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China is a country with the most number of operating peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms (approximately 2,000) worldwide. This study aims to provide an overview on FinTechs in China. It was examined why payment services and P2P lending are so popular in China and what are the determinants for the emergence of P2P lending platforms in different provinces in China.

This study conducted a descriptive analysis of P2P lending in China and an empirical analysis of determinants of P2P lending in China.

This descriptive analysis shows that the surge in the number of the P2P platforms in China follows an inverted U-shaped phenomenon. However, the outstanding balances of P2P lenders is still increasing, while average yields of P2P lenders have sharply plunged. The empirical findings indicate that P2P lending is more extensive in the region with more mobile phone subscriptions; outstanding balance of P2P lenders in region is negatively associated with the size of traditional banking sector; and the number of the P2P platforms in negatively related to the fixed assets investments in region, whereas average yield is positively associated with the fixed assets investments.

Currently, almost no research papers with empirical analysis of FinTechs, especially P2P lenders, exist. This study estimates a simple model to find determinants of P2P lending.

Corporate governance has attracted enormous attention both in the area of law and in the area of financial economics. In comparative corporate governance studies, many people have devoted their energy to find a best corporate governance model. I argue that a functional analysis does not support the view that there is a single best corporate governance model in the world. I further use the transplantation of an English style takeover law into China to show that the importation of foreign law is not always based on careful analysis whether the imported foreign law is the best in the world. Furthermore, I use the subsequent adjustment of the transplanted English takeover law in China to show that the imported foreign law is subject to local political and economic conditions. If there is no best corporate govern model and the transplantation of foreign law into other countries with different social and political background does not achieve similar objectives, the search for a best corporate governance model is misguided. Just as tort law or constitutional law regimes may have diversified models, so do corporate governance regimes in countries with different historical, social and political backgrounds.