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1 – 4 of 4Yafan FU and Yangyang Luo
This paper aims to investigate how and when different dimensions of trust and contracts interact to influence the development to negotiation strategies. Specifically, it explores…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate how and when different dimensions of trust and contracts interact to influence the development to negotiation strategies. Specifically, it explores how different dimensions of trust and contracts are combined to influence dispute negotiation strategies when cooperation parties have or do not have expectations of continuity.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper theoretically identified and empirically examined the interaction effect of trust and contract on dispute negotiation strategies in contractor–subcontractor relationships, by developing a conceptual framework and conducting a questionnaire survey comprising more than 300 disputes in the Chinese construction industry. Hierarchical regression analysis was mainly used to test the hypotheses.
Findings
This paper finds that contractual control may weaken the effect of goodwill trust in fostering interest-based strategies in the presence of expectations of continuity, while it may strengthen the effect in the absence of expectations of continuity. Contractual coordination negatively moderates the relationship between goodwill trust and interest-based strategies only when parties have little expectations of continuity. Moreover, contractual control enhances the effectiveness of competence trust on fostering interest-based strategies.
Practical implications
This paper provides insights for practitioners to wisely use different governance mechanisms to manage negotiation strategies and generate desired outcomes of dispute resolution.
Originality/value
This paper provides a nuanced understanding of how the two types of governance mechanisms interact, by considering trust and contract as multi-dimensional constructs. It explicit the boundary conditions of both the substitute and complementary relationship between them.
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Keywords
Shui Bo Zhang, Junying Chen and Yafan Fu
The purpose of this paper is to unpack the “black box” of the relationship between contract and inter-organizational trust, both theoretically and empirically. Two mediators…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to unpack the “black box” of the relationship between contract and inter-organizational trust, both theoretically and empirically. Two mediators, namely perceived safeguard and restriction, are identified to build up two seemingly contrary possible paths between contract and trust from current literature. Both paths are tested in the context of Chinese construction industry due to our access to sample.
Design/methodology/approach
A survey of 295 contractor-subcontractor relationships from Chinese construction industry was conducted. A three-step multiple regression model was employed to test the mediating effect of perceived safeguard and restriction. Then, a hierarchical regression model was used to test the possible moderating effect of bilateral transaction-specific investment.
Findings
The empirical results support the mediating effect of perceived safeguard between contract and trust in the construction subcontracting industry. Bilateral transaction-specific investments enhance the positive effect of contract on safeguard perception.
Originality/value
Theoretically, this study contributes to governance literature by opening up the “black box” of the relationship between contract and trust. It provides a better understanding of how and when contract complexity impacts trust, instead of simply focusing on whether contract and trust act as complements or substitutes. Practically, this study provides guidelines for construction firms to decide the degree of contract complexity under various degrees of bilateral transaction-specific investments to enhance the other party’s trust, so as to improve performance outcomes.
Details
Keywords
The paper aims to investigate the prevailing institutional logics that underpin the organisational behaviours of Chinese contractors and the institutional complexity they face…
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to investigate the prevailing institutional logics that underpin the organisational behaviours of Chinese contractors and the institutional complexity they face across several strategic areas when they undertake projects abroad.
Design/Methodology/Approach
The paper draws mainly on industry literature, reports and government websites to develop a typology of two ideal types of institutional logics that prevail among Chinese international contractors. The configurations of institutional complexity in different strategic areas are analysed through pattern-matching.
Findings
Two main logics are identified, namely, construction and investment logics. These logics in turn lead to patterns of volatile complexity in the strategic areas of business, technology, human resources and marketing; patterns of aligned complexity in operational and information technology strategic areas; and patterns of segregated complexity in financial strategic area.
Research Limitations/Implications
The paper presents an ongoing doctoral research. It provides a preliminary understanding of the institutional logics affecting Chinese international contractors and sets out the first step to understand the relationship between complex institutional environments and organisational responses.
Practical Implications
Chinese international contractors commonly face resistance, and at times resentment, from the local industries in the countries they operate. The findings of this paper are a first step towards a better understanding of why this is the case and what can be done to rectify the situation and improve long and short-term project performance.
Originality/Value
This paper provides practical implications for Chinese contractors to understand their internal context of institutional complexity and provides the basis for further understanding of Chinese contractors’ strategic responses.
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