Han Sun, JaeHo Lee, Hyoung-Goo Kang and Zengrui Fan
This study investigates the impact of ESG rating disagreements on stock performance in the Chinese A-share market, focusing on immediate and short-term market reactions and the…
Abstract
This study investigates the impact of ESG rating disagreements on stock performance in the Chinese A-share market, focusing on immediate and short-term market reactions and the risk of future stock price crashes. Using data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, we analyze 17,006 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2021. Stock return data are sourced from the Wind database, while additional financial metrics are obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Corporate governance information is drawn from the China National Research Data Service (CNRDS) database. Our findings indicate that higher levels of ESG divergence significantly increase the risk of future stock price crashes. Furthermore, the presence of independent directors moderates this relationship, reducing the likelihood of such crashes. Immediate market reactions to ESG rating disagreements are also significant, underscoring the need for transparency and alignment among rating agencies. The study highlights the importance of robust corporate governance and standardized ESG rating methodologies to mitigate associated risks. Policy recommendations include promoting transparency in ESG rating processes and enhancing the role of independent directors in corporate governance.
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Wei Chen, Zengrui Kang, Hong Yang and Yaru Shang
The game strategies differ when different regions participate in the oil game. Under what circumstances will different participants choose cooperation or sanction strategies? This…
Abstract
Purpose
The game strategies differ when different regions participate in the oil game. Under what circumstances will different participants choose cooperation or sanction strategies? This is the core issue of this paper.
Design/methodology/approach
Regarding the current and future game behavior between different regions in the oil trade, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between two regions to explore the possibility of sanctions strategies between the two sides in different situations.
Findings
The research finds: (1) When the benefits of in-depth cooperation between the two regions are greater, both sides tend to adopt cooperative strategies. (2) When the trade conflict losses between the two regions are smaller, both sides adopt sanctions strategies. (3) When a strong region trades with a weak region, if the former adopts a sanctions strategy, the net profits are greater than the benefits of in-depth cooperation between the two regions. If the latter adopts a sanctions strategy, the net profits are less than the trade conflict losses between the two regions. There will be the strong region adopting a sanctions strategy and the weak region adopting a non-sanctions strategy. At this time, the latter should reasonably balance the immediate and future interests and give up some current interests in exchange for in-depth cooperation between the two regions. Otherwise, it will fall into the situation of unilateral sanctions by the strong against the weak.
Originality/value
There is no paper in the existing literature that uses the evolutionary game method to analyze the oil game problem between the two regions. This paper constructs a two-party evolutionary game model composed of crude oil importers and crude oil exporters and, based on this, analyzes the evolutionary stability between the two regions under sanctions and cooperation strategies, which enriches the energy research field.