The purpose of this paper is to explain theoretically the relation between large shareholders, legal institutions, and capital structure, then empirically deduce how large…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explain theoretically the relation between large shareholders, legal institutions, and capital structure, then empirically deduce how large shareholders and legal institution affected capital structure decision by integrating Chinese institutions.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper adopted cross‐section data of non‐financial listed companies in China and applied series of ordinary least square to empirically test the relationship between large shareholders, legal institution, and capital structure decision.
Findings
The empirical evidence provided by this paper indicates that large shareholders and legal institution do affect capital structure decision, specifically in seven areas.
Originality/value
This paper, based on the institutions of China, takes the largest shareholder, ultimately the controller, the relation of legal institution and capital structure into the research framework for the first time and systematically studies how the capital structure decision making is affected by the controlling shareholders, the nature of ultimately controllers, the concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders and legal institution. It is the first to empirically test whether the concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders and legal institution will affect the relation between controlling shareholders and capital structure, and compensates for the deficiencies in previous studies.
Details
Keywords
Juan Chen, Hongling Guo and Zuoping Xiao
This study aims to investigate how high-speed railway (HSR) development affects urban construction investment (UCI) bond yield spreads based on China’s background.
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate how high-speed railway (HSR) development affects urban construction investment (UCI) bond yield spreads based on China’s background.
Design/methodology/approach
This study constructs a quasi-natural experiment and adopts regression analyses to empirically examine the relation between HSR development and UCI bond yield spreads. The empirical analysis is based on a Chinese sample of 15,109 bond offering observations from 2008 to 2019.
Findings
The results show that HSR development reduces UCI bond yield spreads. Mechanistic analysis shows that HSR development increases land prices and the level of urbanization, which in turn lowers the UCI bond yield spreads. In addition, the impact of HSR development on UCI bond yield spreads is more significant at higher marketization levels and lower degrees of dependence on land finance cities where UCI corporations are located.
Research limitations/implications
The results imply that transportation infrastructure improvement, such as HSR development, helps to enhance the credit of local governments and the solvency of UCI corporations and ultimately reduces the financing cost of UCI bonds.
Originality/value
This paper provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for the impact of transportation infrastructure construction on the implicit debt risks of local governments in China, which enriches the research on the “HSR economy” from a micro perspective and expands the research on the influencing factors of local governments’ debt risk.
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Keywords
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test how ultimate controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and government intervention affect choice of capital…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test how ultimate controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and government intervention affect choice of capital structure (CS), and how the relationship between controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and choice of CS is affected by government intervention.
Design/methodology/approach
Integrating the institutional background of China, the paper adopts balanced panel data containing related continuously obtainable information of 1,076 non‐financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2004 to 2008 (a total of 5,380 observed values), and applies a series of generalised least squares to empirically test how ultimate controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and government intervention affect choice of CS, and how the relationship between controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and choice of CS is affected by government intervention.
Findings
The empirical evidence provided by this paper indicates that: controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence is negatively correlated with leverage; government intervention is positively correlated with leverage; and government intervention will weaken the negative relationship between controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and leverage, and make debt capital suppliers (especially financial institutions like banks, etc.) provide loans, especially long‐term ones, to companies with high ownership‐control rights divergence.
Originality/value
So far, it is still little‐known how ownership‐control rights divergence affects choice of CS and how government intervention affects the relationship between ownership and control rights divergence and choices of CS. This paper is the first to test how ultimate controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and government intervention affect choice of CS, and how the relationship between controlling shareholders' ownership‐control rights divergence and choice of CS is affected by government intervention based on the institutional background of China.