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Daily COVID-19-related morbidity and mortality rates are still high globally, and masking is considered a reliable method of preventing its infections. Yet, the rate of voluntary compliance with masking remains very low in most parts of the world, especially in developing countries. The authors hypothesize that the decision to wear a mask entails some benefit-cost analysis that involves time discounting. In addition, the authors surmise that feel-good benefits from pro-social behavior and from wearing fashionable masks are substantial.

The study is based on a survey of 900 fishermen and fish traders in Ghana. A simple experiment was designed to elicit individual rates of time preference. In addition, the fishers were asked questions about their political affiliation and knowledge of the COVID-19 pandemic, among others. A logit model is used to investigate the determinants of the decision to wear a mask.

The authors found that masking compliance increases in time discounting for fishmongers, suggesting that private benefits from pro-social behavior or feel-good benefits from wearing a mask are very strong. In addition, those who belonged to the ruling political party were more likely to wear a mask. Other factors increasing the likelihood of masking include affiliation with the ruling political party, knowledge of COVID-19 and knowledge of someone who lost his/her job due to COVID-19.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the effect of time discounting on the voluntary compliance of a health safety measure, which could provide a direct utility. In addition, the study explores the effect of political affiliation on voluntary masking behavior.

The formal model of economics of crime developed by Becker is based on the assumption that a miscreant knows with certainty the benefit that accrues to a criminal activity. The purpose of this paper is to relax this assumption and establish a link between technical efficiency and commission of fishery crimes in a developing country where fishing techniques are rudimentary making catch volumes uncertain.

The paper extends the neoclassical model of crime developed by Becker to account for catch uncertainties. The extended model predicts that, in addition to the risk and severity of punishment, less skilful fishermen are more likely to violate effort‐limiting fishing regulations. Primary data were obtained through a survey of 258 artisanal fishermen from the Central and Western Regions of Ghana to test the predictions of the model.

The prediction that less skillful fishers are more likely to violate effort‐limiting fishing regulations is confirmed by the data. Other factors that determined the rate of violation of the fishing regulation include the risk of detection, severity of punishment, rate of time preference, age of the fisher, perceived legitimacy of the regulation and respect for religious norms.

If returns to illegal activities are uncertain, policies that improve the efficiency of potential violators may decrease the rate or extent of violation. Moreover, minimizing overfishing will improve livelihood and reduce poverty among fishers.

The paper makes a novel attempt at linking efficiency (or skills) to violation of regulations.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically verify whether “unfettered” judicial discretion in developing countries breeds corruption or not as judges could favour elites who have access to more money to steal or punish the poor who are petty‐thieves rather harshly.

The paper employs Suits index and regression analysis to investigate the relationship between the amount stolen and jail time. The index which is based on Lorenz curve is used to verify whether punishment for theft cases prosecuted in Ghana is anti‐petty theft, neutral, or anti‐serious theft. The regression analysis is used to explore the determinants of punishment per unit of the crime (i.e. amount stolen).

The results strongly support the claim that disproportionate penalty is assigned to petty thefts committed mostly by the poor and non‐elites. Moreover, the regression line which is almost a perfect fit indicates penalty per unit of the amount stolen decreases by 0.8 percent if the total amount stolen increases by 1 percent.

Due to poor records on criminals, there was very limited information on recidivism, hence this was not considered in the analysis. Second, there are much more theft convictions each year in Ghana than the sample represents. However, since the convicted cases used are random, the results are reliable enough.

Granting enormous discretionary powers to judges in developing countries may not guarantee retributive justice. Indeed the judiciary is likely to grant favours to elites who steal more and punish the poor who normally engage in petty theft disproportionately. Consequently, high discretionary powers to judges could potentially result in high blue and white collar crimes.

The paper makes a novel attempt at employing Suits index and regression analysis to verify the feasibility of retributive justice in the presence of unlimited discretionary powers.