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This study aims to examine the venture capital (VC) industry in China. It has demonstrated a history of high growth with significant variations over time. The authors have examined the trends and determinants of VC investments in China over a 20-year period from 1995 to 2014. They find that the aggregate amount of VC investments, the total number of venture deals and the average amount of venture investments per deal in China are all significantly impacted by macroeconomic conditions (i.e. GDP, export, money supply), technology innovations and financial market indicators (i.e. initial public offerings (IPOs), interest rate, price-to-earnings ratio, etc.). They also find that the 2007 China A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent global financial crisis have motivated VCists in China to adjust their investment strategies and risk levels by allocating more capital to later-stage investments and securing more deals with later-round financings. However, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the China’s venture industry has recovered faster compared to the US counterpart response.

The authors first perform trend analysis of VC investments at an aggregate level, by stages of development, and across industry from 1995 to 2014.To test H1 and H2, the authors use multiple regression models with lagged explanatory variables. To test H3, the authors use univariate tests to compare the measures of VC investments at an aggregate level, stage funds ratios, stage deals ratios and financing series ratios during both a five-year and seven-year time windows around the 2007 A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent financial crisis.

The development of the VC industry in China has demonstrated a history of high growth with significant variation over time. The authors find that the aggregate amount of VC investments, the total number of venture deals and the average amount of venture investments per deal in China are all significantly impacted by macroeconomic conditions (i.e. GDP, export, money supply), technology innovations and financial market indicators (i.e. IPOs, interest rate, price-to-earnings ratio, etc.). The authors also find that the 2007 China A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent global financial crisis have motivated VCists in China to adjust their investment strategies and risk by allocating more capital to later-stage investments and securing more deals with later-round financings. However, the China VC industry has recovered faster compared to the USA just after the 2008 global financial crisis.

There are also limitations in the study. The VC data in China in the earlier 1990s might not be very reliable due to the quality of statistics. Therefore, the trend analysis and discussions mainly focus on the time after 2000. Also, the authors cannot find VC financing sequence data for the analysis. Second, there is no doubt that the policy impact from Chinese transforming economic system and government policies on its VC industry is substantial (Su and Wang, 2013). However, they cannot find an appropriate variable to be included in the empirical models to consider this effect. Further study on this area would provide meaningful information. Third, although the authors have done comparison study between the VC industry in China in this study and the VC industry in the US documented in Ning et al. (2015) and discussed some interesting findings, more in-depth research in this area will be very useful.

The findings have meaningful implications for VCists and start-up companies seeking equity financings in China. VCists should closely monitor macroeconomic and market conditions to make appropriate adjustments to their risk and investment strategies. Entrepreneurs seeking equity financings for their business could also monitor the identified macroeconomic and market indicators, which can help them with their timing and to negotiate a better equity financing deal. VC financing is more likely to succeed when key macroeconomic and market indicators become favorable.

This paper contributes to the literature by testing the supply and demand theory on the VC market proposed by Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1998) from the macroeconomic perspective using 20 years’ VC data from China. The authors also examine how the 2007 A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent financial crisis affected VCists to adjust their risk levels and investment strategies. It provides useful information for international academia and policymakers to understand the quick rise of China VC industry. The authors also find that the macroeconomic drivers of VC industry are somewhat different under different economic systems.

This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.

This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.

Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.

This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.

For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.

The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.

This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

The impact of globalization and worldwide competition has become excruciatingly noticeable in China. The purpose of this study is to examine China’s transformation of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to competitive, capable organizations by identifying the dominant challenges and forces for change to State‐Owned Enterprises in China (SOE), the nature of SOE responses to those forces, and the degree of SOE success in making the necessary transformations to compete in a global business environment.

This paper tests two moving average technical trading rules for four Asian markets. Our results indicate that moving average rules do indeed have predictive power and can discern recurring price patterns for profitable trading. Moreover, our results support the hypothesis that technical trading rules can outperform the buy‐and‐hold strategy. Break‐even one‐way trading costs are estimated to be high for all four markets. To confirm the test outcome, robust tests based on bootstrap and the related t‐tests among the markets are also carried out. We conclude from the statistical results that moving average rules are valid and indeed have predictive power. It is implied that the trading rules may be used to design a trading strategy that will beat the buy‐and‐hold strategy in the Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan markets. The contribution of the current study is that this is the first validation test of trading rules using four markets at a similar development stage and culture tradition; and in the tests, we use most current and longer periods than the periods used in previous literature. Our robust tests are unique and considered distribution‐free.

A new method of representing non‐spherical, smooth‐surfaced, axi‐symmetrical particles in discrete element (DE) simulation using model particles comprising overlapping spheres of arbitrary size whose centres are fixed in position relative to each other along the major axis of symmetry of the particle is presented. Contact detection and calculation of force‐deformation and particle movement is achieved using standard DE techniques modified to integrate the behaviour of each element sphere with that of the multi‐element particle to which it belongs. The method enables the dynamic behaviour of particles of high aspect ratio and irregular curvature (in two dimensions) to be modelled. The use of spheres to represent a particle takes advantage of the computational speed and accuracy of contact detection for spheres, which should make the method comparable in computational efficiency to alternative schemes for representing non‐spherical particles.