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The authors address a two-dimensional (both customer acquisition and retention) incentive in a decentralized service chain consisting of a risk-neutral brand and agent (or averse). 

The authors focus on the relationship between acquisition and retention, that is, retained customers (repeated purchases) are based on and come from the acquired (new) customers in the former period. The authors also design a two-period separate incentive on both dimensions.

The authors found that a targeted incentive strategy should be applied for achieving more revenue when the incentive intensities are relatively small. Otherwise, the brand needs to adjust the targeted incentive strategy into incentivizing the opposite dimension, particularly on acquisition. Under the optimal contract, the brand needs to be very careful with deciding the fixed part of the incentive salary and the incentive intensities on both dimensions. For example, the fixed salary initially decreases and then increases in the incentive intensities. For the optimal incentive policies, the brand should incentivize acquisition but outsource retention if the agent is risk-neutral. When the agent is becoming risk-averse, the brand should lower its incentive intensity as the risk degree and variances become larger. Interestingly, the brand may benefit from introducing risks.

The study contributes to the literature by considering the following points. First, the authors extend the principal-agent incentive model by considering two-period decisions of customer acquisition and retention. Second, based on the two-period principal-agent problem, the authors design separate incentive intensities on acquisition and retention, respectively. While, most of the literature focused on acquisition incentives. Third, different from other works focusing on either risk-neutral or risk-averse environments, the authors consider both and compare the cases of risk-neutral and risk-averse to analyze the impact of risk on the optimal decisions and the brand's expected profit.

This study aims to investigate the impact of liquidity creation (LC) on the profitability and stability of banks while considering the moderating role of corruption.

Panel data from 23 conventional banks and five Islamic banks in Pakistan spanning from 2008 to 2021 were used for analysis. The study used fixed effect and random effect models, along with the generalized method of moments estimation to ensure robustness of the results.

The study reveals a negative relationship between LC and banking profitability, but a positive association with banking stability. Additionally, corruption is found to play a moderating role in the relationship between LC, profitability and stability in the banking sector of Pakistan.

The findings have practical implications for bank managers and investors, emphasizing the negative relationship between LC and profitability in Pakistan. Moreover, the study highlights the significant impact of corruption on bank performance, which can guide policymakers in formulating strategies to strengthen the banking sector and prevent financial turmoil in the future.

This study makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by examining the moderating role of corruption in the relationship between LC, profitability and stability in both conventional and Islamic banks.