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Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.

This study aims to examine the literature from the Web of Science database published on board committees between 2002 and 2023 and outline the quantitative summary, journey of board committees’ research and suggest future research directions.

This study examines bibliometric-content analysis combined with a systematic literature review of articles on board committees to document the summary of the field. The authors used co-citation, co-occurrence and cluster analysis under bibliometric-content analysis to present the field summary.

Board committee composition, such as their gender, independence and expertise, as well as factors affecting corporate governance, such as reporting quality, earnings management and board monitoring, all have a significant impact on board committee literature. The field is getting growing attention from authors, journals and countries. Nevertheless, there is a need for further exploration in areas like expertise, member age and tenure, the economic crisis and the nomination and remuneration committee, which have not yet received sufficient attention.

This paper has both theoretical and practical contributions. From a theoretical perspective, this study substantiates the prevalence of agency theory within board committee literature, reinforcing the foundational role of agency theory in shaping discussions about board committees. On practical ground, the comprehensive overview of board committee literature offers scholars a road map for navigating this field and directing their future research journey. The identification of research gaps in certain areas serves as a catalyst for scholars to explore untapped dimensions, enabling them to strengthen the essence of the committees’ performance.

Recent US reforms aimed at strengthening audit committees and their structure grant independent audit committees the responsibility to appoint, dismiss, and compensate auditors. The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between audit committee characteristics and auditors' compensation and dismissals following the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX).

A series of linear and logistic regression models were employed in a unique sample comprising of 2,393 observations.

It was observed that stronger audit committees demand a higher level of assurance and are less likely to dismiss their auditors. Further, an increase was found in auditor independence as measured by reduced board involvement and less dismissals following an unfavorable audit opinion. Overall results suggest that increased audit committee roles and independence after SOX contribute to auditor independence and audit quality.

This research has implications for regulators, auditors, boards and academics. The paper highlights that although all audit committees had to improve as a result of SOX, the remaining variation in audit committee characteristics continue to be important to the demand for auditor and audit quality.

This study is the first to consider the association between audit committee characteristics and its extended responsibilities after SOX.

Accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) represent an important recent innovation in repurchase methods. Although executives often mention signaling undervaluation as a motivation for ASRs, managing earnings per share (EPS) has been argued as a key alternative motivation in the financial press. This paper aims to investigate whether ASRs are driven by managerial opportunism (i.e. managing EPS) or managerial optimism (i.e. signaling undervaluation) and whether stock market participants see through these motives.

The sample consists of 293 ASRs conducted between 2004 and 2011. Firms suspected of using ASRs to manage EPS (EPS-suspect firms) were identified by examining actual reported EPS, as-if EPS (i.e. EPS that would have been reported in the absence of an ASR), and analysts’ consensus EPS forecasts. A logistic regression of EPS-suspect versus non-EPS-suspect ASR transactions was performed. Analysts’ reactions to ASR announcements and investors’ reactions to post-ASR earnings announcements were examined. Changes in post-ASR operating performance were also analyzed.

Twenty-nine per cent of ASR firms (EPS-suspect firms) would have missed the consensus EPS forecasts had they not implemented the repurchase. Managerial incentives – securing bonuses and maintaining reputation by avoiding EPS misses – appear to lie behind this opportunistic use of ASRs. Upward revision observed in analysts’ EPS forecasts upon the announcement of ASRs is short-lived, indirectly facilitating firms’ use of ASRs to meet or beat consensus forecasts. Investors, however, are not fooled by managers’ use of ASRs as an earnings management device. Unlike EPS-suspect firms, non-EPS-suspect firms exhibit positive abnormal operating performance during the post-ASR period, suggesting that these firms use ASRs as a signaling device rather than as an earnings management device.

ASRs can be used by managers to signal better future performance to investors. However, managers who intend to do so should carefully consider the timing of an ASR. Initiating an ASR when the company is facing the risk of missing analysts’ EPS forecasts may be interpreted as the ASR being motivated by EPS management concerns rather than signaling, diminishing the credibility of a positive signal intended to be conveyed through the ASR. Further, when considering payout policy and executive compensation decisions, corporate boards need to be cognizant of managers’ incentives for undertaking ASRs. The use of ASRs opportunistically to boost EPS is prevalent, and this action is followed by poor performance.

A number of novel results are documented using tests that are methodologically distinct from those used in related previous research. Notably, this is the first study to distinguish between EPS-suspect and non-EPS-suspect ASR firms and examine the determinants as well as consequences of using ASRs as an earnings management versus signaling device. One out of every four ASR firms are EPS-suspects. Analysts react to ASR announcements by only temporarily increasing their short-term EPS forecasts. Investors see through managers’ use of ASRs as an earnings management device. While ASRs are prone to managerial opportunism, a large number of firms use ASRs to communicate favorable information about their future operating performance to investors.

In this paper we report on the approach we have developed and the lessons we have learned in an implementation of the monitoring and control layer for continuous monitoring of business process controls (CMBPC) in the US internal IT audit department of Siemens Corporation. The architecture developed by us implements a completely independent CMBPC system running on top of Siemens’ own enterprise information system which has read-only interaction with the application tier of the enterprise system. Among our key conclusions is that “formalizability” of audit procedures and audit judgment is grossly underestimated. Additionally, while cost savings and expedience force the implementation to closely follow the existing and approved internal audit program, a certain level of reengineering of audit processes is inevitable due to the necessity to separate formalizable and non-formalizable parts of the program. Our study identifies the management of audit alarms and the prevention of the alarm floods as critical tasks in the CMBPC implementation process. We develop an approach to solving these problems utilizing the hierarchical structure of alarms and the role-based approach to assigning alarm destinations. We also discuss the content of the audit trail of CMBPC.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate practicing auditors' beliefs regarding the effect of prior involvement on the occurrence of quality threatening behaviour (QTB) during an audit. The authors examine the extent to which auditors' beliefs about QTB are consistent with the theoretical framework of Kanodia et al., according to which prior involvement in audit work would increase the likelihood of auditors suppressing evidence inconsistent with earlier audit decisions.

The authors conduct an experiment in which auditors assess the likelihood of perceived reputation threats associated with encountering disconfirming evidence late in the audit, and the likelihood that such evidence will be suppressed.

Auditors participating in the study believe that prior involvement will induce a perception of personal reputation threats in an auditor encountering evidence inconsistent with the conclusions of earlier audit work. Participants perceive an auditor with prior involvement in the audit work to be more likely to suppress audit evidence than an auditor with no prior involvement; this effect is largely explained by the personal reputation threats believed to be induced by prior involvement.

The findings provide important information, from the perspective of practicing auditors, about a situational antecedent of QTB that is present on most audit engagements. Prior involvement is perceived by auditors to induce a conflict of interest in reporting troublesome evidence uncovered late in the audit. These perceptions suggest it is important to raise reviewers' awareness of the possibility of undesirable behavior in such situations. Potential limitations of the study relate to generalizability of the results under different levels of misstatement risk and under different environments in audit practice. Also, the authors do not measure auditors' actual behaviour, but their assessment of hypothetical situations and beliefs about others' actions. Future research can examine actual auditor behaviour in the presence of prior involvement.

The paper provides evidence on auditors' beliefs about the effects on QTB of prior involvement, a factor that has not been previously studied in this line of research. The authors show that auditors' beliefs about QTB are consistent with Kanodia et al.'s theoretical framework. The study is the first to measure auditors' assessments of perceived reputation threats and to show their mediating effect on the predicted behavior of audit professionals.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the role of securitised real estate within the confines of a multi‐asset investment portfolio and to identify if indeed securitised real estate can afford investors the desired investment benefits of direct property investment whilst mitigating many of the recognised barriers and risks.

The paper employs a suite of analytical techniques; lead‐lag correlations are utilised to examine market dynamics between listed and direct real estate markets across jurisdictions. Grainger causality and co‐integration techniques are applied to examine the nature and extent of relationships between investment markets with optimal portfolio analysis utilised to explore the role of securitised real estate and the optimum weighting allocation within the confines of a multi‐asset investment portfolio.

The findings demonstrated the unresponsive nature of direct real estate markets relative to listed real estate markets – in some jurisdictions the extent of lag can be as much as 12 months. Whilst the research did not identify a Grainger causality relationship between listed and direct property markets across the jurisdictions, co‐integration analysis does infer trend reverting price behaviour in the long run (ten years) between direct and listed real estate markets. Optimal portfolio analysis serves to demonstrate the crucial role of real estate within a multi‐asset portfolio in terms of both mitigating risk and enhancing performance over the ten‐year time series. Indeed, the optimal portfolio analysis highlights the compatibility and complementarity of listed and direct real estate within a multi‐asset investment portfolio.

The question if securitised real estate is a viable proxy for direct property investment is as inconclusive as it is enduring. In contrast to the large embodiment of previous work, this paper adopts an international market perspective depicting the global nature of securitised real estate investment markets whilst also reflecting on the extent of co‐integration between asset classes and across jurisdictions during a period of extreme financial and economic distress.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of audit engagement partner's professional experience on audit quality. The authors also investigate the relationship between the audit partner's experience and audit fees in both Big 4 and non-Big 4 accounting firms.

Since the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) officially enacted Rule 3211 in 2017, US accounting firms are required to disclose detailed information of engagement partners in Form AP (PCAOB, 2015b). The authors obtained a sample of 2,283 audit partners from Form AP and hand collected their individual professional experience data through Certified Public Accountant (CPA) database, corporate disclosure and social media sites (e.g. Linkedin). Econometric models with fixed effects are used in this study to test our hypotheses. Two-stage least square (2SLS) model is used in the robustness test.

The authors find that the relationship between audit engagement partner's professional experience and audit quality is concave. It indicates that audit quality is increasing during the early stage of engagement partners' career and then decreases as the partners approaching the late-career phase. Further, the authors find that partner's professional experience is positively associated with audit fees in non-Big 4 accounting firms but not significantly associated with audit fees in Big 4 accounting firms.

The finding of how auditor experience impacts audit quality can be useful for accounting firms to better plan their staffing in auditing engagements. This study’s results are also helpful for small accounting firms to optimize their pricing strategy.

This study provides new empirical evidence about the relation between auditor professional experience and audit quality. Furthermore, the authors extend the literature of audit fee determinants by testing the joint effects of audit firm-level factors and auditor individual-level professional experience on audit fees.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the association between auditor-provided tax services (APTS) and long-term corporate tax rates.

The paper uses empirical data and multivariate regression models to explore the relationship between a firm’s use of APTS and their long-term effective tax rate.

An economically and statistically significant long-term negative relationship was found between firm levels of APTS and taxes paid. Further, a portion of this benefit is lost for some firms when returning to their auditor for tax services even after a short break.

This paper contributes to the debate regarding the value of APTS by providing evidence of the apparent long-term negative consequences to firms who reduce their reliance on APTS, perhaps even through the engagement of separate accounting firms for their audit and tax functions, although these consequences may be mitigated upon return with a significant increase in APTS. However, this is the first study, to our knowledge, to explore, in a long-term setting, the consequences of a firm’s return to their auditors for a non-audit service previously reduced or terminated. Additionally, further incremental contributions are made to other studies that look at APTS and tax avoidance by studying the long-term relationship which allows firms to consider the cumulative cost/benefit relationship between independence and knowledge spillover.