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Anecdotal evidence suggests that casting actors with similar facial features in a movie can pose challenges in foreign markets, hindering the audience's ability to recognize and remember characters. Extending developments in the literature on the cross-race effect, we hypothesize that facial similarity – the extent to which the actors starring in a movie share similar facial features – will reduce the country-level box-office performance of US movies in East and South-East Asia (ESEA) countries.

We assembled data from various secondary data sources on US non-animation movies (2012–2021) and their releases in ESEA countries. Combining the data resulted in a cross-section of 2,616 movie-country observations.

Actors' facial similarity in a US movie's cast reduces its box-office performance in ESEA countries. This effect is weakened as immigration in the country, internet penetration in the country and star power increase and strengthened as cast size increases.

This first study on the effects of cast's facial similarity on box-office performance represents a novel extension to the growing literature on the antecedents of movies' box-office performance by being at the intersection of the two literature streams on (1) the box-office effects of cast characteristics and (2) the antecedents, in general, of box-office performance in the ESEA region.

Megaprojects contribute greatly to China’s socio-economic development. However, the diverse stakeholders of megaprojects tend to be prone to conflict and plunge the project into lower performance than expected. This study aims to investigate (1) the optimal supervision mechanism under direct supervision of the owner and (2) the optimal indirect supervision mechanism of the owner, with involvement of integrated construction consultancy (ICC) in supervision and considerations into the impact of collusion between the ICC and the general contractor on supervision efficiency.

This study applies the principal–agent theory and game theory to design effective incentive and punishment mechanisms for direct and indirect supervision by the owner. Through the theoretical framework of game theory, it analyses the strategic interactions between the owner, the ICC and the general contractor, and evaluates the effectiveness of various supervision mechanisms based on Nash equilibrium theory.

The results showed adopting the direct supervision mechanism when the probability of the general contractor’s opportunistic behavior being detected was higher or the occurrence had a greater impact on the owner. However, the increase in supervision cost would reduce the motivation of owner’s direct supervision and prompt the owner to choose the indirect supervision mechanism. Additionally, the indirect supervision mechanism was more likely to inhibit the collusion between the ICC and the general contractor. Thus, increasing penalties for ICC would result in improved supervision of ICC, thereby improving the benefits to the owner.

This study examines the dynamic interaction between the owner, the general contractor and the ICC. The study establishes a game tree and game matrix based on principal–agent theory, and analyses direct and indirect supervision models to determine the Nash equilibrium and optimal supervision strategy that is in the best interest of the owner. The study advocates for improved management and supervision mechanisms and argues that tailored supervision mechanisms can significantly improve the performance of megaprojects, which is well validated in megaprojects in China.