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The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain under the random precipitation.

Two game-theoretic decision models for the IBWT supply chain coordination considering water delivery loss without/with fairness concern under the supply capacity constraint and random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted and compared to derive the corresponding management insights and policy implications.

The research results indicate that the two-part tariff contract could effectively coordinate the IBWT supply chain and achieve operational performance improvement; the binding supply capacity constraint makes the water capacity to be allocated among IBWT distributors in accordance with fair shortage allocation rule and reduces the profit (or utility) of the IBWT supply chain and its members; the existence of fairness concern reduces the utility of the IBWT supply chain and its members; a lower precipitation utilization factor in the case with non-binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain while a higher precipitation utilization factor in the case with binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain; and reducing the water delivery loss rate, the mainline transfer cost, the branch-line transfer cost, the holding cost and the shortage cost and setting a higher retail price are beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain.

Two innovative coordination decision models under random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared through game-theoretic approaches to investigate the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain, which have enhanced the optimization decision theory for the operations management of IBWT projects and provided a better decision support for the IBWT stakeholders to make better operations strategies.

With the growing economic impact of e-commerce and the increasing trend of omnichannel mode, more considerate services can be provided to customers. This paper aims to explore the optimal practice of business strategies and enrich the research content of marine tourism omnichannel.

This paper studies the optimal practice of bundling pricing and service effort strategies between two tourism suppliers (TSs) and a travel agent (TA) who distributes complementary products in marine tourism omnichannel considering joint efforts of both sides. This study develops five models by Stackelberg and Nash game and introduces the revenue-sharing contract. All outcomes/results are analyzed and the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted to derive more managerial implications and business insights.

The main findings show that bundling price is directly proportional to inter-channel integration coefficient and service effort level coefficient, and inversely proportional to the price elasticity coefficient. TA tends to provide a higher level of service effort than TSs when TA plays a dominant role. Improving the service effort level unduly leads to a decline in profits. Moreover, TSs and TA can reach a win-win situation under the coordination mechanism and the marine tourism omnichannel can achieve the best performance.

A novel and useful approach towards joint equilibrium decisions of bundle pricing and service efforts in marine tourism omnichannel with complementary tourism products under different operational strategies is proposed.

In the context of the trade war in full swing, the global supply chain systems have experienced a serious shock and become very vulnerable. The purpose of this paper is to explore the intertwining effects between the export-supporting subsidy policy and the import-deterring tariff policy to develop better insights for trade policy-making under the intra-industry-trade (IIT) conflicts. The research results may provide the trade policy makers and international businesses with better insights in making rational trade policy and business decisions.

Two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical models for the dual competing international supply chains with a unilateral/bilateral tariff imposing or subsidy implementing under six different scenarios of IIT conflict are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted to assess the impact of the tariff and subsidy policies and derive the trade policy implications and business insights.

The research results indicate that: (1) the bilateral subsidy implementing from both governments is the best policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the highest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (2) the bilateral tariff imposing of both governments is the worst policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the lowest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (3) the fair trade scenario without tariff imposing and subsidy implementing turns out to be the second-best trade policy for the governments. Under the World Trade Organization rule and fair-trade principles, the bilateral subsidy policy is not allowed in most of the cases. Thus, adopting a fair-trade policy may be the most appropriate trade policy for two trading countries.

The modeling approach developed for this study is original and innovative due to the following characteristics. First, based on three trade policy alternatives – fair trade, tariff imposing and subsidy implementing – of two generic governments under IIT conflict, nine different combinations of three policy alternatives are defined. Second, excluding the symmetrical combinations, six IIT conflict scenarios under various tariff/subsidy policy pairs ranging from no conflict to high conflict are assumed for two dual competing international supply chains. Third, a novel two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical modeling approach is applied to investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions regarding pricing, ordering quantity and their critical economic outcomes for all possible trade policy scenarios. Fourth, this study lays down a research foundation for the future trade conflict study using a game-theoretical modeling approach.

Adopting an affective events perspective, this paper proposes and tests a moderated-mediation model linking coaching leadership (CL), positive emotion at work (PEW), proactive personality (PP) and constructive deviance (CD).

Altogether, 225 supervisor-subordinate pairs from 45 teams within a large Chinese manufacturing enterprise took part in our study. To keep common method bias to a minimal, two sources of data were used (subordinates and their direct supervisors).

(1) CL and employee CD have a positive association; (2) employee PEW mediates the connection between CL and employee CD; (3) the positive association between CL and follower PEW is moderated by employee PP such that PP strengthens the CL-PEW relationship (4) employee PP accentuates the indirect impact of CL on employee CD via employee PEW. Specifically, the indirect link is insignificant when PP is low.

(1) The results of this study enrich the CD literature; (2) the work puts forward a simple but foundational framework for understanding the CL process; (3) the third contribution arises from examining the influence of employee PP on the relationship between CL and employee CD.

In recent years, the People's Republic of China has made remarkable progress in science and technology. The Chinese industry is competing for leadership in cutting-edge technologies such as 5G, robotics, artificial intelligence, aerospace and green energy. This article aims to analyze: What role do industrial parks, especially Suzhou Industrial Park, play in upgrading technology to encourage independent innovation and economic development? How SIP is related to the Belt and Road Initiative?

This research summarizes China's most important scientific and technological reforms and policies and in particular the Torch Program. In addition, it develops a case study of the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) by analyzing documents, bibliography and presenting data. It ends with a case study of the role of SIP in the Belt and Road Initiative analyzing the Great Stone Park in Belarus.

This article highlights that: China's experience clearly shows that the "visible hand" of the State plays a very important role in economic development and technological catch-up. All of them are implemented from a strategy linking the national objectives with the local ones, this is done from a top-down perspective. As an important aspect of economic and social development, China's experience in promoting indigenous innovation in science and technology provides a relevant example for developing countries.

There are few academic literature on Great Stone Industrial Park.

The international cooperation of the SIP with the technology parks throughout the BRI-countries provides relevant information to deepen collaboration in this field and could contribute to closing the technological gap in developing countries.

The role of the SIP in the Belt and Road initiative is an under research topic. There is few bibliography discussing the impacts of the cooperation in science and technology in the framework of the BRI.