller modes. Game theory and static numerical comparison are used to analyze our models.

Firstly, under low-carbon policies, the spillover effect does not always benefit manufacturer profits and changes non-monotonically with an increasing spillover effect. Secondly, in cases where there are both a carbon emission constraint and a spillover effect present, if either the manufacturer or intermediary platform holds a strong position, then marketplace mode benefits manufacturer profits. Thirdly, regardless of business mode used when environmental damage coefficient is high for products; government should implement cap-and-trade regulation to optimize social welfare while reducing manufacturers’ carbon emissions.

This study offers theoretical and practical research support to assist manufacturers in optimizing production decisions for compliance with carbon emission limits, enhancing profits through the development of effective influencer marketing strategies, and providing strategies to mitigate carbon emissions and enhance social welfare while sustaining manufacturing activities.

This paper addresses the limitations of prior research by examining how the social influencer spillover effect influences manufacturers' business mode choices under government low-carbon policies and analyzing the social welfare of different carbon emission restrictions when such spillovers occur. Our findings provide valuable insights for manufacturers in selecting optimal marketing strategies and business modes and decision-makers in implementing effective regulations.

This paper aims to investigate the interaction between capital requirements and pricing constraints as measures for insurance regulation.

In a theoretical model framework, the author derives the insurer’s shareholder-value-maximizing response to capital regulation, price regulation and the unregulated strategy as a benchmark; all three strategies are presented in an analytical form.

The paper demonstrates that risk-based capital requirements exhibit an efficiency advantage over price regulation and allow for lower premiums. Moreover, the analysis identifies situations in which price floors make insurance more expensive, but have no positive impact on the safety level.

The comparison between capital regulation and price floors provides policymakers with a methodology to evaluate which regulatory tool is more appropriate. Also, the article discusses that maximum discount rates for European life insurers could be ineffective when the new regulatory framework Solvency II is in place.

In all, the article obtains analytical and informative results with relevant implications for insurance regulation.