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This paper sets out to analyze the current global financial crisis that originated in the US subprime mortgage market through the lens of the Kindleberger‐Aliber‐Minsky (KAM) paradigm as set forth in Kindleberger and Aliber's Manias, Panics and Crashes, to first examine the bubble's origins in the displacement caused by the internet collapse, the subsequent US recession, and the aggressive lowering of US interest rates. It shows how these events, combined with other technological and regulatory factors, resulted in a US housing bubble fueled by the aggressive securitization of mortgages by many large financial institutions, a reduction in their credit standards, and a lack of regulatory oversight. In this way it assesses the prime players in the process in terms of motivation and performance.

The paper explores how the process peaked and began to unravel as cash flows at the base of the financial pyramid built through securitization slowed. Once the supporting cash flow came under pressure and was questioned, several major players went bankrupt or took tremendous losses. It became apparent that risk and innovation had been improperly balanced, a prime characteristic of the KAM paradigm. Indeed, greed, innovation, and technology had combined to substantially reduce credit quality and increase leverage, vastly expanding the likelihood of a liquidity crisis and a substantial drop in the value of asset‐backed securities.

The analysis then examines why this effect had significant global dimensions, unlike, for example, the Japanese real estate and stock market collapse or the US internet boom and bust. The analysis also shows how market reactions have been in line with what might be expected under the KAM paradigm. It also conforms with what Robert Shiller and Edward Gramlich anticipated and with normal bank behavior in a credit crisis.

The paper assesses the policy responses to the crisis and their likely success under a KAM paradigm analysis. The proposed remedies already include the aggressive fiscal and lender of last resort monetary responses typical of the KAM paradigm but regulatory measures too. Further, as KAM notes, almost all booms and crashes involve scandals and scams. So not surprisingly there has been growing recourse to the courts seeking criminal and civil remedies. Also typical of such a dramatic boom and bust, governments are examining regulatory and legislative actions to address the current difficult economic and credit situation and to make sure that similar things do not occur in the future. But politics and a US presidential election are driving significant differences in approach. Under these circumstances what can the lens of the KAM paradigm tell us about the actions taken or proposed and what is or is not likely to work?

This research chapter argues lawyers, not just bankers, for good and bad have been involved in all aspects of the current financial crisis. Indeed after examining and assessing various civil causes of action related to the “Mortgage Meltdown” and its aftermath, it appears if lawyers had been less involved or had raised warnings about legal risks as well as economic ones, whether the financial impact would have been so disastrous and widespread. Indeed by raising cautionary flags earlier, lawyers might have better served both the clients’ and the public's long-term interests. This view thus complements issues related to criminally prosecuting mortgage fraud that has also seen explosive growth and where lawyers have again played central roles. Lawyers have been involved at the back end too in terms of legislation or resolving issues such as bankruptcies and foreclosures.

The chapter examines several causes of action the media have reported being raised by various parties and how they illustrate the role lawyers, regulations, and legislation have played in the origins and evolution of the current crisis. The cases explored involve individual parties and class actions. The chapter also analyzes in detail a case representing opposite ends of the origination and foreclosure closure spectrum by describing a derivative shareholder suit against corporate officers and directors actively involved in creating the subprime mess, who were then sued for covering up the inevitable results from failed loans in the reports to shareholders. It thus illustrates the legal complexities emerging from the abuse of complex financial and organizational structures impacting many investors. Finally the chapter concludes by arguing there is a public policy need not only for financial regulatory reform but also for a tightening in the professional standards and regulatory penalties imposed on lawyers involved in such transactions.

Summary This paper presents the case for a geocentric approach to global strategy formation. It describes the geographic adjustments that are the embodiment of both attack and defence under global competition, and the geographic units that multinationals adopt as their primary organizational units to identify and carry out these adjustments. In addition to actions with local effects, global competitive performance demands actions from these primary units which will have payoffs accruing to other units. The geocentric approach to global strategy endeavours to identify and stimulate these cross‐unit opportunities through collaboration among units and the centre. The consequent needs at unit level for information on the global competitive situation are examined, as well as some common impediments to geocentric collaboration imposed by the design of planning, accounting and reporting systems.

International banking refers to the activities of providing financial services (banking) to clients (both institutional and individual) located in many different countries. This encompasses a wide range of activities, including transactions with foreigners and domestic residents relating to deposits and lending in domestic and foreign currencies, facilitating foreign currency transactions and foreign exchange risk hedging, participating in international loan syndications, and facilitating international trade finance for clients.

The foundation collection of the printed books now forming the Library of the British Museum was that of Sir Hans Sloane. This comprised about 40,000 volumes. To it was added in 1759 the Royal collection, begun in the time of Henry VII and inherited by George II from his predecessors on the throne.

By applying models of social and economic networks to financial institutions, the purpose of this paper is to address the issues of how policy makers can promote financial network stability and social efficiency.

The authors characterize the decentralized network formation of financial institutions in three stages through which institutions choose to become member banks connected to a central bank, bank-holding company subsidiaries or non-banks. Financial institutions choose one of the three roles in an endogenous process by considering the effects of sharing shocks among the members of the network. In the model, there is a social-welfare-maximizing government regulator at the center of the network.

The authors show that the stable equilibrium network is not always the efficient network, so the central authority must use policy instruments to ensure that the stable equilibrium network is as close as possible to the efficient network.

To obtain the theoretical results, the authors make assumptions about the utility function and risk aversion of a financial institution, as well as about the costs of network formation. These assumptions might need to be relaxed to bring the model closer to real-world institutions.

The results suggest that regulators must try to set their policy variables to make the efficient network as close as possible to the stable network.

The contribution is to incorporate concepts from social network theory into the modeling of financial networks. The results may be of use to regulators in maintaining the stability of the financial system.

Significant unemployment among adults with serious mental illness (SMI) is a well-documented problem. Estimates suggest that as many as 85% of adults with SMI are unemployed at any one time (Anthony & Blanch, 1987; Milazzo-Sayre, Henderson & Manderscheid, 1997; Rogers, Walsh, Masotta & Danley, 1991). Recent years have seen advances in the development and dissemination of a variety of supported employment services for adults with disabilities. When people with SMI are enrolled in services with a specific employment focus, they achieve employment outcomes (e.g. job placement rates, job tenure) superior to those achieved by people receiving standard mental health services such as day treatment (Bond et al., 2001; Cook, 2003). Supported employment is now considered an “evidenced-based” practice (Bond et al., 2001). Although supported employment approaches vary, evidence-based services share common principles, including (1) prioritizing client preferences for type and timing of work; (2) providing in-vivo and follow-along supports as long as needed; (3) viewing work attempts as part of a learning opportunity; (4) having a commitment to “competitive” employment as an attainable goal; and (5) not relying on pre-vocational training, day treatment or sheltered workshops (Bond et al., 2001; Mowbray, Leff, Warren, McCrohan et al., 1997; Ridgeway & Rapp, 1998).